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COMMENTARY
How TO CREATE AMERICAN MANUFACTURING JOBS
By John Dewar GleissnerI
In An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the
Wealth of Nations, Adam Smith wrote that a nation's
prosperity depends upon "the skill, dexterity, and judgment
with which its labour is generally applied," and upon the
2proportion of the population employed in useful labor.
Economists watch measures of productivity and
employment closely. The unemployment rate is today the
single most prominent measure of economic health. By
these basic criteria, the incarcerated, approximately 2.24
million able-bodied Americans, 3 more idle prisoners than
any other nation, constitute a gigantic drain on the
economy. Very few prisoners produce marketable goods or
services.4 Most inmate labor is simply "prison housework"
1 B.A. with honor, Auburn University, 1973 (Psychology); J.D.,
Vanderbilt Law School, 1977; Practicing attorney since 1977; Author,
PRISON & SLAVERY-A SURPRISING COMPARISON (2010; 438 pages);
Prison Overcrowding Cure: Judicial Corporal Punishment of Adults,
49 CRIM. L. BULL. (Summer 2013); Blog Host, Incarceration Reform
Mega-Site. This piece represents the author's assessment of the U.S.
prison population and economy, and opinions should be recognized as
such. Uncited material may be found in the author's aforementioned
book.
2 ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE
WEALTH OF NATIONS I (Edwin Cannan & George J. Stigler eds., Univ.
of Chi. Press 1976) (1776).
3 LAUREN E. GLAZE & ERIKA PARKS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE,
CORRECTIONAL POPULATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES, 2011, 8 (2012),
available at
http://www.bjs.gov/index.cfm?ty=pbdetail&iid=4537.
4 OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., AUDIT Div., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE,
FEDERAL PRISON INDUSTRIES, INC. ANNUAL FINANCIAL STATEMENTS
FISCAL YEAR 2012, 5 (2012) ("FPI has industrial and service operations
7
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(i.e. helping operate the correctional institution) or the
making of selected goods for the government; only a small
fraction of prisoners work in factories or on farms, ranches,
or roads. Very low employment and productivity in federal
and state prisons is invariably proven by dividing total
annual correctional industry revenue by the particular
prison population. Prison industries often operate at a loss
and inefficiently utilize prison labor.5 What prisoners
might be earning under full employment in the private
sector equals or exceeds the direct costs of maintaining
more than two million prisoners.
Prison problems are not new. Prominent political
leader and diplomat William Eden, Baron Auckland, wrote
as follows in his 1771 treatise Principles of Penal Law:
"Imprisonment, inflicted by law as a punishment, is not
according to the principles of wise legislation. It sinks
useful subjects into burdens on the community, and has
always a bad effect on their morals: nor can it communicate
the benefit of example, being in its nature secluded from
the eye of the people." 6 When American prisons began, it
was immediately recognized that prisoners should work.
The vastly increased negative economic impacts brought
about by massive incarceration are relatively new in
at 81 factories located at 63 prison facilities representing approximately
8% of the work eligible inmate population as of September 30, 2012."
5 Noah D. Zatz, Working at the Boundaries of Markets: Prison Labor
and the Economic Dimension of Employment Relationships, 61 VAND.
L. REV. 857, 890 n.144 (2008).
6 WILLIAM EDEN, PRINCIPLES OF PENAL LAW 44-45 (1771).
7 GUSTAVE DE BEAUMONT & ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, ON THE
PENITENTIARY SYSTEM IN THE UNITED STATES AND ITS APPLICATION IN
FRANCE 23 (Francis Lieber trans., Carey, Lea & Blanchard 1833)
("Labour gives to the solitary cell an interest; it fatigues the body and
relieves the soul.").
8
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historical terms and have not yet been adequately addressed
by legislation.
A predicate for prison reform today is a thorough
understanding of the economic and social costs caused by
the current inefficient incarceration regime. No one has
successfully computed all the various direct, indirect,
social, and collateral costs of massive incarceration. The
value of moving offenders back into the workforce,
restoring manufacturing jobs, and reducing government
expenses and recidivism cannot be denied.
Brief History of U.S. Prison Industries and
Labor. "The earliest forms of prison industries work
programs date back to the late 1700s. Interestingly, many
of the dilemmas we face [t]oday, also challenged our
predecessors: the elimination of inmate idleness, program
self-sufficiency, the overall safety and security of our
prison system, and productive inmate employment without
undue impact upon private sector jobs."8
In the 1800s, several state prison systems were self-
supporting, ran at a profit, and informed their legislatures
that further appropriations would not be necessary.
Productive prison labor under the draconian Auburn
System created profits during three generations of the
remarkable Pilsbury family. Moses C. Pilsbury, Amos
Pilsbury, and Louis D. Pilsbury successfully managed
prisons and prison systems in New Hampshire,
Connecticut, and New York. The Pilsbury System, a type
of Auburn System, paid the cost of running a prison and, in
addition, paid money to the state treasury. Prison labor
made a profit to offset the costs of confinement, saving the
taxpayers money. Zebulon R. Brockway, the father of
' FED. PRISON INDUS., INC., FEDERAL PRISON INDUSTRIES, INC.




Fall 2013 | Volume 9 | Issue 2
Tennessee Journal of Law and Policy 169
rehabilitative penology and an admirer of the Pilsburys and
Andrew Maconochie, produced profits more than four
times greater than the entire cost of running a penal
institution.9 In 1888, the reformatory run by Brockway
claimed that 78.5% of its parolees were living orderly and
self-supporting lives.10
In his 1912 book Fifty Years of Prison Service: An
Autobiography, Zebulon Brockway outlined an ideal prison
system. Brockway said prisoners should support
themselves in prison through industry in anticipation of
supporting themselves outside prison; outside businesses
and labor unions must not interfere; indeterminate
sentences were required, making prisoners earn their
release with constructive behavior, not just the passage of
time; and education and a Christian culture should be
imparted. Brockway opposed releasing prisoners who
would clearly poison the outside world. Zebulon
Brockway's ideal prison system followed the procedures of
Wethersfield Prison in Connecticut when Amos Pilsbury
was its warden. Brockway believed prisoners would work
effectively to defray the expenses of their penal institutions
if given a share of the profits. The profit motive makes
people work much harder and smarter than if they are
forced to work.
Everyone agreed prisoners would be better off if
they worked usefully while in prison." In 1886, the
9 REBECCA M. MCLENNAN, THE CRISIS OF IMPRISONMENT: PROTEST,
POLITICS, AND THE MAKING OF THE AMERICAN PENAL STATE, 1776-
1941, 177-79 (2008).
10 ZEBULON REED BROCKWAY, FIFTY YEARS OF PRISON SERVICE: AN
AUTOBIOGRAPHY 297 (Patterson Smith 1969) (1912).
" This is still the case. MICHAEL B. MUSHLIN, RIGHTS OF PRISONERS §
8:1 (4th ed. 2013) ("The value of productive prison work and its
relationship to rehabilitation are widely accepted."); Stefanie Evans,
Making More Effective Use of Our Prisons Through Regimented
Labor, 27 PEPP. L. REV. 521 (2000).
10
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Second Annual Report of the U.S. Commissioner of Labor
stated that "[i]t is universally conceded that convicts should
be employed at some useful labor."' 2  "Certainly no
thoughtful, humane person, and most assuredly no trade
unionist, wants the inmates of our prisons to remain idle,"
labor leader Samuel Gompers wrote a century ago.13
American prison labor systems through the years have
included lease, contract, piece-price, public account, state
use, and public works labor systems, none of which were
wholly private or agreed to by the convicts.' 4
From their inception, affected businesses and labor
fought prison industries. Legislation and constitutional
provisions were aimed at the discredited convict leasing
and convict contract labor systems opposed by
progressives.' 5 Private industries and labor feared low-cost
prison labor and successfully pushed for debilitating legal
restrictions upon private prison industries. State and
federal laws began prohibiting and restricting the sale of
prison-made goods. In 1890, for example, the State of
Washington prohibited private employment of prison labor
in its constitution and mandated such labor for the benefit
of the state. 16 Opponents of prison industries and labor
12 BUREAU OF LABOR, U.S. DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR, SECOND ANNUAL
REPORT OF THE U.S. COMMISSIONER OF LABOR, 1886: CONVICT LABOR
(1887).
13 SAMUEL GOMPERS, LABOR AND THE COMMON WELFARE 110 (1919),
quoted in Stephen P. Garvey, Freeing Prisoners' Labor, 50 STAN. L.
REV. 339, 369 (1998).
14 EDWIN H. SUTHERLAND ET AL., PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINOLOGY 503-07
(11th ed. 1992).
' Wash. Water Jet Workers Ass'n v. Yarbrough, 90 P.3d 42, 61
(Wash. 2004).
16 Id. at 45, 58 (Even though "[t]he benefits of providing employment
opportunities for convicts [were] not in dispute," a state constitutional
provision, article II, section 29 of the Washington state constitution,
prohibited employment of prisoners by private enterprise.: "After [Jan.
1, 1890], the labor of convicts of this state shall not be let out by
11
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made the valid point that government-supported industries
are not fair competition. The U.S. Supreme Court agreed
that "[f]ree labor, properly compensated, cannot compete
successfully with the enforced and unpaid or underpaid
convict labor of the prison."' 7
Private prison industries came to a screeching halt
at the time of the Great Depression. The Hawes-Cooper
Act of 1929, "[a]n Act to divest goods, wares and
merchandise manufactured, produced, or mined by convicts
or prisoners of their interstate character in certain cases,"
took away the interstate commerce status of prison-made
goods, allowing states to bar them from sale.
That all goods, wares, and
merchandise, manufactured,
produced, or mined, wholly
or in part, by convicts or.
prisoners, except convicts or
prisoners on parole or






use by the Federal
Government, transported into
any State or Territory of the
United States and remaining
therein for use, consumption,
sale, or storage, shall upon
contract to any person, copartnership, company or corporation, and the
legislature shall by law provide for the working of convicts for the
benefit of the state.").
17 Whitfield v. Ohio, 297 U.S. 431, 439 (1936).
12
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arrival and delivery in such
State or Territory be subject
to the operation and effect of
the laws of such State or
Territory to the same extent
and in the same manner as
though such goods, wares,
and merchandise had been
manufactured, produced, or
mined in such State or
Territory, and shall not be
exempt therefrom by reason
of being introduced in the
original package or
otherwise.18
Many states rohibited the sale of those goods. In
Whitfield v. Ohio, 9 the Supreme Court upheld the
conviction of an Ohio seller of prison-made work shirts
shipped to Ohio from an Alabama prison, noting that "the
sale of convict-made goods in competition with the
products of free labor is an evil" recognized by states and
the federal government. 20  There was no discrimination
because Ohio barred its own prisons from selling such
goods on the open market.21 The Wisconsin Supreme
Court invalidated a Wisconsin statute that discriminated
18 Hawes-Cooper Act of 1929, ch. 79, 45 Stat. 1084 . This provision is
no longer explicitly codified as written to make the goods "subject to
the operation and effect of the laws of such State" (words borrowed
from the Wilson Act regarding liquor), but the general structure of
discouraging interstate commerce remains in somewhat confusing
structure.
19 297 U.S. 431.
20 Whitfield, 297 U.S. at 439.
21 Whitfield, 297 U.S. at 437.
13
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against convict-made goods from out of state by not
22similarly barring sales of Wisconsin convict-made goods.
In this depressed era of super-high unemployment,
Congress was in its damaging, protectionist Smoot-Hawley
mood.23 The Ashurst-Sumners Act of 1935, as amended in
24
1940, limited interstate shipment of prisoner-made goods.
In Kentucky Whip & Collar Co. v. Illinois Central Railroad
Co., the Supreme Court upheld the Ashurst-Sumners Act,
saying that "[t]he Congress in exercising the power
confided to it by the Constitution is as free as the states to
recognize the fundamental interests of free labor." 25 in
1936, the Walsh-Healey Act banned convict labor on
26federal procurement contracts. While these restrictive
statutes were passed by perceiving evil, valid exercises of
Congress's power to regulate interstate commerce and were
passed in a time of high unemployment, they were directly
contrary to the letter and spirit of provisions mandating
unencumbered interstate commerce in the U.S.
27
Constitution, nearly every other law Congress passed
22 State v. Whitfield, 257 N.W. 601 (Wis. 1934).
23 The Tariff Act of 1930, the Smoot-Hawley Tariff, raised U.S. tariffs
on imported goods, brought retaliatory tariffs, reduced American
exports and imports, and infamously increased the severity of the Great
Depression. See Ben Bernanke, Chairman, Bd. of Governors of the
Fed. Reserve Sys., Monetary Policy and the Global Economy (Mar. 25,
2013) (transcript available at
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/bernanke20130325a.
htm).
24 18 U.S.C. §§ 1761-62 (2006).
25 299 U.S. § 334 (1937).
26 41 U.S.C. § 6502 (2006) ("(3) INELIGIBLE EMPLOYEES.-No . . .
incarcerated individual will be employed by the contractor in the
manufacture or furnishing of materials, supplies, articles, or equipment
under the contract, except that this section, or other law or executive
order containing similar prohibitions against the purchase of goods by
the Federal Government, does not apply to convict labor that satisfies
the conditions of section 1761(c) of title 18.").
27 U.S. CONST. art. I, §§ 9-10.
14
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regarding the scope of interstate commerce, and free trade
principles expressed in later treaties with foreign nations.
"Prison labor, once viewed as indispensable for
restoring a healthy relationship between the criminal and
society, was made literally a federal offense."28 These
trade barriers in the form of criminal statutes are still
codified, with changes through the years, in state and
federal law. 18 U.S.C. § 1761(a) now states as follows:
(a) Whoever knowingly
transports in interstate
commerce or from any
foreign country into the
United States any goods,
wares, or merchandise
manufactured, produced, or
mined, wholly or in part by
convicts or prisoners, except
convicts or prisoners on
parole, supervised release, or
probation, or in any penal or
reformatory institution, shall
be fined under this title or
imprisoned not more than
two years, or both.29
In other words, manufacturing was limited to the
prison; each state could bar private businesses from their
prisons, which most did; and each state could ban the sale
of prison-made goods, which many did. Congress also
28 David Frum, Working for the Man, AM. SPECTATOR, Aug. 1995, at
49 (quoting Arizona Assistant Attorney General Andrew Peyton
Thomas).
29 18 U.S.C. § 1761(a) (2006).
15
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made it a crime to ship prisoner-made goods without
obvious labeling and provided forfeiture as a penalty.
(a) All packages containing
any goods, wares, or
merchandise manufactured,
produced, or mined wholly or
in part by convicts or
prisoners, except convicts or
prisoners on parole or
probation, or in any penal or
reformatory institution, when
shipped or transported in
interstate or foreign
commerce shall be plainly
and clearly marked, so that
the name and address of the
shipper, the name and
address of the consignee, the
nature of the contents, and
the name and location of the
penal or reformatory
institution where produced
wholly or in part may be
readily ascertained on an
inspection of the outside of
such package. 30
(b) Whoever violates this
section shall be fined under
this title, and any goods,
wares, or merchandise
transported in violation of
this section or section 1761
30 18 U.S.C. § 1762(a) (2006).
16
Fall 2013 | Volume 9 | Issue 2
Tennessee Journal of Law and Policy 176
of this title shall be forfeited
to the United States, and may
be seized and condemned by
like proceedings as those
provided by law for the
seizure and forfeiture of
property imported into the
United States contrary to
law.31
In 1934, at the time private businesses were
effectively excluded from prison industries, Congress
created a government-owned monopoly over the federal
prison industries and labor, Federal Prison Industries, Inc.
(FPI), which uses the trade name UNICOR. FPI's mission
is to provide employment and training opportunities to
inmates confined in federal correctional facilities and to
provide market-priced, quality products and services to
other federal agencies. By law, FPI minimizes competition
with private industry and labor.
(a) Federal Prison Industries
shall determine in what
manner and to what extent
industrial operations shall be
carried on in Federal penal
and correctional institutions
for the production of
commodities for consumption
in such institutions or for sale
to the departments or
agencies of the United States,
but not for sale to the public
" 18 U.S.C. § 1762(b) (2006).
17
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in competition with private
32enterprise.
Statutory passivity requires that FPI diversify its
activities and avoid obtaining excessive market shares. 33
Many state-sponsored correctional industries live by
the mandatory source preference requirements of their
respective governments, which restrict the purchasing
options of the sponsoring governments. When faced with a
similar situation at the federal level, private businesses
complained about the U.S. government's mandatory source
preference requirement in favor of FPI. Congress took
away FPI's status in several steps.34 The procurement law
was changed. Now federal agencies do not always have to
buy from FPI.35 But FPI can only sell to federal agencies,36
which greatly limits the types of products it can make. As
a result of losing its mandatory source preference, FPI is
losing money and prison jobs. Meanwhile, FPI does not
allow private companies to make goods in federal prisons,
blocking the exceptions in 18 U.S.C. § 1761(a) and 18
U.S.C. § 1762(a).
In testimony before Congress, FPI claimed that it
employed 25% of the federal prison population in 1998.37
FPI said that it provided jobs to 17% of the eligible federal
32 18 U.S.C. § 4122(a) (2006).
33 18 U.S.C. § 4122(b)(1)-(3) (2006).
34 NATHAN JAMES, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., FEDERAL PRISON
INDUSTRIES (2011).
35 10 U.S.C. § 2410n (2006).
36 18 U.S.C. § 4122(b) (2006).
3 Prison Industry Reform Legislation: Hearing on H.R. 4100 and H.R.
2758 Before the Subcomm. on Crime of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary,
105th Cong. 58-66 (1998) (statement of Kathleen Hawk Sawyer,
Director, Federal Bureau of Prisons, and Chief Executive Officer,




Fall 2013 | Volume 9 | Issue 2
Tennessee Journal of Law and Policy 178
prison population in 2008 and 8% in 2012.38 Thus, as the
prison population was skyrocketing, the percentage of
federal prisoners working dropped markedly. The outsized,
negative impact of the Great Recession on UNICOR
reflects a connection between prison industries,
government budgets, and, of course, the economy and
general labor market.39
UNICOR claims that "[s]ince 1934, [UNICOR] is
one government program that truly works in every sense of
the word."40 UNICOR's very limited success under the
legal and economic impediments it faces4' proves the
enormous economic and social boost a fully employed
prison force that operates freely in interstate and
international commerce while making profits and paying
taxes could provide. From 1934 to 2013, this federal
government monopoly, in terms of potential workers under
its control, grew exponentially. 42 "The federal budget for
38 FED. PRISON INDUS., INC., supra note 8, at 6, 16; OFFICE OF THE
INSPECTOR GEN., supra note 4, at 5 ("FPI has industrial and service
operations at 81 factories located at 63 prison facilities representing
approximately 8% of the work eligible inmate population as of
September 30, 2012.").
39 During major wars, prisoners generally are worked much harder and
more often than in peacetime, and releases from prison are more
common.
40 FED. PRISON INDUS., INC., supra note 8, at ii.
41 18 U.S.C § 4122 (2006); Coal. for Gov't Procurement v. Fed. Prison
Indus., Inc., 365 F.3d 435 (6th Cir. 2004) (detailing the limitations
imposed on Federal Prison Industries and prison industries generally).
42 In 1934, the federal prison population was about 12,000; in 2013, it
was 218,864. Compare Quick Facts About the Bureau of Prisons, FED.
BUREAU OF PRISONS, www.bop.gov/news/quick.jsp (last visited Oct. 8,
2013), with BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE,
PRISONERS IN STATE AND FEDERAL PRISONS AND REFORMATORIES
1934, 3 (1934) (about 12,000); see also A Brief History of the Bureau
of Prisons, FED. BUREAU OF PRISONS, www.bop.gov/about/history.jsp
(last visited Oct. 8, 2013) (In 1930, there were "just over 13,000"
federal prisoners.).
19
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FY 2010 contained $6 billion for the Bureau of Prisons, an
increase 9 f 1,712% since 19 8 0 ."43 Since the 1970s, state
prison populations have grown more than 700%."
In 1979, Congress authorized a limited exception
through the Prison Industry Enhancement Certification
Program (PIECP), a federally sponsored program to
develop partnerships between private enterprise and prison
labor. PIECP has proven successful in reducing
recidivism. 45 Under the program, which was created in
1979 and continued in 1990, prisoners must receive "wages
at a rate which is not less than that paid for work of a
similar nature in the locality in which the work was
performed." Because PIECP participants must pay the
prevailing wage in the area and meet seven other
requirements, only a tiny handful of offenders are involved.
However, this program merely "exchanges one debilitating
limit on prison labor for another." 46  PIECP inflexibly
requires employers to pay prevailing wages to a workforce
that, as a whole, is substandard in education, job skills,
43 THE SENTENCING PROJECT, THE EXPANDING FEDERAL PRISON
POPULATION (2011),
asca.net/system/assets/attachments/28 11/incFederalPrisonFactsheet_
March20112.pdf91304452236 (citing FED. BUREAU OF PRISONS,
BUDGET AND PERFORMANCE SUMMARY-FEDERAL PRISON SYSTEM
(2011), available at justice.gov/jmd/201 1summary/html/fyl 1-bop-bud-
summary.htm).
44 CHRISTIAN HENRICHSON & RUTH DELANEY, VERA INST. OF JUSTICE,




45 Marilyn C. Moses & Cindy J. Smith, Factories Behind Fences: Do
Prison 'Real Work' Programs Work?, NAT'L INST. JUST. J., June 2007,
at 32, 32-36.
46 Stephen P. Garvey, Freeing Prisoners'Labor, 50 STAN. L. REV. 339,
373 (1998); see also Coal. for Gov't Procurement, 365 F.3d 435
(dealing with multiple statutory restrictions on Federal Prison
Industries (UNICOR)).
20
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mental and physical health, sobriety, morality, human
relationships, industriousness, intelligence, security risk,
and general life experiences. "Paying prisoners the federal
minimum wage is economically unrealistic."4 7  The
prevailing wage requirement put on private businesses is
particularly onerous compared to what FPI pays its
workforce: "Inmates earn from $0.23 per hour up to a
maximum of $1.15 per hour, depending on their
proficiency and educational level, among other things."4 8
Historically, most prison authorities in America did
not work prisoners efficiently at hard labor in the now-
predominant "state-use" system. The state-use system
employs a small fraction of all prisoners. The
indeterminate sentence was effectively squashed because,
at the time, there was little by which to encourage and
judge the productivity or rehabilitation of prisoners. State
ownership of prison industries invariably decreases burdens
on the taxpayers. But those government industries do not
pay taxes and usually require subsidies or preferences.
Modern reform efforts must address the unfairness
issue caused by state-supported prison labor. The solution
will be through the private sector, which more often creates
social good, by avoiding, minimizing, or eliminating unfair
competition with labor or businesses and by recognizing
the more menacing threat of foreign competition.
Economic Costs of Massive Incarceration. The
direct costs of massive incarceration include food, clothing,
shelter, transportation to and from detention, health care-
including mental health care, suicide watches, and
medicines-and extra legal expenses for about 2.25 million
people in or for the federal government and states, counties,
47 Alexander B. Wellen, Prisoners and the FLSA: Can the American
Taxpayer Afford Extending Prison Inmates the Federal Minimum
Wage?, 67 TEMP. L. REV. 295, 333 (1994).
48 JAMES, supra note 34, at 3.
21
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and cities. Managing this high-risk population twenty-four
hours per day, every day, incurs enormous expenses for
correctional salaries, training, equipment, health care, legal
representation, real estate, insurance for high-risk
environments, utilities, and escapes. Direct costs build and
maintain a full-ride welfare state of 2.25 million prisoners
and the correctional personnel and property to manage
them. In fact, the direct costs encompass the largest group
of full-ride welfare recipients in the world. The average
prisoner costs the government about $30,000 annually in
direct costs. Direct costs may nominally be doubled to
account for indirect, collateral, and social costs.
"Prison costs are blowing holes in state budgets but
barely making a dent in recidivism rates."49 The total cost
exceeded $49 billion dollars in 2007, and in 2005 showed a
national per prisoner operating cost of $23,876.00 per
year.5 o The Vera Institute of Justice calculated that the
annual per prisoner cost to the American taxpayers in 2010
was $31,286.51. One study pegged the total annual costs at
more than $60 billion.52 That figure is still rising, taking
ever-larger shares of state general funds and crowding out
other priorities.53 The State of California paid $49,000 per
prisoner per year according to its governor at mid-year
2009, who also said the national average was then already
49 THE PEW CTR. ON THE STATES, ONE IN 100: BEHIND BARS IN
AMERICA 2008, 3 (2008),
http://www.pewtrusts.org/uploadedFiles/wwwpewtrustsorg/Reports/sen
tencing-and corrections/onein_100.pdf.
o Id. at 11.
HENRICHSON & DELANEY, supra note 44, at 10.
52 COMM'N ON SAFETY & ABUSE IN AMERICA'S PRISONS,
CONFRONTING CONFINEMENT 1 (2006), available at
http://www.vera.org/sites/default/files/resources/downloads/Confrontin
gConfinement.pdf.
53 THE PEW CTR. ON THE STATES, supra note 49, at 11-16.
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$32,000 per prisoner per year.54  Incarceration costs
continually increase due to rising health care expenses for
older convicts. "[W]ith one in 100 adults looking out at
this country from behind an expensive wall of bars, the
potential for new approaches cannot be ignored."
Forward-thinking criminologists, recognizing the lack of
good answers in penology, actively seek new evidence-
based techniques from other disciplines. 56 The nation may,
at long last, after taking on an additional 1,800,000 current
prisoners since 1980," be hitting a bottom.
It is not just the prisons that are overcrowded and
expensive. Officers supervising parole and probation often
have more cases to handle than earlier thought optimal.
"At yearend 2011, there were about 4,814,200 adults under
community supervision." 59 Each of those probationers and
parolees costs thousands of dollars per year to supervise.
Direct expenditures on police and the judicial system
increased by several hundred percent over the last thirty
years.
Both Republicans and Democrats thought that the
nation had ended "welfare as we knew it" when work was
required of welfare recipients, but Americans forgot the
54 Arnold Schwarzenegger, Office of the Governor, Speech (June 12,
2009), www.gov.ca.gov. Jails are even more expensive than prisons on
a per prisoner basis.
5 THE PEW CTR. ON THE STATES, supra note 49, at 21.
56 MICHAEL Dow BURKHEAD, THE TREATMENT OF CRIMINAL
OFFENDERS: A HISTORY 173-75 (2007).
5 WILLIAM J. SABOL ET AL., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, PRISONERS IN 2006
(2007); JUSTICE POLICY INST., THE PUNISHING DECADE: PRISON AND
JAIL ESTIMATES AT THE MILLENNIUM 1 (2000). The total incarcerated
population has declined slightly over the last two years.
58 NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, PAROLE, DESISTANCE FROM CRIME, AND
COMMUNITY INTEGRATION 35 (2008).
59 LAURA MARUSCHAK & ERIKA PARKS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE,
PROBATION AND PAROLE IN THE UNITED STATES, 2011 (2012).
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biggest group of unemployed welfare recipients. 60  The
millions of what can be considered social parasites that the
nation fully supports in prisons and jails went almost
undetected during welfare reform. And their numbers have
increased markedly. Very few prisoners pay for more than
a tiny fraction of their upkeep, with most paying zero. In
addition to the "welfare costs" of supporting idle prisoners,
actual welfare payments outside prison increase when wage
earners leave families.
Incarceration simultaneously creates more
unemployment because prisoners are vastly under-
employed. Foreign workers regularly fill labor shortages
outside prison. Massive incarceration broadens widespread
unhappiness and societal disruption. The 2010 Census
arguably counted a couple of million prisoners "in the
wrong place." The blockage of normal human
development and education are significant economic and
social costs.
Contrary to what judgments in criminal cases recite,
imprisonment "to hard labor" barely exists anymore. Most
prisoners are sidelined from strenuous, productive work by
restrictive legislation. While the Thirteenth Amendment
means or implies that the state owns the value of the
prisoners' labor, 62 Congress and most states do not allow
60 ROBERT D. ATKINSON, PROGRESSIVE POLICY INST., PRISON LABOR:
IT'S MORE THAN BREAKING ROCKS (2002), available at
www.dlc.org/documents/prison_1abor_502.pdf.
61 The Thirteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution states
as follows: "Section 1. Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude,
except as a punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been
duly convicted, shall exist within the United States, or any place subject
to their jurisdiction. Section 2. Congress shall have power to enforce
this article by appropriate legislation."
62 See Vanskike v. Peters, 974 F.2d 806, 809 (7th Cir. 1992) ("Indeed,
the Thirteenth Amendment's specific exclusion of prisoner labor
supports the idea that a prisoner performing required work for the
prison is actually engaged in involuntary servitude, not employment.");
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themselves or private businesses to use the full value of that
labor, despite the benefits of jobs for prisoners and all
directly concerned interests. 63
Prison industries and labor achieve the pinnacle of
imperfect economic competition. With rare exceptions,
only the prison system can employ any of its inmates.
There is only a single seller of any goods produced, the
state. One type of buyer, a governmental entity, is the
purchaser, but the state does not necessarily have to buy its
goods from prison industries.64 Criminal and correctional
systems exclusively control entry into prison industries and
all eligibility for work therein. The transportation across
state lines and labeling of prison-made goods is restricted
or prohibited. Governments control the supply of and
demand for prison-made goods while holding all of their
manufacturing workers hostage. This creates a double or
triple monopoly over a system of punishment that has
always failed in its original purpose of rehabilitation.
These government monopolies-by no means simple
ones-create substantial economic inefficiencies, an
enormous deadweight loss. If the U.S. government and
states were subject to antitrust laws, their monopolies over
.prison industries would clearly violate the Sherman
Antitrust Act in multiple ways. In the prison industry
Ali v. Johnson, 259 F.3d 317, 317 (5th Cir. 2001) ("[I]nmates
sentenced to incarceration cannot state a viable Thirteenth Amendment
claim if the prison system requires them to work.").
63 Garvey, supra note 46, at 373.
6 18 U.S.C. § 4124 (2006).
65 U.S.C. § 1 (2006) ("Every contract, combination in the form of
trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce
among the several States . . . is declared to be illegal."); 15 U.S.C. § 2
(2006) ("Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to
monopolize, or combine or conspire with any other person or persons,
to monopolize any part of the trade or commerce among the several
States . . . shall be deemed guilty of a felony . . ).
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context, the entire set of employment laws, including those
passed without prisoners in mind, is precisely the type of
social riidities associated with the long-term decline of
nations.
The American public would benefit if prisons
produced lower-cost goods. "In every country it always is
and must be the interest of the great body of the people to
buy whatever they want of those who sell it cheapest." 67
Instead of deriving economic benefit from prisoners,
federal law constructs impediments and uses their resources
without urgency. "The Attorney General may make
available . .. the services of United States prisoners under
terms, conditions, and rates mutually agreed upon, for
constructing or repairing roads, clearing, maintaining and
reforesting public lands, building levees, and constructing
or repairing any other public ways or works . .. .68 Due
to added security costs, low skill levels, and the importance
of heavy equipment, using prisoners to work outside prison
is the least efficient way to utilize their labor.
Prisoners, even if they work, enter a government-
controlled organization, monopoly, and welfare state. The
high unemployment and underemployment caused by
incarceration reduces tax revenues and greatly increases
government expenses. Economic disadvantages are greatly
exacerbated by the demographic changes wrought by
incarceration. Most of the 2.25 million prisoners in the
66 See MANCUR OLSON, THE RISE AND DECLINE OF NATIONS-
ECONOMIC GROWTH, STAGFLATION, AND SOCIAL RIGIDITIES (1982);
see also Zatz, supra note 5 (discussing a litany of prison labor
considerations under the Fair Labor Standards Act and other
employment-related statutes). Some prisoners today work in
inconspicuous prison-located call centers, a commercial service
business not mentioned in the protectionist statutes.
67 SMITH, supra note 2, at 493.
68 18 U.S.C. § 4125 (2006).
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United States are able-bodied, and the majority of them
enter prison as young people. As the number of productive
workers shrinks in relation to retirees, the incarceration
regime locks up two million workers and keeps them
inactive most of the time. Workers that are not in prison
then have to support this dependent population. In a nation
of aging retirees, the subtraction from the labor force of this
many workers has a harmful economic effect as it skews
the labor force.
For decades, the economic effects of idle prisoners
remained modest compared to the growing American
population that supported those prisoners, the growing
economy, and the growing technological achievements.
During major wars, prisoners were more often released or
put to work. Harmful economic effects increased as the
American prison population multiplied, manufacturing jobs
fled overseas, and demographic trends reduced the
percentage of workers in the total population. Historically,
society has not subjected the criminal justice system to
cost-benefit analysis. 69
As a result of incarceration, commercial activity
declines, but government expenses, inside and outside of
prison, increase. The private sector spending continues to
lose ground to public sector spending, with all the
inefficiencies that public spending entails. Payment of
child support, for example, declines as a result of
incarceration. Therefore, public assistance to the families
of those dependent prisoners increases. Transportation
expenses to and from prison visitation increase. Homeless
people commit crimes for the support advantages of
incarceration. And even some homeless people try to
commit federal crimes to enjoy the better conditions in
federal prisons.
69 Darryl K. Brown, Cost-Benefit Analysis in Criminal Law, 92 CALIF.
L. REV. 323, 338-39 (2004).
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Numerous monopolies inhibit prisons, including
monopolies over prison industries, labor, labeling, and the
transportation of prison-made goods, along with a failed
monopoly over the process of rehabilitation. Instead of
rehabilitating and producing goods or services, prison
systems are an expensive way to make bad people worse.
The only demonstrable economic benefit derived from
incarceration is that the incapacitation of 2.25 million
prisoners who cannot commit crimes outside the prisons
and jails while incarcerated prevents injuries to others.
However, crimes continue behind bars.
Government controls eligibility for work, hiring,
firing, and all of the wages, terms, and conditions of
employment. Security costs and risks, plus the low skill
and literacy levels of prisoners, make prevailing wage
requirements difficult to overcome. In addition,
governments own and operate most prison industries and
decide which private companies can operate a business or
industry in prison or with prison labor. All purchases,
sales, and transportation of raw materials and prison-made
goods are made by or tightly controlled through the
government.
Federal and state laws concerning prison labor are
the strongest racially and gender-based discriminatory
employment barriers in the country today, adversely
impacting African-Americans and men. Each state is free
to restrict the sale of prison-made items, and many do.
Various private sector efforts showed promise in the later
twentieth century, but none of them ever worked for more
70
than a relative handful of prisoners.
Prisoners are not accurately reflected in
unemployment statistics because the Bureau of Labor
70 SUTHERLAND, supra note 14, at 305-07.
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Statistics only counts non-institutionalized people.7 ' To be
accurate, unemployment statistics should count about 90%
of prison inmates as unemployed rather than subtracting
them from the workforce. If the unemployment rate was so
calculated, then the official unemployment rate would go
up approximately one half of 1%.
While the United States harms its own economy
with massive incarceration, Chinese prison-made goods
enter the United States against federal law72 with impunity,
often as components. Today, China incarcerates an
estimated three to five million dissidents, slackers, and
criminals in a vast network of reform-through-labor or
Laogai camps. 73 Despite international agreements and U.S.
statutes, products made by unpaid forced labor find their
way to the United States, and they are not labeled as prison-
made goods as called for under 18 U.S.C. § 1762. Product
components made in Laogai camps pass undetected. Many
internet sales that are conducted in English link to the
Chinese Ministry of Commerce. 74 According to the Laogai
Research Foundation, prisons produce large profits for the
Chinese government.
"Making Bad People Worse." Prisons are
typically thought to house predatory societies populated
with profoundly selfish people. Stress and fear of assault
n Labor Force Statistics from the Current Population Survey, U.S.
DEP'T LAB. BUREAU LAB. STAT. (Apr. 5, 2013),
http://www.bls.gov/cps/1fcharacteristics.htm#laborforce ("The labor
force is the sum of employed and unemployed persons. The labor force
participation rate is the labor force as a percent of the civilian
noninstitutional population.").
72 19 U.S.C. § 1307 (2006).
73 See LAOGAI MUSEUM, www.laogaimuseum.org (last visited Oct. 8,
2013).
74 LAOGAI RESEARCH FOUND., NOT FOR SALE: ADVERTISING FORCED
LABOR PRODUCTS FOR ILLEGAL EXPORT 10-11 (2010),
laogai.org/sites/default/files/pdf/lrfenterprise-ads-report.pdf.
7 Id. at 16-17.
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are common. Prisoners often feel threatened by their own
cellmates. The best current method of controlling assaults
in prison is to prosecute offenders, thereby lengthening
their sentences. Mentally ill prisoners forget to take their
medications; require complicated cell extractions using
protective gear, force, and pepper spray; and end up in
segregation.
Prisons daily affront human dignity. Prisoners
suffer from violence, fear of violence, self-mutilation, gang
influence, and racism. Many prison inmates suffer rape,
sexual and physical assaults, or death while incarcerated.
Congress passed the Prison Rape Elimination Act in 2003,
which set up a Prison Rape Elimination Commission.
Prisoners who complain about sexual assaults risk
retaliation by their rapists or other prisoners and are then at
much greater risk of future assaults for being known as
both "punks" (rape victims) and "snitches" (informants). 76
Rape victims can contract sexually transmitted diseases.
On July 31, 2008, the National Prison Rape Elimination
Commission said, regarding juvenile correctional facilities,
"It is particularly striking that fully 43 percent of those
incidents were reported to involve misconduct or
harassment by correctional staff-the very people who are
responsible for protecting these most vulnerable inmates."
Prisons readily breed infections, and diseases
multiply in prison. The Commission on Safety and Abuse
in America's Prisons found




76 HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, No EQUAL JUSTICE: THE PRISON
LITIGATION REFORM ACT IN THE UNITED STATES 20 (2009),
http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/us06O9webwcover.pdf.
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health care, endanger
prisoners, staff and the
public. Much of the public
dismisses jails and prisons as
sealed institutions, where
what happens inside remains
inside. In the context of
disease and illness, which
travel naturally from one
environment to another, that
view is clearly wrong.
The suicide rate for American prisoners is five to 15
times greater than it is for the general American
population. 7 Possessions are removed, family excluded,
and sexual desire frustrated. Gender segregation prohibits
normal sex. Sexual deviancy increases. Life is unpleasant.
Sanity depends upon mental toughness. Worries remain.
Most prisoners are unhappy. Many are unhappy all of the
time. Pagan, satanic, racist, and occult religious texts are
more popular in prison than outside. Fewer programs for
inmates exist than in prior years. Most prison cells are not
air-conditioned, which can be a medical problem,
especially in warmer climates. 7 8
The nation takes every prisoner away from his or
her spouse, family, and friends. The free world isolates and
abandons prisoners with long sentences. Many prisoners
do not receive any visits from friends or family.79 Solid
1 ALISON LIEBLING, SUICIDES IN PRISON 24 (1992).
78 Climate helps explain in part why (1) prisons began and were more
common in the North, (2) northern states today have the highest
incarceration rates of African-Americans, indicating hot Southern
prisons might be a crime deterrent in the age of air-conditioning, and
(3) Arabians disfavor incarceration over other punishments.
79 GRESHAM M. SYKES, THE SOCIETY OF CAPTIVES: A STUDY OF A
MAXIMUM SECURITY PRISON 65 (1958).
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barriers separate the prisoner and visitors during visits.
Gangs successfully recruit members in prison, spreading
their anti-social ideas and breeding virulent bigotry. By
being in prison, prisoners take on the penitentiary's sick
underclass values, codes, and dogma. The longer the
prison sentence, the more the values and codes affect the
prisoner. The closed environment of prison is kept from
view because prisons severely restrict the media's access,
routinely prohibit press interviews, and monitor and censor
mail and telephone communications.80 Dreadful things
often do not receive investigation or publicity. Through the
centuries, lack of communication between prison and the
outside world allowed abuses to go undetected inside the
closed prison environment. Prisons harm people in several
ways but do not make enough of them penitent.
Incarceration teaches depravity, affects minds adversely,
and then releases prisoners into the free world on their
mandatory release dates or on parole. Criminals learn
better how to commit crimes but not how to be productive
in the free world.
In the last twenty years, the use of segregation or
solitary confinement has increased markedly, worsening
outcomes and significantly increasing expenses for the
prison system. Solitary confinement-known as isolation,
punitive segregation, disciplinary segregation, segregated
housing, and other names-causes psychiatric harm in
manifold ways, especially to those with previous mental
illnesses. Solitary confinement can cause psychotic
disorganization, self-destructive behavior, delusions, panic
attacks, paranoia, and an inability to adapt to the general
prison population. Hypersensitivity, rage, aggression,
memory problems, concentration problems, and impulse-
control problems can also stem from segregated housing
units. Intolerance of social interaction is one of the more
80 HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 76, at 44-45.
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common results. With respect to the ill effects of solitary
confinement, Harvard psychiatrist Stuart Grassian said,
"The laws and practices that have established and
perpetuated this tragedy deeply offend any sense of
common human decency." 8' Prisoners requiring solitary
confinement are more frequently those who cannot obey
prison rules but are not usually the worst offenders in terms
of criminal convictions. Solitary confinement is on the rise
for disciplinary and security reasons and creates additional
expenses.
Prisons are therefore on a different planet compared
to employment-related legislation regulating free labor.
Those advocating employment rights for prisoners ought to
consider the employer's potential regulatory and legal
compliance costs. How many manufacturers would place
their operations in a prison, employ problematic prison
labor at prevailing wages, and then face numerous frivolous
lawsuits? There is no general federal or state right to air-
conditioning in the free world, but Southern prisoners
would naturally love air-conditioning. Prisoners live in
"sweatshops" as it is. There is no law for or against
boredom either, but boredom naturally makes prisoners
want real jobs. Federal and state legislation creates
approximately a 90% unemployment rate, exclusive of
prison housework, while bored prisoners stay overheated in
the summer. Reforming incarceration requires an entirely
new way of conducting business.
Recidivism. Prisons are revolving doors for
recidivists. The number released is about equal to the
number imprisoned. Every year, a large and poorly
disciplined American army of released prisoners-about
700,000 ex-cons-goes back to the streets. Released
convicts face many re-entry obstacles, most do not make
81 Stuart Grassian, Psychiatric Effects of Solitary Confinement, 22
WASH. U. J.L. & POL'Y 325, 355 (2006).
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the transition successfully, and huge numbers are returned
to the prison system. Prisons are, as Jens Soering's 2004
book title reveals, An Expensive Way to Make Bad People
Worse.82 In 2007, 725,000 prisoners were released from
jail or prison. Their suicide risk is very high in the first few
weeks and months after release. Carrying the "felon" or
"ex-con" stigma, prisoners often leave without much job
training, substance abuse counseling, or education.
Released prisoners replicate the trauma of slave
emancipation every day: they have trouble finding homes,
work, and food. A huge percentage of convicted felons are
unemployed when arrested and when released are often
unemployed again, immediately and several years after
release. Finding and keeping employment is one of the
biggest barriers to re-entry.
Offenders usually lack job skills and work habits,
and when they are released, they encounter a shrinking
number of low-skill jobs. Offenders cannot easily comply
with the terms of their probation or parole unless they hold
a job. Many prisoners are illiterate or only semi-literate.
One good thing that prisons often do is educate prisoners to
the GED level, but the public opposes paying for college
degrees. Some prisoners, especially young ones, have
never held regular jobs. Collateral sanctions bar convicted
felons from employment, positions, welfare, housing,
student loans, food stamps, voting rights, the right to keep
and bear arms, jury service, and other benefits. Their post-
release status injects them into a New Jim Crow regime,
82 JENS SOERING, AN EXPENSIVE WAY TO MAKE BAD PEOPLE WORSE:
AN ESSAY ON PRISON REFORM FROM AN INSIDER'S PERSPECTIVE
(2004).
83 LIOR GIDEON, SUBSTANCE ABUSING INMATES: EXPERIENCES OF
RECOVERING DRUG ADDICTS ON THEIR WAY BACK HOME 68 (2010).
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where they are second-class citizens by operation of law.84
As Emma Goldman wrote years ago,
Year after year the gates of




humanity, with the Cain mark
on their foreheads, their
hopes crushed, all their
natural inclinations thwarted.
With nothing but hunger and
inhumanity to greet them,
these victims soon sink back
into crime as the only
possibility of existence.85
Danger increases even more when convicts
go from solitary confinement directly to the streets.
Certain categories of released prisoners have a
problem staying out of trouble in the first three years of
their new freedom; many do not make it six months.
Released inmates typically end up back in trouble, jail, or
prison, having been unable to cope in the free world. Every
year, approximately 300,000 parolees return to prison due
to parole violations alone, usually because they committed
new crimes. In addition, the United States incarcerates
many thousands of probationers every year for violating the
84 See MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS
INCARCERATION IN THE AGE OF COLORBLINDNESS (2010).
8 Emma Goldman, Prisons, in THE CRY FOR JUSTICE: AN ANTHOLOGY
OF THE LITERATURE OF SOCIAL PROTEST 147-48 (Upton Sinclair ed.,
1915).86 NAT'LRESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 58, at 10.
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terms of their probations, for new offenses, or for other
reasons. Substantial recidivism keeps America's jails and
prisons full.
Returning parolees increase crime rates in their
neighborhoods. Offenders on probation or parole commit
a prodigious number of crimes, enough to turn the public
against these "alternative sentences." A study by the
Bureau of Justice Statistics of the U.S. Department of
Justice found that in the year 1991, 162,000 probation
violators were sent to prison and those violators-with
almost half using illegal drugs daily-had committed 6,400
murders, 7,400 rapes, 10,400 aggravated assaults, and
17,000 robberies. 8 9 With statistics like these, states and the
federal government eliminated or tightened the
requirements for parole and "good time." Over half the
states enacted truth-in-sentencing laws, which require
completion of most of the original sentence. The very best
modern treatment programs, cognitive behavioral therapies,
have a small but statistically significant impact on
recidivism rates, but these therapies cost money and are not
commonly used.90
Civil rights activists decry the New Age slavery of
prison followed by a New Jim Crow regime that has
87 LAUREN E. GLAZE & THOMAS P. BONCZAR, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE,
PROBATION AND PAROLE IN THE UNITED STATES 15-16 (2007).
88 John R. Hipp & Daniel K. Yates, Do Returning Parolees Affect
Neighborhood Crime? A Case Study of Sacramento, 47 CRIMINOLOGY
619 (2009).
89 ROBYN L. COHEN, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, PROBATION AND PAROLE
VIOLATORS IN STATE PRISON, 1991 (1995).
90 BURKHEAD, supra note 56, at 165-73; Mark W. Lipsey et al., Effects
of Cognitive-Behavioral Programs for Criminal Offenders, CAMPBELL
COLLABORATION (Aug. 9, 2007),
www.campbellcollaboration.org/lib/download/143/; Paul Gendreau &
D.A. Andrews, Tertiary Prevention: What the Meta-Analyses of the
Offender Treatment Literature Tell Us About "What Works," 32
CANADIAN J. CRIMINOLOGY 173, 173-84 (1990).
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created a new pariah class in our supposedly color-blind
society.9 1  While work is considered critical to
rehabilitation and re-entry into society, most employers
refuse to hire convicted felons or former prisoners. This
dilemma forces many released prisoners back into a life of
crime, continuing the cycle of recidivism. As a result,
correctional populations are huge. "Adult correctional
authorities supervised about 6,977,700 offenders at yearend
2011 . . . which includes probationers, parolees, local jail
inmates, and prisoners in the custody of state and federal
facilities."92
A large Bureau of Prisons study, Post-Release
Employment Project (PREP), found job training programs
in prison substantially reduce recidivism. 93 Another study
indicates job training in prison may benefit minorities more
than other prisoners.94 Other studies found little significant
effect, 95 but no studies find that prison labor and job
training increase recidivism. Hard work in a position more
closely approximating a real job in the competitive private
sector, allowing prisoners to accumulate savings,
91 ANGELA DAVIS, ARE PRISONS OBSOLETE? (2003) (using the term
"New Age Slavery" for the first time); ALEXANDER, supra note 84
(coining and explaining "New Jim Crow Regime").
92 GLAZE & PARKS, supra note 3.
93 William G. Saylor & Gerald G. Gaes, Training Inmates Through
Industrial Work Participation and Vocational and Apprenticeship
Instruction, I CORRECTIONS MGMT. Q. 32 (1997).
94 See WILLIAM G. SAYLOR & GERALD G. GAES, THE DIFFERENTIAL
EFFECT OF INDUSTRIES AND VOCATIONAL TRAINING ON POST RELEASE
OUTCOME FOR ETHNIC AND RACIAL GROUPS (1999), available at
http://www.bop.gov/news/research-projects/published-reports/recidivi
sm/oreprprep.sl.pdf.
9 See WILLIAM G. SAYLOR & GERALD G. GAES, COMMENTARY ABOUT
THE SCIENTIFIC MERIT OF THE POST RELEASE EMPLOYMENT PROJECT
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conditioning prisoners to a long work week, and enforcing
pro-social work environments under powerful management
is bound to reduce recidivism more than existing
government vocational training programs not focused on
profitability. A prisoner conditioned to work sixty hours
per week will easily work forty hours per week in the free
world.
Social Consequences of Massive Incarceration.
Given the social consequences of massive incarceration, the
questions become whether the United States deserves the
developments brought on by massive incarceration and
whether the country can benefit by putting its prison
population to profitable work. Macroeconomic
disadvantages, the expansion of big government, public
debt, a huge increase in the welfare state, social costs, and
the decline in personal liberty all prove that enormous
incarceration is harmful to the nation as a whole.
The economic and social inefficiencies and
disadvantages of incarceration are surpassed only by the
ineffectiveness of the punishment itself. From the
perspective of a behaviorist, prison is a poor form of
learning because the punishment is delayed too long from
the commission of the criminal behavior sought to be
controlled. Further, the behavior most often taught in
prison is to follow prison rules, not behavior for success on
the outside.
Massive incarceration is a social disaster. Indirect
and human costs of incarceration probably equal direct
expenditures. Child support payments virtually stop once a
prison sentence starts. Collateral social costs include
increased welfare payments and social services for the
children and families of the incarcerated. Increased suicide
and mental illness among prisoners and the stunted
development of human capital affect most prisoners. The
majority of prisoners do not perform much useful labor,
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and their earnings, job skills, education, and
entrepreneurship opportunities suffer or disappear. The
destruction of families and the imbalance in sex ratios
outside prison, particularly in African-American
communities, have long-term harmful social effects.
Families of incarcerated persons frequently have to drive
long distances for visitation. Overrepresentation of African
-Americans in this new pariah class also increases the racial
divide on economic, social, and educational dimensions.
Lowered rates of fertility result. Incarceration breaks up
families, marriages, and communities. The children of the
incarcerated grow up without parents and are then more
prone to criminal activity themselves. Marriage prospects
decline, resulting in less opportunity for stable home
environments that would otherwise decrease crime.
Correctional expenses crowd education funding out of state
and local budgets. 96 Barriers to geographic mobility are
erected, not just for prisoners but for their families.
"Nothing Works:" The Failure of Government
Regulation. The Effectiveness of Correctional Treatment:
A Survey of Treatment Evaluation Studies evaluated 231
different studies and found very little in the way of prisoner
rehabilitation that had any positive impact on recidivism.97
A simplistic summary of this survey arose: "Nothing
works." This sound bite sprung up based on a 1974 article
by one of the co-authors of The Effectiveness of
Correctional Treatment: A Survey of Treatment Evaluation
96 See NAACP, MISPLACED PRIORITIES: OVER INCARCERATE, UNDER
EDUCATE-EXCESSIVE SPENDING ON INCARCERATION UNDERMINES
EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITY AND PUBLIC SAFETY IN COMMUNITIES (2d
ed. 2011), available at
http://naacp.3cdn.net/ecea56adeef3d84a28_azsm639wz.pdf.
97 See DOUGLAS LIPTON ET AL., THE EFFECTIVENESS OF CORRECTIONAL
TREATMENT: A SURVEY OF TREATMENT EVALUATION STUDIES (1975).
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Studies.9 8 A decade later, Congress "recognized that the
efforts of the criminal justice system to achieve
rehabilitation of offenders had failed." 99 The Sentencing
Reform Act of 1984 abolished parole in the federal system,
sought to eliminate huge sentencing disparities, basically
madel all federal sentences determinate, said "punishment
should serve retributive, educational, deterrent, and
incapacitative goals," and found that "imprisonment is not
an appropriate means of promoting correction and
rehabilitation."' 0 0 From 34,263 federal prisoners in 1984,
the federal prison population grew to 214,774 in 2011, over
a six-fold increase, ' and this does not count growth in
state prison systems and jails in all fifty states.
Congress and state legislatures effectively
sabotaged rehabilitation in prison by eliminating the
indeterminate sentence, destroying the market for prison-
made goods and labor, and passing other ill-considered
legislation. At the same time, Congress and state
legislatures established state monopolies over prison
industries and labor. Prisons became enormously
expensive after the prison population proliferated.
American incarceration represents in multiple dimensions
the utter failure of over-regulation; it achieves the opposite
of the intended goal. A system originally designed for
rehabilitation actually makes prisoners worse over time. A
losing War on Drugs creates casualties but returns POWs to
the streets. Sentences to "hard labor" became sentences to
forced inactivity. Prison gangs gained power. Sentences
were lengthened through various means, though this had
98 IAIN MURRAY, MAKING REHABILITATION WORK: AMERICAN
EXPERIENCE OF REHABILITATING PRISONERS, available at
http://www.civitas.org.uk/pdf/Rehab.pdf.
99 Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 366 (1989).
1n Id. at 367; see generally 18 U.S.C. § 3582(a).
101 United States v. Diaz, No. 1-CR-00821-2, 2013 WL 322243, at *10
(E.D.N.Y. Jan. 28, 2013) (citing DOJ statistics).
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little effect on deterrence. Additional conduct was
criminalized. Paradoxically, most of the law and order
voices who favored tougher stances on crime, including the
author, were also proponents of private enterprise and
smaller government, yet the result ultimately achieved in
corrections exponentially increased the size, power,
intrusiveness, and expense of government. In 2010,
Michelle Alexander expressed great exasperation with the
failure of civil rights legislation and advocacy to prevent
creation of "The New Jim Crow" in an age of supposed
color-blindness. There is plenty of blame to go around in
every direction of the political spectrum. The invention of
the penitentiary and subsequent growth of incarceration
prove the power of unintended consequences. Societies do
not legislatively abolish all barbaric human traits because
those characteristics always seem to return later in
different, concealed, or unexpected places. They operate in
a veneer of civilization and only within the tolerances
permitted by human nature. Peace treaties can lead to war.
Laws intended for good sometimes cause violence and
disorder. It is thought that society sees the worst of human
nature in criminals, who obviously require extraordinary
handling.
The nation's rejection of rehabilitation was made
without reference to the corrective power of thriving prison
industries, which teach work skills and discipline. Studies
show the ineffectiveness of standard prison sentences
compared to the value of work and some alternative
sentencing arrangements.102 History proves prisons can be
profitable. Private prison employment would likely be
even more reformative, especially if employers controlled
102 Kevin Marsh & Chris Fox, The Benefit and Cost of Prison in the
U.K.: The Results of a Model of Lifetime Re-Offending, 4 J.
EXPERIMENTAL CRIMINOLOGY 403, 403-23 (2008).
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the entire prison environment as well as the work itself.
Work and crime are opposites.
Incapacitation: The Value of Incarceration. The
goal that prisons should be self-supporting has been
forgotten. The four remaining purposes of prisons are
usually said to be (1) punishment or retribution, (2)
deterrence, (3) incapacitation or public protection while
offenders are incarcerated, and (4) rehabilitation. Scientific
research on criminal deterrence fails to find much deterrent
value in incarceration.103 Indefinite prison sentences in the
future, to be served in places they may never have seen, are
not foremost in criminals' minds when offending. With
regard to imprisonment, "there is not a strong relationship
between objective sanctions and perceived sanctions."
The "dirty little secrets" in crime deterrence research prove
that the threat of confinement deters crime very little
compared to the massive investment in this punishment;
incarceration is simply not certain, severe, or swift. 05
Even though prisons fail in their goals of deterrence
and rehabilitation, there is one way they succeed:
incapacitation. When criminals are in prison, they cannot
commit crimes in the free world. Studies show great value
in temporarily preventing crime with incapacitation.
Incapacitation now ranks as the primary justification for
prison. A reputable study found that for each convict
released due to prison overcrowding litigation, fifteen
crimes are committed, at a cost of $45,000 above the
average cost of keeping a prisoner for one year.106 Dr.
103 Raymond Paternoster, How Much Do We Really Know About
Criminal Deterrence?, 100 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 765, 818
(2010).
1" Id. at 808.
15 See id.
106 See Steven D. Levitt, The Effect of Prison Population Size on Crime
Rates: Evidence from Prison Overcrowding Litigation, 111-2 Q. J.
ECON. 319, 319-51 (1996).
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Levitt found four reasons for the marked decrease in U.S.
crime, starting in about 1991: the rising prison population,
more police, the receding crack cocaine epidemic, and the
legalization of abortion. The National Institute of Justice
published a widely cited 1987 statistical study by Dr.
Edwin W. Zedlewski entitled Making Confinement
Decisions. Making Confinement Decisions found that it
costs more to release offenders than to keep them confined;
the study computed annual costs of $430,000 per prisoner
released. 08  Dr. Zedlewski's findings utilized a Rand
Corporation survey of inmates, which found the average
inmate was committing 187 to 287 crimes per year before
incarceration.109
One advantage of prison is that it gives young men
and women time to mature. After lengthy prison sentences,
older, more mature offenders are less likely to re-offend
violently than when they were younger. Some sober up in
prison. The incapacitation effect literally keeps crimes
from occurring. The early release of prisoners, brought on
by budgetary and financial difficulties, causes crime to
increase, especially in the large urban areas to which
criminals usually return. While logic and data will instruct
authorities as to the least threatening prisoners to release,
given current recidivism rates, the early release of multiple
prisoners inevitably causes an increase in crime. While
incarceration itself is harmful and may increase the
propensity of a criminal to recidivate, that increased
likelihood is smaller than the decrease in crime brought
about by the complete incapacitation of offenders while
107 See Steven Levitt, Understanding Why Crime Fell in the 1990's:
Four Factors That Explain the Decline and Six That Do Not, 18-1 J.
ECON. PERSP. 163, 163-90 (2004).
'08 FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING & GORDON J. HAWKINS, THE SCALE OF
IMPRISONMENT 93 (Univ. Chi. Press 1991).
'09 Id.
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incarcerated. Modern prisons do not rehabilitate or deter
crime very well, but prisoners naturally do not deserve to
be in the free world, where they would commit many more
crimes than they do in prison. The revitalization of prison
industries, including putting prisoners to work, is a prime
way to reconcile the value of incapacitation with reductions
in recidivism brought about by the aging or maturation
process. Those serving life without parole and other long
sentences make some of the best workers.
Past Calls for Freeing Prison Labor. Scholars
and some leaders agree about the need to overthrow the
protectionist regime. In 1985, professors J. Roger Lee and
Laurin A. Wollan, Jr. proposed a "libertarian prison" in
which prisoners were free to produce, run businesses, and
move inside the walls of prison, subject of course to
surveillance and normal legal restraints.' 10 The National
Center for Policy Analysis in 1996 released Factories
Behind Bars by economist Morgan 0. Reynolds,
advocating greater private sector involvement."' In 1998,
law professor Stephen P. Garvey called for Freeing
Prisoners'Labor in a Stanford Law Review article with that
title.112 Professor Garvey outlined the strangulation of
prison industries over the years and proposed opening the
market for prison goods and labor, removing the
"embargo." U.S. Representative Bill McCollum of Florida
introduced the Free Market Prison Industries Reform Act of
1998 and conducted hearings before that bill died in House
110 See J. Roger Lee & Laurin A. Wollan, Jr., The Libertarian Prison:
Principles of Laissez-Faire Incarceration, 65-2 PRISON J. 108, 108-21
(1985).
"I MORGAN 0. REYNOLDS, NAT'L CTR. FOR POLICY ANALYSIS, NCPA
POLICY REPORT No. 206: FACTORIES BEHIND BARS (1996), available at
http://www.ncpa.org/pdfs/st206.pdf.
112 See Garvey, supra note 46.
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committee. 1 3  In 1999, economist Steven D. Levitt
contended that inmate labor participation should increase
by removing existing legal barriers.'1 4  After all these
writings and hearings, prison and jail populations rose
sharply.
Difficulty of Change. Prisoners are the least
popular segment of modem society considering that society
keeps them hidden and concern for them is very low.
Many Americans want prison to be worse than it is, and
there is a prevailing myth that prisoners have it easy.
Politicians lose elections if they appear "soft on crime." It
is possible to see prison as a failed social experiment of the
last 200 years, but society now accepts it as the norm and is
appalled at some alternatives. Correctional officials
working in the civil service are not in a good position to
strongly advocate major structural changes. Jails, where
prisoners serve shorter sentences and extra space is not
often available, are admittedly not typically suitable for
industrial operations, but jail prisoners are more easily
transported with less risk.
113 Prison Industry Reform Legislation: Hearing on H.R. 4100 and H.R.
2758 Before the Subcomm. on Crime of the Comm. on the Judiciary,
105th Cong. (1998), available at
http://commdocs.house.gov/committees/judiciary/hju57231.000/hju572
31_Of.htm. Dr. Morgan 0. Reynolds testified as follows: "Our current
policy is the height of folly. To ban any part of the population from
productive employment opportunities creates a string of economic
losers. A new study of inmate labor from the American Bar
Association's subcommittee on correctional industries shows that the
unemployment problem in prisons is getting worse rather than better.
The nation's inmate population is growing so rapidly that the share of
state and federal prisoners with jobs has shrunk from 7.6% to 6.5%
since 1990." Id.
114 See Steven D. Levitt, The Economics of Inmate Labor Participation
(May 26, 1999) (unpublished manuscript), available at
http://caselaw.org/Files/Levitt%20Paper.doc.
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Many who identify with the plight of prisoners
stand in the way of revitalizing prison industries by
complaining about the "exploitation" of prison labor or by
insisting on rights and wages enjoyed in the free world.
These anti-business advocates, known by their use of the
term "prison-industrial complex," do not fully realize that
prisoners want to perform useful labor; such employment is
good for everyone; prisoners first exploited society to earn
their incarceration; big government and a massive legal
structure has failed prisoners; private enterprise is the
wellspring of economic progress; or the prison workforce
necessarily contains many problematic workers. The hard
truth is that it is better to be exploited than ignored or
marginalized. At the height of exploitation, antebellum
slaves were, on average, valued," 5 happier, treated better,
and were exponentially more productivell 6 than "New Age
slaves" in prison. 7
According to scholars, penal systems in stable
nations change very slowly. The principle of less
eligibility means that the public wants prison life to be
1" A top field hand in today's money was worth up to $45,000.
116 ROBERT W. FOGEL & STANLEY L. ENGERMAN, TIME ON THE CROSS:
THE ECONOMICS OF AMERICAN NEGRO SLAVERY (Univ. Press of Am.
1974), established that antebellum slavery was efficient and as
profitable as industrial investments in the North. They found that
slaves consumed 88% of their own economic production. Id. at 153.
This work was and continues to be an eye-opener.
117 See JOHN DEWAR GLEISSNER, PRISON & SLAVERY: A SURPRISING
COMPARISON (Outskirts Press, Inc. 2010). Except for educational
opportunities, slaves lived better day-to-day and were far happier than
modern prisoners; food, clothing, and immediate shelter were
comparable; slaves enjoyed their families, co-workers, spouses, friends,
festivities, churches, had greater freedom of movement, better health,
community peace, worked with animals, pastoral environment, less
sexual exploitation, etc.
" JOHAN THORSTEN SELLIN, SLAVERY AND THE PENAL SYSTEM 132
(Elsevier Scientific Publ'g Co. 1976).
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worse than the lifestyle enjoyed by the poorest law-abiding
citizens. Because modern punishment is hidden, the public
remains ignorant and apathetic in many ways. In other
words, modern prison life is "out of sight, out of mind."
The public presumably likes to see prisoners picking up
trash on the side of the road, but this masks widespread
idleness inside jails and prisons. The public presumably
does not care much, if at all, whether the lives of prisoners
improve. The interplay between state and federal
governments compounded the difficulty of remedying the
protectionist regime. When the federal government gave
the states power to ban the sale of prison-made goods, at a
time when most states sought to do just that, the anti-free
trade and pro-government monopolies took root and grew
in their insidious yet anemic ways. The monopolistic
regime was never wiped away, even though the Smoot-
Hawley Tariff and similar laws were repealed in favor of
international trade.
Prison labor law is now inextricably bound up with
other restrictive or expensive legislation and tort law. This
includes mandatory source preferences and the
complications of federal and state procurement laws,
international, interstate and intra-state transportation and
sales barriers, labeling, required employee benefits, the Fair
Labor Standards Act, Title VII, Prison Litigation Reform
Act, and the Inmate Accident Compensation Act. Change
in this area must also address the concerns of the public,
political constituencies, and affected businesses and labor.
Bureaucracies resist change.
The greatest drivers of prison reform today will be
budgetary, economic, and financial problems, some of
which bring on judicial denunciations and prisoner releases.
Because elected officials presumably do not favor
prisoners, unelected officials, namely federal judges, act
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when conditions violate the Constitution, a debatable yet
necessary standard.
In Brown v. Plata,'l9 the U.S. Supreme Court called
California's severely overcrowded correctional system,
exacerbated by "an unprecedented budgetary shortfall,"
unconscionable, unsafe, harsh, toxic, criminogenic, violent,
unsanitary, chaotic, disease-ridden, violent, and suicide-
inducing, all resulting in torture, lingering deaths, and a
culture of cynicism, fear, and despair.' o The federal courts
over several years forced California to drastically lower its
prison population. From December 31, 2010, to December
31, 2011, California's prison population decreased by
15,493, more than the U.S. prison population as a whole.121
Thus, forced prisoner releases in California fully and
statistically explain the entire 2011 decline in the U.S.
prison population, which is not a clear sign of progress,
especially if, as predicted by some, it causes an increase in
crime.
Legal and Structural Changes Needed. State-run
correctional industries do not have one clearly defined goal;
several missions are in their mission statements. Is their
primary goal to help the prisoner train for work after prison
and reduce recidivism, or do they intend to save the state
money? Are they supposed to create peaceful prison
conditions or provide goods to other divisions of
government? Do they produce the highest quality at the
lowest price? If they are really helping the taxpayer, why
do they often lose money?
Most prisoners do not work, prison industries
cannot usually sell goods in the private sector, and
11 Brown v. Plata, 131 S. Ct. 1910, 1927 (2011).
I20 id.
121 E. ANN CARSON & WILLIAM J. SABOL, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE,
PRISONERS IN 2011, 3 tbl.2 (2012), available at
http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/pl1 .pdf.
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prisoners generally do very little to offset the enormous
costs of their own incarcerations. When prison systems
made profits, they worked prisoners very hard under the
Auburn System in the private industrial setting. Industrial
work avoids the extra security costs and inefficiencies of
roadwork and other tasks prisoners are allowed to do today
but which chores are not nearly as productive as organized
manufacturing work in secure facilities.
Changes in the legal and economic structures of
prisons can be made without reducing the benefits of
incapacitation. The primary vehicle for revitalizing prison
industries and benefiting the American economy will be
private prison industries operating in secure prison
environments free of wage and hour laws and almost all
employment-related legislation and tort claims, thereby
imposing greater discipline on prisoners. The nation must
get government-owned-and-operated prison industries out
of the business of losing money and force them to transition
to a market economy. Far from being exploitation of
prison labor, prisoners would naturally welcome the paying
jobs. Putting hundreds of thousands of people to work
would help revitalize the American economy and bring
manufacturing jobs back to the United States. To
overcome the previously unfair competition presented by
unpaid or poorly paid prison labor, prison industries might
be restricted to making goods now made exclusively
overseas.122 In this way, all Americans would benefit, even
those in organized labor.
122 Federal Prison Industries, Inc. (UNICOR) is trying to jump on this
bandwagon by taking advantage of a program designed for private
businesses ("During fiscal year 2012, FPI received legislative authority
to participate in the Prison Industries Enhancement Certification
Program (PIECP) and to manufacture products that would otherwise be
produced outside of the United States, as approved by FPI's Board of
Directors. With the passage of these authorities, FPI's Board has
approved 14 pilot programs for repatriated products. FPI anticipates
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According to free market economists, prohibiting
mutually beneficial exchanges harms the economy.
Protective legislation at the federal and state levels greatly
limits prison industries and labor. The modern prison
regime suffers because it cannot participate freely in an
open market. Prison-made goods are about the only legal
products in the whole country not allowed to be sold freely
in the market. Stifling economic production in prison
drained the economy more as prison populations rose. It is
time to repeal those protectionist statutes, the last relics of
the Smoot-Hawley legislative era, to create a more open
market for prison-made goods.
Society remembers labor exploitation by private
enterprise during the Industrial Revolution, slavery, and
serfdom, but none of those labor regimes were as bad as the
current incarceration regime. The current prison regime
oppresses the punishers along with the punished and helps
foreign manufacturers. Private enterprise would create a
better working environment without coercion. Prisoners
would have to live and work without any sense of
entitlement. The more exacting requirements of private
employers under a competitive employment-at-will regime
would impose upon inmates the discipline that has ever
been associated with rehabilitation.
CREATING AMERICAN MANUFACTURING JOBs-8 STEPS
1. Repeal Restrictive Federal and State Trade
Statutes. The federal government made a fundamental
mistake when it allowed interstate commerce to be
regulated in fifty-one different places, and that mistake can
best be corrected by federal preemption now. Federal and
these pilot projects will assist in further reducing its losses."). OFFICE
OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., supra note 4, at 2. This action merely
compounds bureaucratic impediments in an attempt to stop red ink.
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state statutes prohibiting and limiting the manufacture,
purchase, sale, and shipment of prisoner-made goods
should be repealed or preempted. Prisoner-made goods
should be allowed to move in interstate commerce to the
same extent as any other product, without special labeling
requirements. Mandatory source requirements could be
eliminated on a government-by-government basis as state-
run correctional industries competed with private
businesses. Existing prison industries for the sake of
efficiency would adapt to the market without existing
preferences. Government agencies would be freed from
purchasing restrictions.
Existing state protective trade legislation was
passed to prevent the evils of convict leasing, prevent
unfair competition, and preserve government control over
prison labor and industries. To some extent, the states were
retaliating with trade barriers in response to the barriers set
up against them by other states. Any statute that protected
the worker or public from harm should not be affected in
any reformed system.
2. Limited Freedom of Contract. Freedom of
contract should prevail between prison employers,
prisoners, and federal and state correctional institutions.
Prisoners and private businesses (or existing correctional
industries) would negotiate on a laissez-faire basis, within
the limitations imposed by ongoing sentences of
imprisonment. Federal and state governments should
encourage contracts between private and state businesses
and prisoners regarding negotiated wages, hours, and
conditions of employment. Private prison industries could
be established within space rented from the prison or in
separate secure facilities, forcing out state-sponsored
businesses if it benefited the state. Transportation, food,
clothing, and shelter might all be addressed in contracts if
51
Fall 2013 | Volume 9 1 Issue 2
Tennessee Journal of Law and Policy 211
industries chose to employ workers outside existing prison
walls.
Instead of the prison system or state leasing its
prisoners, as in the discredited convict leasing systems of
the past, prisoners should contract directly with private
employers. Involuntary convict leasing has a tragic record
and should be avoided. The history of convict leasing
provides guidance on how not to work prison labor: do not
intermingle the determination of guilt with the desire for
cheap labor; do not let the government lease convicts; do
not eliminate wages or incentives for decent treatment; do
not make most prison labor involuntary; do not send
prisoners to the most dangerous jobs; and of course do not
discriminate on the basis of race.
In practice, a tri-partite contractual relationship
would arise because prisons would impose conditions on
private employers and prisoner-employees. The primary
condition would be that prisoners remain in prison or be
securely confined in a comparable facility. While this may
sound complicated, it would take on many attributes of
existing tri-partite, dual-employer contracts between
general employers (temporary service employers or
agencies), special employers (companies needing work
performed), and their shared employees. Although we need
to get government-owned-and-operated prison industries
out of their current business of losing money, the state will
remain involved in a lesser but vital role. Private
enterprises could submit bids to prisons regarding the
renting of developed or undeveloped space, machinery,
utilities, and other industrial needs. These concessions
would reduce the costs of incarceration. State correctional
industries could sell out to private concerns, partner with
other businesses, transform themselves, or try to survive as
they are.
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Obviously, businesses will create contracts to
ensure productivity, peaceful work environments,
innovation, and hard work. Contracting parties can achieve
these goals by agreement much better than any level of
government regulation. Employers would surely prohibit
gang activity, weapon production, violence, suspicious or
preventable accidents, and other behavior prisons struggle
to bar. For example, prisoners might be required to break
up any fights as soon as possible on pain of losing their
own jobs.
It is to some extent inconsistent to speak of a
prisoner's freedom of contract when the prisoner loses his
liberty and other freedoms upon incarceration or when the
state intervenes in the market to support workers who are
then enabled to work for lower wages than if they were
required to provide their own food, clothing, shelter, and
health care. Thus, freedom of contract in the context of
prison labor is limited by the conditions of incarceration.
With an imprisoned workforce supported at state expense,
the market is never truly "free." All that can be done is to
inject more freedom of action into prison industries and
labor and try to benefit the public at large by getting
repealed crippling laws. The unequal bargaining position
of prisoners is inherent in their status as prisoners and in
reality provides pro-social forces greater power to
discipline them.
3. Immunity from Claims, Lawsuits, and
Prosecution. "Corporate tax liability, employee benefits,
tort litigation, [and] regulatory compliance .. . contribute to
the cost differential confronting manufacturers in the
United States."12 3  Statutes, regulations, tort claims,
123 MFG. INST., FACTS ABOUT MANUFACTURING 4, available at
http://www.themanufacturinginstitute.org/ResearchlFacts-About-
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required employee benefits, lawsuits, hearings,
investigations, government enforcement agencies, extra
procedures, forms, compliance activities, delayed personnel
decisions, and legal expenses drive up the cost of American
labor and send manufacturing jobs to lower-wage
countries.124 ,Structural costs in 2011 were 20 percent
higher than for our major competitors, up from 17.6 percent
in 2008. That cost differential excludes the cost of
labor."l 25
To prevent expensive litigation and compliance
costs, private and state prison industries should enjoy full
immunity from almost all lawsuits and claims.' 26
Employment laws, wage and hour legislation, insurance,
employee benefits, tort claims, and restrictions protecting
law-abiding workers should exempt prison labor industries,
with the exception of OSHA and scaled-back workers'
compensation for permanent injury, something similar to
Manufacturing/-/media/3EBE6A748B5B420E853B5216D4812847.ash
x.
124 Robert W. Hahn & John A. Hird, The Costs and Benefits of
Regulation: Review and Synthesis, 8 YALE J. ON REG. 233 (1991); C.S.
Bradford, Does Size Matter? An Economic Analysis of Small Business
Exemptions from Regulation, 8 J. SMALL & EMERGING Bus. L. 1
(2004).




126 See Vanskike v. Peters, 974 F.2d 806 (7th Cir. 1992) (prisoner
performing janitorial, kitchen helper and similar duties directly for
Department of Corrections not entitled to minimum wage under Fair
Labor Standards Act; different results in other cases); Noah D. Zatz,
Working at the Boundaries of Markets: Prison Labor and the Economic
Dimension of Employment Relationships, 61 VAND. L. REV. 857
(2008) (complexity of potential claims discussed).
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the current federal Inmate Accident Compensation Act and
its promulgated regulations.127  American prison labor
should be legally considered (1) part of the sentence
imposed by the sentencing court, (2) required at the
discretion of the state as "involuntary servitude" without
compensation within the meaning of the Thirteenth
Amendment, and (3) allowed gratuitously in the sole
discretion of the state under the proposed legislation. For
purposes of immunity from lawsuits, prisoners while
incarcerated should legally be considered involuntary
servants of the state. 128 Under the Thirteenth Amendment,
the state is arguably entitled to 100% of the value of
prisoners' labor, a principle bolstered by the state paying
for all of the prisoners' food, clothing, shelter, and health
care. That labor value belongs to all of the people and
ought to be equally available to all manufacturers and
service providers in the United States.
The Inmate Accident Compensation Act and its
promulgated regulations impose significant limitations
127 18 U.S.C. § 4126 (West, Westlaw through P.L. 113-36 (excluding
P.L. 113-34)). Under 28 C.F.R. § 301.318, "The Inmate Accident
Compensation system is not obligated to comply with the provisions of
any other system of worker's compensation except where stated in this
part." Other reasonable limitations are imposed on the inmates'
recovery, including factors such as minimum wage.
128 In 1977, Supreme Court Justice Thurgood Marshall cited a Virginia
decision that "[fjor much of this country's history, the prevailing view
was that a prisoner was a mere slave of the State, [who] not only
forfeited his liberty, but all his personal rights except those which the
law in its humanity accords him." Jones v. N.C. Prisoners' Labor
Union, Inc., 433 U.S. 119, 139 (1977) (quoting Ruffin v.
Commonwealth, 62 Va. 790, 796 (1871)). Although antebellum
slaveholders were not required to pay their slaves, they often did to
increase production.
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upon monetary recoveries for on-the-job injuries by federal
inmates. "The Inmate Accident Compensation system is
not obligated to comply with the provisions of any other
system of worker's compensation . . . ."129 Imposed
limitations include only calculating impairment at the time
of release,' 30  withholding payment until release,13 1
suspension of benefits if an inmate is re-incarcerated,132
and other limitations similar to those in most workers'
compensation laws. Prompt and simple determinations are
facilitated: initial determination is made by a claims
133 -134examiner, with appeal to a committee. Significantly,
Federal Prison Industries-the employer-controls the
- 135accident compensation process.
After almost fifty years, U.S. circuit courts are still
split on the question whether Title VII applies to convict
labor.136 Many other unresolved questions exist in prison
labor law. The legal uncertainties add greatly to potential
compliance costs, discouraging employment. The potential
compliance costs of labor laws and tort claims cause more
unemployment in prison than any good they could possibly
129 28 C.F.R. § 301.318 (LEXIS through 2013).
130 28 C.F.R. § 301.314(a) (LEXIS through 2013).
13' 28 C.F.R. § 301.301(a) (LEXIS through 2013).
132 28 C.F.R. § 301.316 (LEXIS through 2013).
133 28 C.F.R. § 301.305 (LEXIS through 2013).
134 28 C.F.R. § 301.306 (LEXIS through 2013).
135 See 28 C.F.R. §§ 301.302, -.313, -.317 (LEXIS through 2013).
136 Jackson Taylor Kirklin, Title VII Protections for Inmates: A Model
Approach for Safeguarding Civil Rights in America's Prisons, 111
COLUM. L. REV. 1048, 1068 (2011).
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do. Whether or not prisoners and prison industries are
actually covered by specific labor laws, they must be
exempted from and granted immunity regarding
employment-related statutes and claims. Prisoners
arguably do not deserve such protection, and many of their
civil rights are already removed by virtue of their
convictions and incarceration. Exemptions, even if not
legally necessary, are desirable and will prevent claims and
litigation regarding coverage and applicability. Immunity
will make unskilled and uneducated prison labor more
viable by reducing the labor burden. Across-the-board
elimination of worker benefits and protection, with a few
exceptions, would strengthen the hand of employers
attempting to control problematic prison labor.
Prison labor and industries should be specifically
exempted from and made immune from suit regarding the
Fair Labor Standards Act, Age Discrimination in
Employment Act, Equal Pay Act, Pregnancy
Discrimination Act, Americans with Disabilities Act,
Rehabilitation Act of 1973, National Labor Relations Act,
Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA),
Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act
(LMRDA) of 1959, all Civil Rights Acts, Uniformed
Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act,
Employee Polygraph Protection Act, Consumer Credit
Protection Act (CPCA), Davis-Bacon Act, McNamara-
O'Hara Service Contract Act, Uniformed Services
Employment and Reemployment Rights Act, Walsh-Healey
Public Contracts Act, Migrant and Seasonal Agricultural
Worker Protection Act (MSPA), Immigration and
Nationality Act (INA), Worker Adjustment and Retraining
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Notification Act (WARN), Federal Employees'
Compensation Act (FECA), Comprehensive Omnibus
Budget Reconciliation Act of 1985 (COBRA), Civil Rights
of Institutionalized Persons Act (except for modified
portions of the Prison Litigation Reform Act), Health
Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA),
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (Obamacare),
The Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act of 2008
(GINA), and the Family and Medical Leave Act. Some
legislation such as the Federal Mine Safety and Health Act
of 1977, Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation
Act (LHWCA), Railway Labor Act, Energy Employees
Occupational Illness Compensation Program Act
(EEOICPA), Radiation Exposure Compensation Act
(RECA), and the Black Lung Benefits Act (BLBA) would
not need changing, as those environments are not suitable
for prison labor. To the long list above, immunity from tort
claims, unemployment insurance requirements, and
comparable state statutes should be added. Employers are
already immune from tort claims by virtue of workers'
compensation laws. A host of state laws need addressing,
on a state-by-state basis or with federal preemption.
Employers should not be required to provide benefits to
inmates that they otherwise provide to their non-
incarcerated employees.
The mere listing of the statutes above, and
contemplation of additional state employment-related
statutes and tort claims, ought to inform the nation how
complex, cumbersome, and expensive employment and tort
laws have become relative to the rest of the world.
Difficulties of interpretation and the expenditures of time
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and legal expenses are even more burdensome in the
context of prison industries, where prisoners have a proven
record of filing a mountain of frivolous lawsuits, regulation
is spread across fifty-one jurisdictions, and the existing
legal framework is complicated and confusing in multiple
ways.
Few of these federal employment-related statutes
help prisoners now, and their existence harms prison
employment prospects. Given the public's historical
disdain of prisoners, now is not the time to grant prisoners
the rights afforded under these laws, let prisoners imagine
they have such rights, or allow litigation over coverage. A
chief error of the PIECP was trying to bring prisoners up to
prevailing wage standards. The creation of a laissez-faire
employment regime would bypass the huge layer of
employment laws that make American labor substantially
more expensive than unprotected labor in foreign countries.
In the process, it would create an excellent laboratory to
test the value of the employment laws against a laissez-
faire employment environment, one more similar to foreign
labor-management relations in developing nations. In the
prison context, the re-setting of the American employment
relationship back to employment-at-will ought to educate
the nation more fully on the advantages and disadvantages
of its employment regulations. Experience will determine
what employment protection prisoners need far better than
adapting generally inapplicable or unsuccessful legislation
to the correctional context. Even without legal
requirements, "employers already largely accept and
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comply with their employment law obligations," 3 7 and this
would be true of most established corporations operating in
the prison context. Federal laws have changed attitudes
and norms in society, and their repeal in certain contexts
will not cause wholesale relapse.
Immunity from lawsuits would permit religious
organizations a greater role in establishing, funding, and
managing prison industries and workplaces in accordance
with their particular religious principles. Hiring and
management practices based upon religious activity or
beliefs should be allowed because religion possesses the
power to transform lives and will inject morality into prison
systems. Businesses affiliated with particular religions
ought to be clothed with the same constitutional protection
otherwise allowed churches, mosques, synagogues, and
temples.
The power and authority of federal regulation of
interstate commerce relating to prison-made goods has
already been established by 18 U.S.C. §§ 1761 and 1762
and comparable federal legislation. Federal law needs to
encourage and facilitate this interstate commerce instead of
blocking it. The best way is for Congress to preemptively
wipe the slate clean, admit the bankruptcy of its domestic
Smoot-Hawley regime, prevent states from imposing
restrictions on interstate commerce, and allow a fresh start.
If prison jobs that simply help run the prison or jail
are not counted, the huge edifice of federal and state
regulation of labor and industries, in and out of prison,
causes a market-productive prisoner unemployment rate of
about 90%. Because the existing legal structure has failed
137 Noah D. Zatz, Working at the Boundaries of Markets: Prison Labor
and the Economic Dimension of Employment Relationships, 61 VAND.
L. REV. 857, 945 (2008).
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prisoners and prison industries, contracts must take the
place of the failed state and federal legislation. The
reformed legal environment of a very few applicable
employment-related laws and reliance upon contracts
would still be better for all interests than the involuntary
servitude contemplated and allowed by the first section of
the Thirteenth Amendment.
Full and enforceable immunity is necessary given
the volume of tort and statutory claims and suits that would
be filed if prisoners were allowed the opportunity. Indeed,
the primary reason for the Prison Litigation Reform Actl38
(PLRA) was the stupendous number of lawsuits filed by
prisoners, almost all of them frivolous or unfounded. The
PLRA succeeded in bringing a halt to the unprecedented
volume of frivolous prison litigation and might be
strengthened again to serve as a helpful vehicle to swiftly
deal with and reduce "jailbird lawsuits." Federal law
already limits recoveries by injured Federal Prison
Industries workers.139 The Inmate Accident Compensation
Act,14 not the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), is the
exclusive remedy against the government by a federal
prisoner with work-related injuries' 4 1 and might be retained
and made available to private businesses.
Legislatures and Congress chose to regulate prison
labor and industries with criminal statutes. 142 The use of
13' 42 U.S.C. § 1997e (West, Westlaw through P.L. 113-36 (excluding
P.L. 113-34)).
139 Smith v. United States, 561 F.3d 1090 (10th Cir. 2009), cert. denied,
130 S. Ct. 1142, 175 L.Ed.2d 973 (2010); 18 U.S.C. § 4126 (West,
Westlaw through P.L. 113-36 (excluding P.L. 113-34)).
140 18 U.S.C. § 4126.
141 United States v. Demko, 385 U.S. 149 (1966); Smith v. United
States, 561 F.3d 1090 (10th Cir. 2009), cert. denied, 558 U.S. 1148
(2010).
142 See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1761-62 (West, Westlaw through P.L. 113-36
(excluding P.L. 113-34)).
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criminal laws to regulate this trade had and still has a
chilling effect on anyone seeking to find any exceptions or
legal pathways through this complex, changing, and
confusing anti-competitive body of law and deters railroads
and transportation companies, too. Obviously, those anti-
competitive criminal laws should be repealed, revised, or
federally preempted.
4. Mutual Rights of Return to General Prison
Population. Subject to their contracts, private and state
businesses should have the unfettered right to return
offending workers to the general prison population.
Likewise, prisoners could voluntarily return to the general
prison population in the event employers did not provide a
better working or living environment. Clearly, the
draconian aspects of the Auburn System, such as enforced
silence, lock-step marching, and masks, would not re-
appear because employers would seek to retain their
workers. Many prisoners would naturally love to work in
an air-conditioned environment, which is not something
they enjoy in most prisons. Employment would be at-will,
subject to whatever contracts the employers and prisoners
made prior to the commencement of employment.
Contracts might provide that prisoners have to return to the
general prison population if they want to pursue a claim
against their employers and that their legal damages stop
accumulating once they leave their jobs.
5. Trust Accounts. Money earned by prisoners
would be put into a trust account, pending good behavior
and subject to claims for child support, victim restitution,
court costs, fines, and their own room and board in prison.
Deductions for federal, state, and local taxes, reasonable
charges for room and board, child and family support, and
victim restitution are already provided for and regulated in
18 U.S.C. § 1761(c)-TRANSPORTATION OR IMPORTATION
[OF PRISON-MADE GOODS]. If prison work pilot projects pay
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prevailing wages and are designated by the Director of the
Bureau of Justice Assistance, then wages "subject to
deductions . . . shall not, in the aggregate, exceed 80 per
centum of gross wages." 4 3
Misbehavior by prisoners under contracts might
result in forfeiture of earnings on account of escape
attempts, violence, theft, strikes, work slowdowns, or other
violations of agreed rules and contacts. Prisoners would
undoubtedly behave to assure their continued employment
(and sometimes residence) in these better secure
environments. Employers would more easily enforce
discipline and rules with the absolute discretion allowed to
employers in an employment-at-will relationship.
Prisoners would then have an investment in their own good
behavior, learn pro-social skills, and develop healthy work
habits. Prisoners serving life without parole (or other long
sentences) should be able to spend earned money, while the
victims' families receive regular checks from those
earnings. Juries might determine the eligibility of victims'
families to receive these checks.
Deductions from the prisoner's paycheck for family
support, victim restitution, court costs, taxes, and the costs
of confinement could vary from state to state. Optimum
levels of deductions are yet to be determined. The states
would be free to experiment with different deduction
amounts and allocations. Something similar to the current
overall federal limitation permitting no more than 80% of
gross wages to be deducted seems wise; that overall limit
on deductions might best be enforced by federal preemptive
legislation.
6. Oversight. State and federal governments would
provide administrative and judicial oversight of prison
labor, industries, and contracts to assure prisoners received
their agreed compensation, were not abused, and did not
143 18 U.S.C. § 1761(c)(2).
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agree to unconscionable contractual provisions. U.S.
magistrate judges already resolve lawsuits filed by federal
prisoners. Existing federal mediation and arbitration
services could settle or decide disputes in the federal prison
system. States are increasingly encouraging alternative
dispute resolution, an expedited procedure appropriate for
disputes in the prison context.
7. Significantly Decrease Prison Population. A
common concern of those who are suspicious of business is
that, like in the convict leasing age, the legal system will
provide cheap labor by finding more criminals guilty and
increasing the length of prison sentences. This legitimate
concern is based upon (1) evidence that criminal
convictions fed the need for free or low-cost labor and
convict leasing regimes after the Civil War and for decades
thereafter;14 (2) current prison privatization, which merely
privatizes the warehouse function of incarceration and
provides to special interests the financial incentives to
increase prison populations; (3) the political strength of
private correctional corporations and correctional officers'
unions; and (4) the power of the courts to affect the supply
and demand for prison labor. Therefore, the opening up of
vibrant prison industries ought to include an increase in
alternative sentences such as drug treatment, proposed
judicial corporal punishment, 45 community service, parole,
probation, and other sentences short of incarceration.
The revitalization of prison industries does not
depend upon increasing the 2.25 million prisoners now
144 DOUGLAS A. BLACKMON, SLAVERY BY ANOTHER NAME-THE RE-
ENSLAVEMENT OF BLACK AMERICANS FROM THE CIVIL WAR TO
WORLD WARII (2008). The history of convict leasing instructs us on
what not to do.
145 See J.D. Gleissner, Prison Overcrowding Cure: Judicial Corporal
Punishment of Adults, 49-4 CRIM. L. BULL. (2013) (author suggests
halving the U.S. incarcerated population with judicial corporal
punishment).
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behind American bars. The reduction of the American
prison population and the freeing of prison labor can
proceed simultaneously. Both would recognize that some
people in prison do not necessarily have to be there for the
betterment of society as a whole. Incarceration is not a
vital feature of the nation's republic. Incarceration as it is
now known did not exist when the U.S. Constitution was
written. The Declaration of Independence redirected the
most successful form of British punishment, transportation
of convicts, away from the Thirteen Colonies and toward
Australia.
8. Avoid Unfair Competition. Several steps can
be taken to reduce or eliminate unfair competition from
prison industries and labor. These options include one or
more of the following: (1) Competing employers should
have equal access to prison labor. This is one advantage of
eliminating convict leasing (or contracting for groups of
prisoners) by the prison system and allowing prisoners and
employers to make individual employment decisions. (2)
Prison industries could be limited to manufacturing goods
now exclusively made overseas or to domestic industries
under serious assault by foreign manufacturers and
processors. If only one American manufacturer made a
particular item in the United States, that manufacturer
could be allowed to hire prison labor. (3) Prison industries
might be required to prove that their prison employees
support existing employment in the free sector or re-shore
jobs to the United States. Union shops, for example, would
benefit from prison labor if their prison industry suppliers
sold goods and services to union shops at lower prices. (4)
The transfer of prison laborers from one prison system to
another can be facilitated, increasing industrial efficiency,
permitting more flexibility in hiring and plant locations,
and avoiding or lessening unfair competition on a regional
or distance basis. (5) Prison industries might be required to
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show that they were not displacing currently employed,
free American workers.
With the diversification of the world economy and
production methods, the off-shoring of manufacturing jobs,
and the limitations of incarceration, competition with
American labor and businesses outside prison will not be as
great as many perceive. Prison jobs under a reformed
regime will largely be low-skilled jobs, and the competition
for these jobs would not be as intense as with skilled
positions. Prisoners would not mix with free workers or
leave secure facilities. Prison labor cannot compete with
workers in mining, transportation, construction, power
generation and transmission, highly sophisticated
manufacturing, defense industries, or any dangerous
industry. Anything that required work in changing
locations would be out of consideration for prison labor.
American jobs that have already moved overseas, including
less skilled positions, would not be endangered and in fact
might be brought back to the United States.
Today, work shirts, the subject of the Supreme
Court's 1936 decision in Whitfield v. State of Ohio, 46 are
almost all made overseas. Americans still make horse
collars, harnesses, and straps, the contested products in
Kentucky Whip & Collar Co. v. Illinois Central Railroad
Co.,1 47 but the leather industry has changed radically since
1937.




economies, which are now
becoming major players in
146 297 U.S. 431 (1936).
147 299 U.S. 334 (1937).
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the trade. In fact, developing
and emerging economies can
now manage the whole
supply chain on their own
and are fast becoming the
most important suppliers of
value-added finished
products. About 45% of
footwear, for example, is
made in China.148
Competition between foreign and U.S. labor dwarfs
any potential competition between free and incarcerated
labor in the United States. America must work harder and
smarter to remain the leading world power. All American
manufacturing jobs create U.S. tax revenues and additional
American employment, while manufacturing jobs lost to
foreign countries generally subtract from the U.S.
economy. Research, development, and engineering follow
manufacturing. The nation needs a free trade agreement
with itself. Clearly, jobs move overseas to lower-wage
countries, indicating the relative economic advantages of
lower wages. American prisoners would still be making
more money than wages in Vietnam, India, China, or
Pakistan ... and they would be making more money than
they are making right now.
Expected Results of Proposed Changes. Texas
A&M economist Dr. Morgan 0. Reynolds, former Chief
Economist at the U.S. Department of Labor, predicted, "If
148 Leather, INT'L TRADE CENTRE,
http://www.intracen.org/exporters/leather/ (last visited Jan. 1, 2013);
see COMMODITIES & TRADE Div., FOOD & AGRIC. ORG. OF THE UNITED
NATIONS, WORLD STATISTICAL COMPENDIUM FOR RAW HIDES AND
SKINS, LEATHER AND LEATHER FOOTWEAR 1992-2011 (2011)
(unmistakable and growing dominance of developing countries over
developed countries).
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half of all prisoners worked in market-type jobs for five
years, earning $7 an hour in full-time employment, they
could boost the nation's gross domestic product by $20
billion. Prison-based industries would have a ripple effect
in their communities, as they tap local suppliers and other
services."14 9 Additionally, tax receipts would rise. Prison
laborers should pay taxes and be subject to Social Security
because when they leave prison and grow old, they will be
asking for Medicare or Social Security benefits.
If federal and state statutes restricting prison labor
and private prison industries are swept away, freedom of
contract would create jobs in a circle around prisons. "An
increment to manufacturing production in the U.S. creates
more economic activity both within and outside the sector
than does a similar increment in any other major sector."150
Manufacturing generates a larger economic multiplier
effect than other sectors of the economy.'' If, for
example, 100,000 manufacturing jobs in prison were
generated, a manufacturing multiplier of 1.5 would create
an additional 150,000 jobs, for a total of 250,000 jobs.
Economists argue convincingly that the 1.5 manufacturing
multiplier significantly understates the true multiplying
149 Warren Richey, Made in USA . .. But by Convicts, CHRISTIAN SCI.
MONITOR, Jan. 14, 1998, available at
http://www.csmonitor.com/1998/0114/011498.us.us.4.html/(page)/2.
15 JOEL POPKIN & KATHRYN KOBE, CO. FOR THE NAT'L Ass'N OF
MFRS. & THE NAM COUNCIL OF MFG. Ass'Ns, MANUFACTURING
RESURGENCE-A MUST FOR U.S. PROSPERITY (2010), available at
http://www.nam.org/System/Capture-Download.aspx?id=f36ec9f5-
7bff-4da4-aeba-faab4b009b92.
"' MFG. INST., FACTS ABOUT MANUFACTURING 3 fig.2, available at
http://www.themanufacturinginstitute.org/-/media/1242121E7A4F45D
68C2A4586540703A5/2012FactsAboutManufacturingFullVer
sionHighRes.pdf.; Susan Helper et al., Why Does Manufacturing
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effect of the manufacturing sector on the economy.152
Although prison labor would be unskilled at the outset, and
relatively low wages would produce a smaller
manufacturing multiplier, prisoners can boost productivity
the old-fashioned way by working longer hours. Ambitious
prisoners might, for example, work sixty hours per week at
two dollars per hour and thereby bring manufacturing jobs
back to the United States from lower-wage countries. 153
More convincing than mathematical projections is the
historical record of profitability enjoyed by American
prison systems in the nineteenth century.
Existing correctional industries owned by the state
could expand their markets to make and sell many more
different products or services to a greatly expanded base of
potential purchasers, in and out of the government. This
would undoubtedly boost their viability, make money for
the prison systems, put more prisoners to work, and have
more advantages in rehabilitation. Private businesses
would provide stiff competition for state-run correctional
facilities. Each government could best determine its
preferred method of doing business.
Inevitably, private businesses would hire low-wage
prison labor to make goods now made in lower-wage
countries. The nation's competitive disadvantages relative
to developing nations would shrink, and the danger to
American manufacturing jobs would lessen. Consumer
goods now made exclusively overseas would more
152 Michael Mandel & Diana G. Carew, Manufacturing in the App
Economy: How Many Jobs Should We Aim For?, PROGRESSIVE POL'Y
INST., May 2012, at 1, available at http://progressivepolicy.org/wp-
content/uploads/2012/05/05.2012-MandelCarewManufacturing-in-
the-App-Economyl.pdf.
1 One five-hour shift, followed by a five-hour rest period for naps,
would make the second daily five-hour shift much easier. Prisoners
would not have to commute, nor do they consume much time with
family, civic, or social matters.
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commonly be produced in the United States. Prison
businesses would retain workers by providing safer, more
comfortable, and more remunerative environments than
exist for prisoners today-and that would not often take
much extra effort. Organized labor would benefit by
increased economic activity, the circle of jobs created
around manufacturing plants, and the need of prison
industries to repair machines, transport goods, supply
goods and services, and generally participate in a more
vigorous economy.
A variety of business arrangements would arise.
Most correctional facilities have behind their fences and
walls unused land on which to build factories or are located
in rural areas with available land. Some private industries
might prefer to house, feed, and care for their own captive
labor force off the premises of existing state prisons but
still in secure facilities. Other industries would contract
with the state to rent existing or unused prison space.
Businesses might be required to lower the state's direct
incarceration costs or guarantee no increase in those costs.
Prisons could rent space or equipment and sell any items it
produced to prison industries. Plenty of used
manufacturing equipment is available or in storage.
Overall, prison overcrowding and its attendant
problems would decrease. Prisoners would have a better
chance to support themselves when released from prison.
Prison violence would decrease. Prisoners serving life
without parole actually make some of the best workers if
they mature in prison. The American economy would
improve.
Because separate plants, workhouses, and work
communities of prisoners would provide a safer, better life
for prisoners, the behavior of prison workers would
improve. Behavior in the general prison population would
also improve as prisoners vied for jobs. Religious activity
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would increase, and religious organizations would play a
greater role than they do currently.
A hard core of incorrigible, insane, disabled,
dangerous, sick, and lazy prisoners and gang members
would remain in the general prison population, death row,
or solitary confinement. Employers would know whom to
hire and whom to promptly send back. If they misbehaved,
prisoners would instantly lose their jobs, some or all of
their trust account savings, and get sent back to the general
prison population. Today, there are not nearly enough jobs
for prisoners, and the scarcity of jobs would likely continue
for years even if the protectionist regime fell.
Recidivism would decline once prisoners learned to
work very hard in a private business, saved money for their
releases, controlled their behaviors better as required by
their employment contracts and authoritative employers,
and stayed away from the corroding influences of the worst
criminals. Even a small drop in recidivism has a very
positive effect on the general economy. 154 Rehabilitation
prospects advance with hard work, contributions to the
larger society, and recognition of the monetary rewards
from hard work.' 55  Crime victims would benefit by
increased restitution payments, just as families would
benefit by increased child and family support income. The
economic and social costs of incarceration would decrease.
CONCLUSION
Nations do not prosper by putting millions of able-
bodied workers in cages with nothing to do. This nation
did not achieve its world position by discouraging hard
work, letting foreign nations work harder and smarter, or
by letting the government assume ever larger portions of its
154 Levitt, supra note 114.
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economy and daily lives. Freedom, mutually beneficial
exchanges, hard work, innovation, and enormous resources
made America what is considered the leading economy in
the world. Each of the fifty-one governments has a
valuable labor resource it does not fully employ. In the
context of prison industries, the nation must re-affirm the
importance of hard work, private enterprise, less
government control, freedom of contract, and competition.
Economic and social conditions, standing in the world, and
the enormous growth in the nation's prison, jail, and
correctional populations all urge the creation of
manufacturing jobs.
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POLICY NOTE
STATES ARE MAKING THEIR OWN DECISIONS
REGARDING WHETHER MARIJUANA SHOULD BE




On November 6, 2012,1 three states proposed
landmark legislation for a vote to the people of their
respective states.2 These landmark pieces of legislation
allowed for the recreational use of marijuana. 3 While the
potential legislation failed in Oregon, the proposed
legislation passed in Colorado and Washington.4
Washington's marijuana legislation went into effect on
December 6, 2012," and Colorado Governor John
Hickenlooper signed Colorado's marijuana legislation into
law on December 10, 2012.6 The passage of recreational
1 This date represents Election Day 2012.
2 See Colorado, Washington Pass Marijuana Legalization; Oregon





5 Gene Johnson, Legalizing Marijuana: Washington Law Goes into




6 Will C. Holden & Thomas Hendrick, Governor Signs Amendment 64,
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marijuana usage legislation in Colorado and Washington
joins them with twenty states, plus the District of
Columbia, which have legalized use of marijuana for
medical purposes.7
While it has been legalized by the states, marijuana
still remains illegal under federal law.8 Because of the
Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution,9
federal law remains binding on the states.' 0 Therefore,
while the states have passed legislation legalizing the use of
marijuana, whether for medical use or recreational use,
these laws are essentially moot due to federal law. The
issue now is whether the federal government will
investigate and prosecute those who follow their state
marijuana laws or will use investigatory and prosecutorial
discretion to allow the laws to take effect.
This paper will discuss the ever-widening
acceptance by state legislatures of marijuana, especially for
medical purposes, and the refusal by the federal
government to recognize these acceptances, thus resulting
in a federalism fight. The federal government should use
its investigatory and prosecutorial discretion to allow these
state experiments with marijuana. The current arguments
for keeping marijuana illegal can be examined by allowing
the states to implement their new and existing marijuana
laws.
7 See 20 Legal Medical Marijuana States and DC, PROCON.ORG (Jan.
7, 2013, 01:42 PM),
http://medicalmarijuana.procon.org/view.resource.php?resourcelD=000
881.
821 U.S.C. §§ 812(c)(c)(10), 844(a) (2006).
9 U.S. CONST. art. IV, cl. 2.
1o Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 29 (2005) ("The Supremacy Clause
unambiguously provides that if there is any conflict between federal
and state law, federal law shall prevail.").
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II. THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF FEDERAL
MARIJUANA LAWS
The first federal legislation that attempted to
regulate drugs in interstate commerce came in 1906.11 But
the primary drug control law came in the form of the
Harrison Narcotics Act of 1914.12 This act attempted to
control narcotics mainly by assessing taxes. Then the first
real attempt by Congress to regulate marijuana occurred in
1937.13 The 1937 law "did not outlaw the possession or
sale of marijuana outright."l 4 However, the law imposed
strict administrative requirements and high taxes on the
trade of marijuana.' 5  Then, in 1969, "President Nixon
declared a national 'war on drugs."" 6 In response to this
declaration, Congress enacted the Comprehensive Drug
Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970 or Controlled
Substances Act (CSA).1 7 The CSA repealed most of the
previous antidrug laws.' 8
Under the CSA, narcotics are placed in one of five
schedules.19 Congress placed marijuana in Schedule 1.20
Being classified as a Schedule I drugs means that marijuana
meets three criteria: (1) a "high potential for abuse"; (2)
"lack of any accepted medical use"; and (3) an "absence of
any accepted safety for use in medically supervised
treatment."21 By classifying marijuana as a Schedule I
1 Pure Food and Drug Act of 1906, ch. 3915, 34 Stat. 768, repealed by
Act of June 25, 1938, ch. 675, § 902(a), 52 Stat. 1059.
12 Harrison Narcotics Act of 1914, 38 Stat. 785 (repealed 1970).
13 Marihuana Tax Act of 1937, 50 Stat. 551 (repealed 1970).
14 Raich, 545 U.S. at 11.
" See id.
Id. at 10.
1721 U.S.C. §§ 801-971 (2006).
18 Raich, 545 U.S. at 12.
'9 21 U.S.C. § 812(a) (2006).
2021 U.S.C. § 812(c)(c)(10) (2006).
21 Raich, 545 U.S. at 14; see also 21 U.S.C. § 812(b)(1) (2006).
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drug, the only research that can be performed on the drug is
through "a Food and Drug Administration pre-approved
research study." 22
Even with the CSA in place, eighteen states enacted
legislation that attempts to legalize marijuana for medical
purposes prior to the votes on recreational marijuana usage
23laws in 2012. Then, in 2012, two states legalized
24
marijuana for recreational use. However, the CSA
remains in place, and marijuana is still classified as a
Schedule I drug. 25
III. CHALLENGING THE CSA
a. Challenges in Federal Courts
Because Colorado and Washington are the first
states to legalize the recreational use of marijuana,26 the
majority of the development of the law has focused on the
use of medical marijuana. The first challenge to the CSA
came in the form of a medical necessity defense.27 Without
bringing criminal charges, the United States sought to
enjoin certain medical marijuana dis ensaries from
manufacturing and distributing marijuana. The Supreme
22 Raich, 545 U.S. at 14.
23 See 20 Legal Medical Marijuana States and DC, PROCON.ORG (Jan.
7, 2013, 01:42 PM),
http://medicalmarijuana.procon.org/view.resource.php?resourcelD=000
881.
24 See COLO. CONST. art. XVIII, § 16; WASH. REV. CODE § 69.50.325
(LEXIS through 2013 Regular Session); WASH. REV. CODE § 69.50.535
(LEXIS through 2013 Regular Session).
25 21 U.S.C. § 812(c)(c)(10) (2006).
26 See COLO. CONST. art. XVIII, § 16; WASH. REV. CODE § 69.50.325;
WASH. REV. CODE § 69.50.535.
27 United States v. Oakland Cannabis Buyers' Coop., 532 U.S. 483
(2001).
28 See id. at 486-87.
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Court narrowly held that the medical necessity defense
does not apply to those who manufacture and distribute
marijuana. Therefore, the United States was successful in
enjoining the medical marijuana dispensaries.
The seminal case regarding the legalization of
marijuana by states is Gonzales v. Raich.30 Raich deals
specifically with the medical marijuana laws of
California. 3 1 The plaintiffs believed that the CSA, as
applied to them, "would violate the Commerce Clause, the
Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, the Ninth and
Tenth Amendments of the Constitution, and the doctrine of
medical necessity." 32 The district court denied their motion
for a preliminary injunction.33 The Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit reversed, agreeing with the plaintiffs that
"the CSA is an unconstitutional exercise of Congress'
Commerce Clause authority." 34
The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the
Ninth Circuit, justifying the CSA as a "valid exercise of
federal power" under the Commerce Clause. 35 The Court's
main justification was "the undisputed magnitude of the
commercial market for marijuana."36 Therefore, the Court
found that "Congress could have rationally concluded that
the aggregate impact on the national market of all the
transactions exempted from federal supervision is
unquestionably substantial."37 Thus, the Court remanded
the case to the Ninth Circuit.
29 Id. at 486.
30 Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005).
31 See id. at 5.
32 Id. at 8.
33 Id.
34 Raich v. Ashcroft, 352 F.3d 1222, 1227 (9th Cir. 2003).
3 Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 9 (2005).
36 Id. at 33.
371 Id. at 32.
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On remand, the Ninth Circuit rejected the other
arguments put forth by the plaintiffs.38 The court was
uncertain whether the Supreme Court's previous decision
regarding the medical necessity defense was binding on the
case. 39 To avoid the question, the court stated that the
question would better be resolved in a criminal
proceeding.40 The court also rejected the substantive due
process argument because "federal law does not recognize
a fundamental right to use medical marijuana prescribed by
a licensed physician to alleviate excruciating pain and
human suffering" at the present time.4 1 Finally, the court
rejected the Tenth Amendment argument because of the
Supreme Court's decision regarding the Commerce
Clause.42
b. Administrative Challenges
Besides the traditional method of seeking to enjoin
the enforcement of the CSA against the plaintiffs, an
alternate option is to petition the Drug Enforcement
Agency (DEA) to reschedule marijuana. 43 Congress has
delegated its CSA rescheduling powers to the Attorney
General.44  The Attorney General, in turn, has delegated
these powers to the DEA.45 The DEA has recently denied
petitions to reschedule marijuana46 after seeking a
"scientific and medical evaluation" 47 by the Department of
38 See Raich v. Gonzales, 500 F.3d 850 (9th Cir. 2007).
39 Id. at 860.
40 Id. at 861.
41 Id. at 866.
42 Id. at 867.
43 See 21 U.S.C. §§ 811, 812 (2006).
' 21 U.S.C. § 811(a) (2006).
45 Am. for Safe Access v. DEA, 706 F.3d 438,441 (D.C. Cir. 2013).
46 See, e.g., Denial of Petition to Initiate Proceedings to Reschedule
Marijuana, 76 Fed. Reg. 40,552 (July 8, 2011).
47 21 U.S.C. § 811(b) (2006).
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Health and Human Services (DHHS).48 The DHHS's
recommendation to the DEA is that "research on the
medical use of marijuana has not progressed to the point
that marijuana can be considered to have a 'currently
accepted medical use' or a 'currently accepted medical use
with severe restrictions."' 49  Therefore, while state
legislatures have determined that marijuana has medical
uses, the federal government has not been convinced by the
current clinical research and further research is required.
IV. FEDERAL AND STATE POLICIES
a. Federal Policy on Medical Marijuana: The
Ogden Memo
The most interesting document showing the federal
government's policy regarding medical marijuana is the
"Medical Marijuana Guidance" memorandum, which was
prepared by then-Deputy Attorney General David Ogden
(Ogden Memo).5 0 The Ogden Memo was distributed from
the United States Department of Justice to "SELECTED
UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS." 5' The goal of the
memorandum was to give "clarification and guidance to
federal prosecutors in States that have enacted laws
authorizing the medical use of marijuana." 5 2
While the Ogden Memo did "not 'legalize'
marijuana or provide a legal defense to a violation of
48 Am. for Safe Access, 706 F.3d at 442.
49 Denial of Petition to Initiate Proceedings to Reschedule Marijuana,
76 Fed. Reg. 40,552, 40,562 (July 8, 2011).
50 David W. Ogden, Deputy Attorney General, Investigations and
Prosecutions in States Authorizing the Medical Use of Marijuana, U.S.
DEP'T OF JUST. (Oct 19, 2009),
http://www.justice.gov/opa/documents/medical-marijuana.pdf.
" Id. at 1.
52 Id.
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federal law ... [and] is intended solely as a guide to the
exercise of investigative and prosecutorial discretion,"53 the
memorandum acknowledged that "[a]s a general matter,
pursuit of [drug traffickers of illegal drugs] should not
focus federal resources in your States on individuals whose
actions are in clear and unambiguous compliance with
existing state laws providing for the medical use of
marijuana." 54 Thus, while acknowledging that the CSA is
still federal law, the United States Attorneys should
"mak[e] efficient and rational use of [the Department's]
limited investigative and prosecutorial resources," and
prosecuting those who comply with "existing state law ...
is unlikely to be an efficient use of limited federal
resources."5
While the Ogden Memo focuses on prosecution of
those following medical marijuana laws, it also points out
the reasons that the United States Attorneys should still
pursue illegal drug traffickers. 56 The memorandum states
that "the illegal distribution and sale of marijuana is a
serious crime and provides a significant source of revenue
to large-scale criminal enterprises, gangs, and cartels."57
As a telling example, the Ogden Memo states that
"marijuana distribution in the United States remains the
single largest source of revenue for the Mexican cartels."58
This reasoning is interesting because it would apply to both
medical and recreational use of marijuana. Thus, the
memorandum sheds some light on the federal government's
policy toward recreational use of marijuana.
51 Id. at 2.
54 Id. at 1-2.
55 id.
56 See id. at 1.
5 Id. at 1.
58Id.
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b. State Purposes for Legalizing Recreational
Marijuana
Colorado amended its own constitution to legalize
marijuana.59 The amendment starts by stating the purpose
of the legalization:
In the interest of the efficient
use of law enforcement
resources, enhancing revenue
for public purposes, and
individual freedom, the
people of the state of
Colorado find and declare
that the use of marijuana
should be legal for persons
twenty-one years of age or
older and taxed in a manner
similar to alcohol.60
The amendment states three very distinct
reasons for legalizing marijuana. The rest of the
amendment contains the restrictions and regulations
regarding marijuana.61 These restrictions and
regulations fairly mirror those that are placed on
alcohol.62
While Washington's marijuana legislation does
not specifically state its purpose, the purpose can be
fairly deduced from the statutory language.
Washington's marijuana legislation states in pertinent
part as follows:
59 COLO. CONST. art. XVIII, § 16.
60 COLo. CONST. art. XVIII, § 16(1)(a).
61 See COLO. CONST. art. XVIII, § 16.
62 COLO. CONST. art. XVIII, § 16(1)(b).
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There is levied and collected
a marijuana excise tax equal
to twenty-five percent of the
selling price on each
wholesale sale in this state of
marijuana by a licensed
marijuana producer to a
licensed marijuana processor
or another licensed marijuana
producer. This tax is the
obligation of the licensed
marijuana producer. 63
The first purpose is to receive taxes on the sale
of marijuana. 64 In fact, the legislation taxes marijuana
three times before it reaches the consumer.65 The other
implied purpose is to control who can sell marijuana. 66
V. THE FUTURE OF THE FEDERALISM FIGHT
OVER MARUUANA
The issue now becomes what stance the federal
government will take with regard to the recreational use
laws. The biggest problem is the fear that those who
cultivate and distribute marijuana, even while following
state law, will be subject to punishment by the federal
government. The federal government must decide whether
to investigate and prosecute those people.
The closest analogy to the current situation is the
prohibition of alcohol in the 1920s and 1930s. 67  The
63 WASH. REV. CODE § 69.50.535.
64 See WASH. REV. CODE § 69.50.535.
65 id.
66 See WASH. REV. CODE § 69.50.325.
67 U.S. CONsT. amend. XVIII (repealed 1933).
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Eighteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution
made "the manufacture, sale, or transportation of
intoxicating liquors" illegal.68 While the amendment had
an initial positive effect, the long-term effect was an
increase in not only crime but also organized crime.69
Because the manufacture and sale of intoxicating liquors
was illegal, those who participated in the organized crime
were able to pocket the entirety of the profits without being
taxed.70 The negative effects ultimately led to the Twenty-
First Amendment, which repealed the Eighteenth
Amendment in its entirety.7 1
The biggest difference between the 1920s alcohol
prohibition and the current marijuana initiative is that the
alcohol prohibition was performed by amendment and
subsequently repealed by amendment. The CSA, however,
is a statute that has been held valid under the Commerce
Clause. 72 Congress's inaction with respect to the CSA has
caused states to reevaluate the goals of the CSA
themselves. As Justice O'Connor astutely notes in her
dissent in Raich, "[o]ne of federalism's chief virtues, of
course, is that it promotes innovation by allowing for the
possibility that 'a single courageous State may, if its
citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social
and economic experiments without risk to the rest of the
country."' 73
68 U.S. CONsT. amend. XVIII, cl. 1 (repealed 1933).
69 id.
70 See id.
" U.S. CONST. amend. XXI.
72 See Raich v. Gonzales, 545 U.S. 1 (2005).
7 Raich, 545 U.S. at 42 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (quoting New State
Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting)).
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This situation is the ultimate "novel social and
economic experiment[]."74 The economic element of the
experiment is readily apparent. Both Washington and
Colorado have explicitly or impliedly stated that a main
goal of the legislation is to recover taxes on the sale of
marijuana. Further, Colorado has explicitly stated that
this effort is "[i]n the interest of the efficient use of law
enforcement resources."76 By legalizing the sale of
marijuana, Colorado no longer has to focus as much of its
policing efforts on marijuana law enforcement. Similarly,
there is a beneficial economic impact on the judicial system
that is not so apparent. For example, by lowering arrests on
marijuana crimes, costs can be saved in the judicial system.
Further, with fewer arrests there will be fewer convictions,
which could save money in the prison system.
The reasoning in the Ogden Memo should provide
guidance on which policy to follow in this situation. The
fact that commercial marijuana distribution "provides a
significant source of revenue to large-scale criminal
enterprises, gangs, and cartels," such as the Mexican drug
cartel,77 pushes for a policy allowing these states to
experiment with their recreational use marijuana laws. If
the sale of marijuana provides revenue to these groups, then
it must follow that marijuana is being sold in the United
States. By allowing the states to regulate the sale of
marijuana, the states, and potentially the United States in
the future, will receive at least a portion of this revenue that
the criminal enterprises are currently collecting. The loss
74 New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis,
J., dissenting).
7 See COLO. CONST. art. XVIII, § 16(1)(a); WASH. REV. CODE §
69.50.527 (LEXIS through 2012 Second Special Session).
76 COLO. CONST. art. XVIII, § 16(1)(a).
77 Ogden, supra note 50, at 1.
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of revenue for the criminal enterprises may even curtail
their other criminal ventures.
It is important to emphasize that at least a portion
of the revenue may be recovered and that these laws may
curtail other criminal ventures. The reason that it is
important to emphasize these points is because we do not
know the exact effect that the recreational marijuana use
laws will have. Until we have actual, tangible evidence on
the effect of legalizing marijuana, we will not know.
Therefore, the federal government should use investigatory
and prosecutorial discretion to allow these laws to take
effect until this evidence is compiled. After evidence is
gathered regarding its effects on the criminal enterprises,
then the policy can be revisited and changed if necessary.
Although recreational marijuana may only be legal
in two states, the federal government remains interested
because there is always potential for the legal marijuana to
cross state borders.78 As noted above, however, the fact
that criminal enterprises are receiving revenue from the sale
of marijuana means that these criminal enterprises are still
selling marijuana in the United States. This begs the
question of whether we as a country would rather have
marijuana, which has been taxed and regulated, sold across
state borders or whether we as a country would rather have
the illegal sale of marijuana continue in those states.
However, the argument may then be that the sale of the
legal marijuana across state borders may create new
criminal enterprises. But, again, we do not know the effect
that these laws will have. Therefore, the effects of
legalized marijuana should not be evaluated until we gather
evidence either way.
Washington's Governor Inslee and Attorney
General Ferguson met with United States Attorney General
78 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
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Eric Holder on January 22, 2013.79 The three did not
discuss Holder's intentions regarding investigatory and
prosecutorial discretion. However, Governor Inslee
decided to continue with implementation and rule-making
for the law.8 While the federal government's policy was
not explicitly stated, we can be sure that the policy is not to
stop the implementation of the law at the outset. 82
VI. CONCLUSION
Although twenty states have legalized marijuana for
medical use, two states have taken the bold initiative to
legalize marijuana for recreational use. The legalization is
directly contrary to the legislative decision made by the
United States Congress in the CSA. The Supreme Court
has upheld the CSA against constitutional challenges
because it found that the CSA is a valid exercise of power
by Congress under the Commerce Clause. Because the law
is a valid exercise of federal power, the states are limited to
implementing their new marijuana laws only if the United
States Attorneys allow the laws to take effect by using their
investigatory and prosecutorial discretion.
The United States Attorneys should use their
discretion to allow the states to implement these laws until
evidence can be gathered on the laws' economic effects and
their effects on criminal enterprises. After gathering this
evidence, both the states and federal government should
convene and determine the next step, whether that step is to
keep marijuana illegal or to push for legalizing marijuana
7 See Bob Young, Inslee Encouraged by Marijuana Talk with Attorney
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under the CSA. Therefore, this situation creates the perfect
time to "try novel social and economic experiments without
risk to the rest of the country," 83 and the federal
government should recognize the opportunity.
83 New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis,
J., dissenting).
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POLICY NOTE
THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF ELIMINATING OR




A century ago, Tennessee lent her signature to the
ratification of the Seventeenth Amendment, which altered
how a United States senator was chosen from legislative
appointment to popular choice.' Today, some political
factions are calling for a complete repeal of the
amendment,2 while others are taking smaller steps toward
entrenching more power within state legislatures at the
expense of the power granted to the voting public under the
Seventeenth Amendment. 3
Tennessee is one state that has taken steps toward
diminishing the role of the Seventeenth Amendment in the
1 RALPH A. RossUM, FEDERALISM, THE SUPREME COURT, AND THE
SEVENTEENTH AMENDMENT: THE IRONY OF CONSTITUTIONAL
DEMOCRACY 217 (2001).
2 See Charles C.W. Cooke, Repeal the 17th Amendment!, NAT'L REV.
(Mar. 1, 2013), http://www.nationalreview.com/articles/341894/repeal-
17th-amendment-charles-c-w-cooke.
3 New Hampshire lawmakers failed at altering the candidate selection
process for senators in 2010. See John Celock, Senate Elections: New
Hampshire Lawmakers Propose Changes to Candidate Selection,
HUFFINGTON POST (Dec. 14, 2011),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/12/14/new-hampshire-senate-
elections_n_1 149279.html; John Celock, Frank Niceley, Tennessee
State Senator, Proposes Partial End to Direct Election of U.S.
Senators, HUFFINGTON POST (Feb. 14, 2013),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/02/04/frank-niceley-
tennessee n_2616266.html [hereinafter Frank Niceley].
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selection of United States senators.4 As introduced earlier
this year, Senate Bill 0471/House Bill 0475 would remove
the primary election as the method for determining the
candidates for the general election and would replace it
with legislative nomination.5 Under the bill, the members
of the state legislature belonging to each party would
choose the candidate for their respective parties. 6
Although there is little discernible case law directly
addressing the constitutional protection of primary
elections, it is likely that, by leaving the general election
and the ultimate choice of United States senator in the
hands of the public, the proposed Tennessee legislation will
be valid under the Constitution. There is a chance,
however, that the law will be struck down if submitted to
judicial scrutiny, as it is in direct opposition to the
underlying objectives of the Seventeenth Amendment and
would remove a considerable amount of choice from the
people by placing it in the hands of the state legislatures.
While this would be considered desirable under the original
text and intent of the Constitution, it would not uphold the
spirit of the Seventeenth Amendment.
H1. HISTORY OF CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTION
FOR PRIMARY ELECTIONS UNDER THE
SEVENTEENTH AMENDMENT
On its face, the Constitution does little to address
the protection of primary elections for United States
senators, as the text itself omits any mention of the term.7
4 S.B. 0471, 108th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Tenn. 2013); H.B. 0415,
108th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Tenn. 2013).
5 Id.
6 id.
7 See U.S. CONST.
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The Seventeenth Amendment, which requires the popular
election of senators, reads in its relevant part as follows:
The Senate of the United
States shall be composed of
two Senators from each state,
elected by the people thereof,
for six years; and each
Senator shall have one vote.
The electors in each state
shall have the qualifications
requisite for electors of the
most numerous branch of the
state legislatures.8
Due to the absence of direct protection for the
primary, 9 it has been the province of the courts to
determine whether, and to what extent, the primary is
constitutionally protected.
In 1921, the Supreme Court heard Newberry v.
United States.'0  There, the Court addressed an issue of
campaign spending in a Michigan primary." The Court, in
preserving the Elections Clause as the congressional source
of electoral authority,12 determined that the primary
election, in determining the candidates for the general
election, "is in no real sense part of the manner of holding
the election."' 3  This narrow interpretation of the term
"manner of holding the election" led the Court to continue
as follows: "We cannot conclude that authority to control
U.S. CONST. amend. XVII.
9 See U.S. CONST.
0 Newberry v. United States, 256 U.S. 232 (1921).
' Id. at 244-46.
12 Id. at 248.
13 Id. at 257.
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party primaries or conventions for designating candidates
was bestowed on Congress by the grant of power to
regulate the manner of holding elections."1 4  This
interpretation of the term has recently been questioned, and
recent decisions have suggested that the modern Supreme
Court agrees with a broader understanding of the term
"manner of holding elections" as those procedural elements
of holding elections.
In the landmark 1941 case United States v. Classic,
the Supreme Court established the extension of e ual
protection to the right to vote in a primary election. It
reads as follows:
Where the state law has made
the primary an integral part
of the procedure of choice, or
where in fact the primary
effectively controls the
choice, the right of the elector
to have his ballot counted at
the primary is likewise
included in the right
protected by Article I, § 2.
And this right of participation
is protected just as is the right
to vote at the election, where
the primary is by law made
an integral part of the
election machinery, whether
the voter exercises his right
14 Id. at 258.
15 Zachary M. Ista, Comment, No Vacancy: Why Congress Can
Regulate Senate Vacancy-Filling Elections Without Amending (or
Offending) the Constitution, 61 AM. U. L. REV. 327, 336 (2011).
16 United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 318 (1941).
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in a party primary which
invariably, sometimes or
never determines the ultimate
choice of the representative. 17
Currently, primaries are unequivocally a part of the
procedure of choice in Tennessee, and thus, the right to
vote in the primary is equally rotected under Article I of
the United States Constitution. What this case does not
do, however, is establish the primary election as the
necessary model of choice for nominations for electing a
United States senator. The opinion is careful to recognize
the protection of the right to vote in a primary only where
the primary either effectively controls the choice of senator
or where it is by law made a part of the "election
machinery."l 9  Both the Constitution and the federal
government have long deferred to the states to determine
the method by which the states will elect their senators;20
however, the final draft of the Seventeenth Amendment
does not modify the congressional power to regulate "the
[t]imes, [p]laces and [m]anner of holding [e]lections for
Senators and Representatives." 21
Twenty-five years after the Classic decision, the
Supreme Court heard Tashjian v. Republican Party.22 The
Court found Connecticut's closed primary law, which
required voters in primary elections to be registered
members of the party, unconstitutional because it
unreasonably burdened a political party's free association
17 Id. (emphasis added).
8 See id.
19 Id.20 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4.
21 Id.; see also Newberry v. United States, 256 U.S. 232, 252 (1921)
(quoting U.S. CONST. amend. XVII).
22 Tashjian v. Republican Party, 479 U.S. 208 (1986).
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23
rights without a compelling government interest. The
Republican Party rule, which allowed independent voters
the ability to vote in party primaries, was thus
constitutional.24
While not directly addressing the protection of
primary elections generally, the Court did discuss more
broadly the rationale of constitutional protections. The
Court said, "The constitutional goal of assuring that the
Members of Congress are chosen by the people can only be
secured if that principle is applicable to every state in the
selection process."25 The Court ultimately held that "the
Qualifications Clauses of Article I, § 2, and the
Seventeenth Amendment are applicable to primary
elections in precisely the same fashion that they apply to
general congressional elections." 26 Therefore, because the
Republican Party rule did not disenfranchise voters that
would otherwise be able to vote "for the more numerous
house of the state legislature," it did not run afoul of the
Qualifications Clause. 27 This holding was adopted in the
framework developed by Classic in that it is applied
"[w]here the state law has made the primary an integral part
of the procedure of choice, or where in fact the primary
effectively controls the choice." 2 8
The Third Circuit addressed the practical effect of
both Classic and Tashjian in Trinsey v. Pennsylvania.29
The court, in interpreting Classic and Tashjian, held
primary elections were not required under the Constitution
23 Id. at 229.
24 Id.
25 Id. at 227.
26 id.
27 Id. at 229.
28 United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 318 (1941).
29 See Trinsey v. Pennsylvania, 941 F.2d 224 (3d Cir. 1991), cert.
denied, 502 U.S. 1014 (1991).
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when filling a vacant senate seat mid-term.30 While the
Trinsey court was reluctant to issue a broad holding on the
constitutional protection of primary elections generally,31 it
did address the history of the Seventeenth Amendment and
the intent of those who ultimately passed the amendment
into law. According to the court, "[the author of the Senate
Report] made clear that he believed that the precise mode
of senatorial nomination and election was to be a purely
local question and that establishment of a primary system
was to be left to the states."32 The court further determined
that "there is no firm evidence [the authors of the
amendment] believed that they were tackling the political
machines by mandating primaries as well as direct election
of Senators." 33 Whether the Sixth Circuit will follow suit is
yet to be determined.
Ill. POLICY ISSUES SURROUNDING THE DIRECT
ELECTION OF SENATORS
A. The Seventeenth Amendment
The Seventeenth Amendment was passed at a time
in which several political concerns outweighed the
Framers' intent of entrenching federalism within the
national legislative framework by delegating United States
senators to act as representatives of, and chosen by, state
legislatures. 34 At the time the Seventeenth Amendment
was passed, there were no primaries as exist today. 35 These
concerns have been addressed in the years following the
'o Id. at 234.
31 Id. at 231.
32 Id. at 230.
33id.
34 See THE FEDERALIST No. 10 (James Madison).
3 Newberry v. United States, 256 U.S. 232, 250 (1921).
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Seventeenth Amendment and still rightly exist as legitimate
concerns today.
One of the concerns the Seventeenth Amendment
aimed to address was the problem of legislative deadlock
within state legislatures. 3 6 The difficulty came about due to
a variety of factors involving the power vested in the states
to conduct their own affairs and the balanced two-party
system.3 7 This deadlock resulted in the failure of many
states to elect senators over a period of years leading up to
the ratification of the Seventeenth Amendment. 3 8
A second concern included bribery of legislators
and corruption of senate elections.39 While the number of
senators investigated on bribery charges was relatively few
in comparison to the number of senators appointed, the
cases were heavily publicized, leading to a demand of
populist reform.40
B. The "Activist" Supreme Court
Beyond the history and intent of the framers, the
proponents of increased (or absolute) state power in
appointing senators argue that as a result of the decline of
federalism and inherent protection for state powers, an
"activist" Supreme Court has been required to step in to
protect state interests.41  Since the ratification of the
Seventeenth Amendment, 4 2 the Supreme Court has made a
series of increasingly "pro-state" decisions in order to
36 RossuM, supra note 1, at 183.
37 See id. at 184-87.
A table of legislative deadlocks in the appointment of U.S. senators
can be found at RossuM, supra note 1, at 187-90.
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maintain the federalist structure that was undermined by the
enactment of the Seventeenth Amendment.43
These decisions include:
Hammer v. Dagenhart, which
held the Federal Child Labor
Act invalid under the
commerce clause," and
Bailey v. Drexel Furniture
Company, in which the Court
found that Congress was
improperly penalizing
employers using child
labor.45 Bailey was decided
in the same year as Hill v.
Wallace, which invalidated
the Future Trading Act of
1921 as an unconstitutional




overstepping its bounds in
enacting legislation that
ought to be the province of
the states.47 These decisions
have been described as
43 id.
4 Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251, 276-77 (1918), amended on
public policy grounds by U.S. v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941); RossuM,
supra note 1, at 236.
45 Bailey v. Drexel Furniture Co., 259 U.S. 20, 36, 44 (1922); ROSSUM,
supra note 1, at 238.
46 Hill v. Wallace, 259 U.S. 44, 66-68 (1922); RossuM, supra note 1, at
238.
47 RossuM, supra note 1, at 236-38.
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"unfortunate"48 and
"imprudent" 49  by some,
coupled with stark criticism
of the actions of the Supreme
Court Justice Day. In writing
for the majority in Hammer,
Justice Day seemed wholly
unaware that there is simply
no historical evidence to
suggest that the people who
ratified the Seventeenth
Amendment intended to
transfer the power to protect
that original federal design
from the indirectly elected
Senate to an appointed Court
so that it might invalidate the
very measures now passed by
their democratically elected
Senate.5 o
Yet the Supreme Court continued to pass
increasingly pro-state decisions, invalidating laws
supported by the legislative and executive branches of the
federal government.5 The role of the Supreme Court in
supporting the original design of federalism and the
protection of states continues to this day.52
A second school of thought insists that the
ramifications of the Seventeenth Amendment are concerned
primarily with not a loss or decline in federalism but with
48 See id. at 238.
49 Id.
50 Id. at 241.
5' See id.
52 See RossuM, supra note 1, at 284-85.
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the relationships among the branches of the government.5 3
While the relationships surely have changed, they require
more understanding and deliberation than what is currently
afforded.54
IV. ANALYSIS OF THE CONSTITUTIONALITY AND
POLITICAL WISDOM OF THE STATE
LEGISLATURE CHOOSING CANDIDATES FOR
THE GENERAL ELECTION OF U.S. SENATORS
Of course, the proposed Tennessee legislation falls
short of calling for an absolute repeal of the Seventeenth
Amendment. By removing a step of the process in which
the voting public can choose, however, the law would
prove to be ultimately undesirable, bringing with it many
more problems than solutions.
The first is the question of constitutionality. At first
glance, the proposed law is constitutional, as there is no
mention within the Constitution itself of primary
elections. 5 However, the Supreme Court in Classic and in
later cases maintained that rights were protected when the
primary was included as a part of the "election machinery"
and as a part of the choice of the people, with deference
given to the choice of the states. Supreme Court
precedent suggests the pivotal issue, therefore, is whether
this law would remove the primary as a part of this
procedure of choice. If it does, then the law will remain
constitutional and the Seventeenth Amendment will not be
offended, as the public will make the final selection of a
53 Vikram David Amar, Indirect Effects of Direct Election: A Structural
Examination of the Seventeenth Amendment, 49 VAND. L. REV. 1347,
1349-50 (1996).
54 See id. at 1405.
55 See U.S. CONST.
56 See United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 318 (1941).
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United States senator in a general election. If the proposed
law falls short of removing the selection of candidates from
the procedure of choice, it may be found invalid under the
Seventeenth Amendment under this reading of the Classic
holding.
Assuming the constitutionality of the proposed bill
withstands judicial scrutiny, there remains a question of
policy. By removing the selection of candidates from the
public domain and admitting it to the legislature,
proponents of the law suggest its benefits echo those of the
individuals who would repeal the Seventeenth Amendment
altogether. Those who would see it repealed cite an
increased need for reins on the powers of the federal
government, which, they argue, have been increasing at the
expense of the powers of the states, thereby undermining
federalism. 59 The Framers, in borrowing from the British
the model of the bicameral legislature, with the House of
Representatives and Senate resonant of the House of
Commons and the House of Lords, did not intend for both
chambers to be elected by popular vote.60 Rather, they
intended the House of Representatives to act as agents of
the people and the Senate to act with the voices of the
several states.61
Indeed, removing the public vote is a small step
toward the original intent of the Framers. According to the
bill's sponsor, "We've tried it this way for 100 years. It's
5 Id.
5 See Frank Niceley, supra note 3.
59 John W. Dean, The Seventeenth Amendment: Should It Be Repealed?
Why the Direct Election of Senators May Have Been a Serious Mistake,
and One That Helps Explain the Supreme Court's States' Rights Views,
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time to try something different." 62  This would further
allow the State of Tennessee a greater part in the choice of
senator and allow the senator to act in the interest of the
state as an independent political entity.
There may also be fiscal benefits to eliminating
senatorial primaries. Elections for United States senators
can cost millions of dollars for the state to administer.63
Saving that money that pays for the primaries could allow
the state to direct it elsewhere; the time saved by those
voting in the primaries could be put to another use. There
would also be the reduction of costs for those wishing to be
considered for the general ballot, with proponents
suggesting that by avoiding a primary altogether, primary
consideration would be open to a greater number of
people. 64
Finally, it would allow state legislatures a larger
role in choosing senate candidates without the difficulty of
repealing a constitutional amendment. To amend the
United States Constitution, Article V requires an
affirmative vote of two-thirds of both the House of
Representatives and the Senate, followed by a ratification
of three-quarters of state legislatures. 65
Unfortunately, these benefits do not outweigh the
negative repercussions of implementing such a plan. First,
allowing the legislature to select the primary candidates for
a general election will do very little to reestablish
62 Frank Nicely, supra note 3.
63 For example, the upcoming New Jersey special primary and special
election to fill the vacant seat of Senator Frank Lautenberg is estimated
to cost taxpayers about $24 million. John Celock, Objection to
Christie's $24 Million Senate Special Election Spreads Across State,
HUFFINGTON POST (June 20, 2013),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/06/20/new-jersey-senate-special-
election n_3474790.html.
6 Frank Nicely, supra note 3.
65 U.S. CONST. art. V.
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federalism as the ultimate choice of senator will be left to
the people of Tennessee.66 While the choice of candidates
would be determined by the legislature, there is little
guarantee that the candidates, if elected, would work to
promote the state's interest beyond what they currently do,
short of an additional mandate requiring them to do so.
This in turn would fail to remedy the actions of the
"activist" Supreme Court given their decisions supporting
and defending states' interests would continue to be
required.
Second, it would give legislators an additional
responsibility above and beyond those they currently have.
Tennessee legislators are in session a short amount of time.
Session begins each year on the second Tuesday in January
at noon and usually adjourns in late April or early May for
a total of ninety session days over a two-year period.67 The
addition of such a potentially time-consuming task would
take time away from their primary mandate-to make laws.
The additional task could then make the process of
selecting candidates much more politicized. In addition to
appealing to public sentiment to win the general election,
those wishing to become the candidate would undoubtedly
be required to be well-connected to state politics, the
politicians, and the party itself. This may result in better-
qualified individuals being placed on the ballot, as the
68
sponsor of the proposed Tennessee law has insisted.
However, it could also be argued that a primary in itself
results in more electable candidates on the final ballot,
having already been chosen by the voting public above
other party candidates. Additionally, the increased political
66 S.B. 0471, 108th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Tenn. 2013); H.B. 0415,
108th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Tenn. 2013).
67 About the Tennessee Legislature, TENN. GEN. ASSEMBLY,
http://www.capitol.tn.gov/about/ (last visited July 27, 2013).
68 See Frank Niceley, supra note 3.
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pressure could also narrow the field of potential candidates
running under Democratic or Republican banners and to
enter the general election as Independents. 69
Finally, the proposed law would run afoul of the
spirit of the Seventeenth Amendment-to give the voters of
the several states a dominant voice in the election of their
U.S. senators and to ensure a more democratic system of
election.70 Proponents will still argue that the intent of the
original Constitution validates their stance on the matter.71
Ratified by the states, the proposed bill will, the author
submits, potentially violate the Seventeenth Amendment
under the principles of Classic.72
Ultimately, taking away the ability of the public to
vote in primaries for their choice of party candidate in the
general election would leave voters feeling ostracized. In
this time of low voter turnout and general public apathy
toward elections,73 enacting legislation that would push
individuals away from the electoral process and leave them
feeling like their input is neither required nor desired would
be ill-advised. It should be the democratic goal of all
branches of government to engage the population in
political life, rather than shun them. For this reason, the
proposed Tennessee legislation should not pass.
69 The proposed legislation allows for minor parties to nominate a
person in accordance with the rules of the minor parties or by holding a
primary election. S.B. 0471, 108th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Tenn.
2013); H.B. 0415, 108th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Tenn. 2013).
70 Amar, supra note 53, at 1354.
7 Dean, supra note 59.
72 United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 318 (1941).
73 See Voter Turnout, FAIRVOTE.ORG, http://www.fairvote.org/voter-
turnout (last visited July 16, 2013).
104
Fall 2013 | Volume 9 1 Issue 2
Tennessee Journal of Law and Policy 264
105
Fall 2013 1 Volume 9 | Issue 2
Tennessee Journal of Law and Policy 265
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GUT CHECK: WHY OBESITY Is NOT A DISABILITY UNDER
TENNESSEE LAW AND HOW THE LEGISLATURE CAN
ADDRESS THE OBESITY EPIDEMIC
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"A lean compromise is better than afat lawsuit."
- English Proverb'
I. INTRODUCTION
"Bigger is better." This old adage rings true for
paychecks and televisions but not pant size. Now, some
lawmakers and courts seek to protect obesity under
disability law. Obesity currently plagues 35.7% of
AmericanS2 and 29.2% of Tennesseans, 3 and it is growing
at epidemic rates.4  However, the "bigger-is-better"
argument rings false in this instance considering obesity's
severe complications and side effects. In the same vein,
more people are also considering the consequences of
obesity in the workforce, in health care, and in the medical
profession. Indeed, tackling the issue of obesity demands
sympathy because of the stigma and stereotypes associated
with the condition, including the thoughts that obese people
* J.D. Candidate, The University of Memphis, Cecil C. Humphreys
School of Law, May 2014; The University of Memphis Law Review,
Senior Articles Editor, Volume 44; B.A., English, The University of
Memphis, 2011. I am sincerely grateful to Professor Jodi L. Wilson
and William C. Terrell for their guidance and valuable editorial
assistance. I also wish to thank my mother, Stacey Vallor, and sister,
Emily Vallor, for their love and unwavering support. Thank you also
to Sam Ivy for his love and encouragement.
1 KATHRYN ZULLO, THE NEW LAWYER'S WIT AND WISDOM 184 (Bruce
Nash & Allan Zullo eds., Running Press 2d ed. 2001).
2Adult Obesity Facts, CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION,
http://www.cdc.gov/obesity/data/adult.html (last reviewed Aug. 16,
2013). As of 2011, the CDC has made changes to its formula for
calculating obesity. Id. The CDC has stated that because of these
changes, estimates of obesity prevalence from 2011 forward cannot be
compared to previous years. Id.
3 id.
4 The Obesity Epidemic, CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL &
PREVENTION, http://www.cdc.gov/cdctv/ObesityEpidemic/ (last
reviewed Nov. 22, 2013).
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are lazy, unintelligent, or lacking in self-respect.5  In a
society that is highly focused on appearance, the outlook
for combating these stereotypes seems gloomy.6 However,
while compassion is a must, legal protection under
disability law is not.
More and more courts are having to decide complex
legal issues regarding obesity as a disability. Consider the
plaintiff Toni, a 5-foot, 4-inch woman who weighs 305
pounds, whom the defendant declined to hire chiefly based
on a concern about her weight.7 Toni's scenario is one of
5 Michael L. Klassen et al., The Role of Physical Appearance in
Managerial Decisions, 8 J. Bus. & PSYCHOL. 181 (1993); see also
Michelle R. Hebl et al., Perceptions of Obesity across the Lifespan, 16
OBEsIrY 46, 46 (2008) (concluding that "this research shows prevalent
and consistent patterns of obesity stereotyping across the lifespan").
Hebl's study viewed the extent to which individuals ages 18-77
stereotyped obese people in 20-, 40-, and 60-year olds. Id. Women
weighing more were more negatively rated on all criteria examined in
the study. Id. Interestingly enough, the CDC has found no significant
relationship between obesity and education among men. Adult Obesity
Facts, supra note 2. However, among women there is a correlation-
those with college degrees are less likely to be obese than women with
less education. Id.
6 See M. Neil Browne et al., Obesity as a Protected Category: The
Complexity of Personal Responsibility for Physical Attributes, 14
MICH. ST. U. J. MED. & L. 1, 8 (2010).
7 Cassista v. Cmty. Foods, Inc., 856 P.2d 1143 (Cal. 1993). In Cassista
v. Community Foods, Inc., Toni Cassista sued an employer, a health
food store, which denied her a job because of her weight. Id. at 1143.
The job duties included many physical activities such as standing long
hours to run the cash register, stocking thirty- to fifty-pound bags of
grain, carrying fifty-pound boxes of produce, retrieving groceries from
the warehouse, and carrying large crates of milk. Id. The Supreme
Court of California ultimately found that medical evidence must be
shown that excessive weight was the result of a physiological condition
affecting one or more basic bodily systems and limiting a major life
activity. Id. at 1149. Here, the plaintiffs weight discrimination claim
was denied because she was unable to produce medical evidence. Id. at
1154.
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the most common among "weight discrimination" claims in
courts today, and about one-third of Tennesseans could
theoretically share Toni's plight.9 At first glance, one
likely feels sympathetic for Toni, as is appropriate.
However, whether the law should afford her a remedy
under a disability statute requires a different analysis. In
deciding weight discrimination cases, where clear statutory
guidance is often lacking, the court must balance the state's
interests, the plaintiffs interests, and the employer's
interests. In doing so, the court must look at other disabled
plaintiffs and compare Toni-which is where the problem
lies. Is Toni's obesity a disability similar to other
disabilities, like blindness or deafness? Is obesity
preventable unlike other qualified disabilities? How do we
determine who suffers from this nebulous condition?
Different jurisdictions employ different methods when
considering whether obesity should be a disability.' 0 Often,
judicial instinct directs a court as to whether the obese
merit protection under disability law." However, in some
instances, explicit statutory language guides the court.' 2
The State of Tennessee has yet to make a clear
determination on whether Toni would prevail on a
disability claim under the Tennessee Human Rights Act or
the Tennessee Disability Act, which are very similar to the
Jane Korn, Too Fat, 17 VA. J. Soc. POL'Y & L. 209, 225-26 (2010).
9 Adult Obesity Facts, supra note 2. Nearly all lawsuits based on
weight discrimination are filed in the context of employment
discrimination. Browne, supra note 6, at 10-11; Perla Trevizo,
Tennessee Human Rights Commission Battling New Biases,
CHATrANOOGA TIMES FREE PREsS (Feb. 22, 2012),
http://www.timesfreepress.com/news/2012/feb/22/human-rights-
commission-battling-new-biases/.
'0 Milena O'Hara, Note and Comment, "Please Weight to Be Seated":
Recognizing Obesity as a Disability to Prevent Discrimination in
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Americans with Disabilities Act. However, with the
alarming obesity statistics in Tennessee, the state's
legislature and the courts will inevitably be compelled to
answer this single question for the first time: should
Tennessee consider obesity a disability? If Tennessee
courts ultimately decide that obesity is a disability, Toni's
claim prevails. Superficially, Toni's victory in court would
appear to be promising for Toni and other plaintiffs
similarly situated; however, this result leaves other aspects
of the obesity epidemic legally unaddressed and quickly
dismissed at an unfairly high cost to Toni's employer,
health care provider, and other truly disabled plaintiffs.
Various state approaches to disability law focus on
different elements, definitions, symptoms, and causes of
obesity when considering whether obesity is a disability.' 3
Some states even focus on the same variables but reach
different conclusions.14  For the most part, disability
statutes seem to echo each other with one main purpose: to
protect disabled persons from discrimination. While this is
a noble goal indeed, it is one that requires courts to do more
than simply study relevant statutory law. In each case, the
court adopts an attitude of willingness or unwillingness to
expand the protections offered by disability statutes. 15 This
is not unlike traditional areas of disability law and other
protected areas such as race and gender.16 However,
because most statutes do not explicitly mention obesity,
13 Id. at 926 (explaining how some courts rely on different methods of
proof for weight discrimination claims, such as requiring proof of the
diagnosis of an underlying condition, and some do not, possibly
allowing recovery on the perceived disability theory or focusing on
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courts decide each case on a very fact-specific basis,
leading to an uncertain future for this issue.
A national debate has ensued as to whether courts
and legislatures should consider obesity a disability.
Currently, neither Tennessee statutory law nor case law has
specified whether obesity is a disability under the
Tennessee Human Rights Act or the Tennessee Disability
Act. In this Note, I argue that obesity does not qualify as a
disability in Tennessee. To show why, this Note will show
how obesity is inherently different from other protected
disabilities. The nature of obesity, however, requires the
legislature to use its influence to combat obesity in areas
where legislation can be effective. Part II provides
background on federal and state law regarding disability
law generally and how it currently affects weight
discrimination law specifically. Part III explains the legal
argument for excluding obesity as a disability under
Tennessee state law. Part IV offers a proposal for the
legislature to address obesity outside of disability statutes.
Part IV also describes several of the benefits of adopting
this proposal. Part V offers brief closing remarks.
II. BACKGROUND ON FEDERAL AND TENNESSEE
DISABLITY LAW
Perhaps the most problematic shortcoming of this
area of disability law is the amorphous definition of
"disability." Since the inception of the Americans with
Disabilities Acts in 1990, courts have struggled to pinpoint
what constitutes a protected "disability." Further, the
nebulous definition of "disability" adds confusion when
determining whether the definition of "obesity" fits within
that definition. Understanding the legal landscape upon
which these definitions developed is important to
1 id.
112
Fall 2013 | Volume 9 1 Issue 2
Tennessee Journal of Law and Policy 272
understanding why obesity simply does not render an
individual disabled, namely under the Tennessee Human
Rights Act or the Tennessee Disability Act.
A. Defining "Disability"
i. Federal Disability Law
Before the landmark Americans with Disabilities
Act (ADA) was passed, several laws existed-most
importantly, the Rehabilitation Act of 1973.18 Section 504
of the Rehabilitation Act served as a "major conceptual
foundation for the ADA."l 9 Even with the Rehabilitation
Act and other federal laws designed to protect disabled
citizens, discrimination unfortunately continued.20
In the decades between the civil rights era and the
enactment of the Americans with Disabilities Act in 1990,
complainants, legislators, and the public battled back and
forth on whether the Civil Rights Act (CRA) should cover
disabilities.21 -Riding on the coattails of the civil rights era,
the concept of protection for the disabled gained regard.22
The ongoing discrimination demanded protection for
individuals with disabilities, and a Congress-appointed
council drafted what would eventually become the ADA. 23
" 29 U.S.C. § 701 (2006).
19 BUREAU OF NAT'L AFFAIRS, THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES
ACT: A PRACTICAL AND LEGAL GUIDE TO IMPACT, ENFORCEMENT, AND
COMPLIANCE 9-11 (1990) [hereinafter PRACTICAL AND LEGAL GUIDE].
20 U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, ACCOMMODATING THE SPECTRUM
OF INDIVIDUAL ABILITIES 159 (1983).
21 See O'Hara, supra note 10, at 926.
22 PRACTICAL AND LEGAL GUIDE, supra note 19, at 9-11 (explaining
that the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which prohibits discrimination on the
basis of race, color, religion, or national origin, "was a major
inspiration for the concept of protection for people with disabilities").
23 Id. at 28-30.
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Signed by President Bush in 1990, the ADA became the
first major response to disability discrimination.24 The
ADA responded to decades of attempts to end
discrimination against disabled individuals. 25
The ADA's passage was prompted by a statistic of
26
forty-three million disabled Americans. Ultimately, the
ADA adopted most of the Rehabilitation Act's definitions,
including "disability." 27 While the ADA covers millions
and, thus, a variety of conditions, Congress never provided
an exhaustive list of what it considered a "disability." 28
Congress did, however, provide the following language for
what constituted a protected "disability": "(a) a physical or
mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of
the major life activities of such individual; (b) a record of
such impairment; or (c) being regarded as having such an
impairment."29 The ambiguity in this definition is clear,
and the task of interpreting it was left to courts. 30
Congress passed the ADA to provide a
"comprehensive mandate for the elimination of
discrimination against individuals with disabilities." 31
24 See Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-
12213 (2006); see also 1 BERNARD D. REAMS ET AL., DISABILITY LAW
IN THE UNITED STATES: A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE AMERICANS
WITH DISABILITIES ACT OF 1990, PUBLIC LAW 101-336, at vii (1992).
25 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (2006); see also PRACTICAL AND LEGAL
GUIDE, supra note 19, at 9-11.
26 Browne, supra note 6, at 30.
27 Id. at 63. Compare §§ 12101-12213 with 29 U.S.C. § 701 (2006).
The ADA uses the term "disabled," as opposed to the Rehabilitation
Act's "handicap," because the former is less stigmatizing. S. REP. No.
101-116, at 35 (1989).
28 See H 12101-12213.
29 Id. § 12102(1).
30 Browne, supra note 6, at 31.
3' 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(1). The ADA spans five titles, including
employment, public entities, public accommodations,
telecommunications, and miscellaneous. Id. §§ 12101-12213.
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During the ADA bill hearings, cancer patients, blind
persons, and quadriplegics-persons traditionally
considered disabled-gave personal testimony to exemplify
the bill's merit to Congress. 32 Building upon these initial
purposes, Congress enacted amendments to the ADA in
2009, the Americans with Disabilities Act As Amended
(ADAAA), to offer courts more discretion when deciding
disability claims. 33 Congress instructed courts to use the
definition of "handicapped individual" under the broader
definition that appears in the Rehabilitation Act of 197334
when deciding what constituted a disability under the
ADA.35 Congress further urged courts to broaden the scope
of what was included under "substantially limits" and
"major life activities," effectively making it easier for
plaintiffs to prove their disabilities. 36 Although Congress
broadened the scope of these phrases, it never provided a
definition for "substantially limits."
In drafting the ADAAA, Congress replaced the
Supreme Court's narrow interpretation of the definition of
"disability" and "substantially limits," finding the Court's
32 See, e.g., Hearing on H.R. 2273 Before the H. Comm. on Educ. and
Labor and the S. Comm. on Labor and Human Res., 100th Cong. 74-
75 (1988) (statement of Judith Heumann, World Institute on
Disability). Heumann explained how her handicap placed many
obstacles in her life, including a denial of admission to a local public
school because her wheelchair made her a "fire hazard" and an attempt
by her high school principal to prevent her from going on stage to
accept an award at graduation because she was in a wheelchair.
33 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (2011) (amended 2008).
34 29 U.S.C. § 705(9)(A) (2006). Note that because the ADA's
definition of disability is identical to the Rehabilitation Act's definition,
cases arising under either statute generally follow the same precedent.
See 29 U.S.C. § 701.
3 154 CONG. REC. S9626-01 (daily ed. Sept. 26, 2008) (statement of
Sen. Reid).36 id.
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37
standard too high. Accordingly, the ADAAA provides a
non-exhaustive list of what constitutes a major life activity,
including "caring for oneself, performing manual tasks,
seeing, hearing, eating, sleeping, walking, standing, lifting,
bending, speaking, breathing, learning, reading,
concentrating, thinking, communicating, and working." 38
However, Congress did not provide a
comprehensive list of "disabilities," and federal courts take
a variety of approaches when determining what constitutes
a "disability." Some courts require a medically
diagnosable condition to be shown before calling a
condition a "disability."39  Still, other courts have found
that mutable characteristics cannot constitute a disability.40
Further, courts have also found that when the plaintiffs
37 Lowe v. Am. Eurocopter, LLC, No. 1:10CV24-A-D, 2010 WL
5232523 (N.D. Miss. Dec. 16, 2010).
3842 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A) (2006).
39 See, e.g., EEOC v. Watkins Motor Lines, Inc., 463 F.3d 436, 443 (6th
Cir. 2006) (holding that obesity, absent a physiological condition, was
simply a physical characteristic and not a physiological disorder in
itself).
40 Tudyman v. United Airlines, 608 F. Supp. 739 (C.D. Cal. 1984)
(finding that a bodybuilder's condition was self-inflicted, which
rendered his claim for weight discrimination unsuccessful); Dale v.
Wynne, 497 F. Supp. 2d 1337, 1342 (M.D. Ala. 2007) (holding that
obesity is a voluntary condition and thus not a disability. under
Alabama law); Greene v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 548 F. Supp. 3, 5 (W.D.
Wash. 1981) (holding that because obesity "was not an immutable
condition such as blindness or lameness," it is not a disability). Several
state courts have also found that federal interpretation of the ADA
precluded plaintiffs from recovering when the condition was mutable.
See, e.g., Cassista v. Cmty. Foods, Inc., 856 P.2d 1143, 1152 (Cal.
1993) (finding that obesity was a voluntary condition and thus not a
disability under California disability law); Mo. Comm'n on Human
Rights v. Sw. Bell Tel. Co., 699 S.W.2d 75, 79 (Mo. Ct. App. 1985)
(holding that because plaintiff failed to take advantage of treatment for
her known hypertension and obesity, she could not get the benefit of
disability law).
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inability to work is of "limited duration," she is not
41disabled under the ADA. In the same vein, "intermittent,
episodic impairments" are not disabilities.42 Unique facts
and circumstances in each case have led to a variety of
court holdings without any cohesive jurisprudence.43
Federal interpretation of disability law often guides state
courts' decisions. Therefore, this lack of cohesion in
federal courts renders many difficulties for state courts and
legislatures in determining what qualifies as a "disability"
in their respective states.
ii. Tennessee Disability Law
In 1978," the Tennessee General Assembly
enacted the Tennessee Human Rights Act 45 (THRA) to
provide protection for various forms of discrimination,
including race, creed, color, religion, sex, age, or national
origin. Shortly after the enactment of the THRA, the
disabled became a protected category when the legislature
enacted the Tennessee Disability Act46 (TDA)
41 See, e.g., McDonald v. Pennsylvania, 62 F.3d 92, 96 (3d Cir. 1995).
42 Vande Zande v. Wis. Dep't of Admin., 44 F.3d 538, 544 (7th Cir.
1995).
4 3 O'Hara, supra note 10, at 929-30.
44 TENN. CODE ANN. § 8-50-103 (2012); Trevizo, supra note 9.
45 TENN. CODE ANN. § § 4-21-101 to -1004 (2012).
46 Formally known as the Tennessee Handicap Act. Effective April 7,
2008, the Tennessee Handicap Act was renamed the Tennessee
Disability Act. See TENN. CODE ANN. § 8-50-103(a) (2012). Notably,
this change was made after the Americans with Disabilities Act was
amended in 2008. Unlike the changes made to the ADAAA that
included amendments in the statute's language, the Tennessee
Disability Act was not substantively changed. This is evidence that
shows the Tennessee General Assembly was updating the name of the
statute but did not mean to change the language of the statute in accord
with the meanings found in the ADAAA.
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(collectively, "Acts").47  Although the THRA prohibits
discrimination based on "race, color, creed, religion, sex,
age, disability, familial status and national origin," the
TDA provides a mechanism for plaintiffs facing
discrimination based on a disability. 48 That is, a plaintiff
bringing a disability discrimination claim will sue under the
TDA. However, the TDA relies on the principles and
purposes set forth in the THRA.49 The legislature listed its
purposes for creating the Acts explicitly in the THRA
itself: from the purpose of safeguarding individuals from
discrimination based on race, creed, and sex to the purpose
of making available to the state a citizen's full productive
capacity in employment.50 More generally, the Acts seek
to preserve the "public safety, health and general welfare"
of the state.
Generally, discrimination claims under the TDA are
comparable to ADA claims, and courts may evaluate them
using federal cases interpreting the ADA as guidance. 52
However, the TDA is not identical to the ADA. Although
47 The TDA prohibits discrimination "against any applicant for
employment based solely upon any physical, mental or visual handicap
of the applicant, unless such handicap to some degree prevents the
applicant from performing the duties required by the employment
sought or impairs the performance of the work involved." § 8-50-103.
48 Id.; Forbes v. Wilson Cnty. Emergency Dist. 911 Bd., 966 S.W.2d
417, 420 (Tenn. 1998) (finding that the TDA embodies the principles
and definitions of the THRA).
49 Forbes, 966 S.W.2d at 420.
50 TENN. CODE ANN. § 4-21-101(3), (5).
51 Id. § 4-21-101(a)(7).
52 Barnes v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 48 S.W.3d 698, 705 (Tenn.
2000).
53 See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A) (2006); Roberson v. Cendant Travel
Servs., Inc., 252 F. Supp. 2d 573, 583 (M.D. Tenn. 2002) (noting that
the TDA elements are very similar to the ADA's but do not require
employers to make "reasonable accommodations" for disabled
employees).
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the TDA prohibits discrimination in the employment
context based solely on any physical, mental, or visual
disability (unless the condition prevents the applicant from
performing the duties required by the position), the TDA
does not require the employer to furnish a "reasonable
accommodation" like the ADA does.54 The Tennessee
Court of Appeals has repeatedly noted-albeit in
unpublished opinions55 that the TDA lacks the
"reasonable accommodation" element. However, the
Tennessee General Assembly has yet to amend the statute
and thus make Tennessee statutory law more similar to the
ADA. 56
Identical to the ADA, the TDA defines "disability"
as: "(i) a physical or mental impairment which substantially
limits one (1) or more of such person's major life activities;
(ii) a record of having such impairment; or (iii) being
regarded as having such impairment." 57 The Tennessee
Supreme Court has found that "an impairment that may
disqualify one from working at a job of choice does not
limit a major life activity."58 For example, the court found
that the plaintiff in Barnes v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co.
did not prove that his Bell's Palsy "substantially limited a
major life activity" even though it prevented him from
5442 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12102.
55 See, e.g., Anderson v. Ajax Turner Co., No. OIAO1-9807-CH-00396,
1999 WL 976517, at *3 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 28, 1999) (finding that
the TDA does not require an employer to provide disabled employees
with a "reasonable accommodation").
5 6 TENN. CODE ANN. § 8-50-103 (2012).
" Id. § 4-21-102(3)(A)(i)-(iii) (2012); see also 42 U.S.C. § 12102
(2006).
5 Barnes v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 48 S.W.3d 698, 705 (Tenn.
2000).
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working at Goodyear because he was still able to work at a
broader class of jobs.59
Even though the ADA and Tennessee disability
statutes are not identical, courts have consistently found
that the Acts require them to at least consider federal law
when reaching a decision. 60 In doing so, these courts have
relied solely on the first purpose listed in the THRA: to
"[p]rovide for execution within Tennessee of the policies
embodied in the federal Civil Rights Act[s] . . ., the
Pregnancy Amendment of 1978, and the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967."61 Notably,
none of the federal legislation mentioned in this purpose
covers disabilities. Thus, the courts are using federal law to
decide state disability issues without explicit-or even
implicit-direction to do so. At least one court has
declined to follow federal law when doing so would thwart
the purposes of the THRA.62
B. The Obesity Epidemic and Disability Law
Like the term "disability," pinpointing a single
definition, cause, or treatment for "obesity" proves
difficult. This section discusses general medical definitions
and then moves to federal law and state disability law
regarding obesity. Offering little guidance, a dictionary
defines "obesity" as "very fat." 63 In trying to understand
59 Id. at 704. However, the court still found defendant-employer liable
based on other grounds unrelated to the scope of this Note.
6 Booker v. Boeing Co., 188 S.W.3d 639, 647 (Tenn. 2006); Barnes,
48 S.W.3d at 707; Spicer v. Beaman Bottling Co., 937 S.W.2d 884, 888
(Tenn. 1996).
61 TENN. CODE ANN. § 4-21-101 (a)(1).
62 Booker, 188 S.W.3d at 647.6 3 OXFORD AMERICAN DESK DICTIONARY AND THESAURUS 567 (2d ed.
2001).
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this amorphous condition, the medical community and
courts have offered guidance as well.
i. Medical Definitions of Obesity and Its
Causes
A more precise indication used by experts is the
Body Mass Index (BMI), which indicates overweightness
and obesity more precisely.64 The BMI considers many
facets of a person's body, including health, weight, and
frame size, .to produce a number. This number allows a
person to see where he or she falls on a scale indicating if
the person is overweight, normal, or underweight. A BMI
ranging from 25-29.9 is considered overweight, and a BMI
of 30 or greater is considered obese. 65
Still, other medical professionals use percentages of
ideal body weight66 to create three categories of obesity.67
A person is "mildly obese" if he weighs twenty to forty
percent over the ideal body weight.68 A person is
"moderately obese" if he weighs forty to one hundred
percent over his ideal body weight. Finally, a person who
weighs more than one hundred percent over his ideal body
weight suffers from "morbid" or "severe obesity." 69
" MERCK MANUAL OF DIAGNOSIS AND THERAPY 950 (Robert Berkow
et al. eds., 15th ed. 1987) [hereinafter MERCK MANUAL 15TH ED.].
65 U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., OVERWEIGHT AND
OBESITY STATISTICS 1 (2012),
http://win.niddk.nih.gov/publications/PDFs/stat904z.pd.
66 Ideal body weight is a BMI of 18-24.9. MERCK MANUAL HOME
HEALTH HANDBOOK, OBESITY (2008),
http://www.merckmanuals.com/home/disorders-of-nutrition/obesity-a
ndthemetabolic-syndrome/obesity.html.
67 MERCK MANUAL OF DIAGNOSIS AND THERAPY 981 (Robert Berkow
et al. eds., l6th ed. 1992) [hereinafter MERCK MANUAL 16TH ED.].68 id.
69id,
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On an individual level, obesity is directly and
indirectly associated with a plethora of other health risks.
Obesity-related conditions include heart disease, stroke,
Type II diabetes, and certain types of cancer. 70 Of these
conditions, Type II diabetes is most directly linked to
obesity.7 1 Ninety to ninety-five percent of Type II diabetes
cases result from the individual being overweight. 72
Moreover, obesity is often associated with a variety of
other health issues as well, including hypertension,
osteoarthritis, sleep apnea, and respiratory problems. 73
Morbid obesity is outside of the realm of this Note;
however, knowing what constitutes morbid obesity is
helpful for understanding what normal obesity is. The
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC)
defined severe, or "morbid," obesity as 100% over the
normal weight for that specific person.74 The EEOC
70 Adult Obesity Facts, supra note 2.
7' The Coming Diabetic Epidemic, FOOD MGMT., Dec. 2000, at 18.
72 Tara Parker-Pope, Diabetes: Underrated, Insidious and Deadly, N.Y.
TIMES (July 1, 2008),
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/07/01/health/01 well.html?_r=0&pagewa
nted=print. Notably, the Tennessee Court of Appeals in Davis v.
Computer Maintenance Service, Inc. decided that diabetes was not
considered a disability when the plaintiff took insulin or other
medication to regulate blood sugar levels. No. OIAO1-9809-CV00459,
1999 WL 767597 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 29, 1999). However, the court
relied on the United States Supreme Court's decision in Sutton v.
United Airlines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471 (1999), which has been preempted
by the ADAAA. Id. at *1.
73 NAT'L HEART, LUNG, & BLOOD INST., CLINICAL GUIDELINES ON THE
IDENTIFICATION, EVALUATION, AND TREATMENT OF OVERWEIGHT AND
OBESITY IN ADULTS: THE EVIDENCE REPORT (1998),
http://www.nhlbi.nih.gov/guidelines/obesity/ob-gdlns.pdf,
http://www.cdc.gov/Other/disclaimer.html [hereinafter CLINICAL
GUIDELINES]. Notably, the CDC mentioned that these obesity-related
conditions were "some of the leading causes of preventable death."
74 EEOC v. Watkins Motor Lines, Inc., 463 F.3d 436, 441 (6th Cir.
2006).
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considers morbid obesity to be a physiological impairment,
i.e. a "disability." However, prior regulations state that
"[b]eing overweight, in and of itself, generally is not an
impairment."75 For this premise, the EEOC offered
examples of bodybuilding and mild cases of being
overweight.76
Obesity is generally preventable and mutable, but
once an individual becomes morbidly obese, complications
and treatment are much more rigorous.77 Researchers
suspect that morbid obesity, unlike normal obesity, may be
linked to a recessive gene. Morbid obesity is very rare,
affecting only 0.1% of the population. 79 Although morbid
obesity shares some of the physiological characteristics of
regular obesity, the consequences are much more severe.80
Additionally, a change in diet and physical activity is
usually ineffective at battling morbid obesity, forcing the
individual to often resort to surgery.8 1
Some courts find that once an individual becomes
morbidly obese, his metabolism is permanently
dysfunctional, creating a physical impairment.82
Individuals who are morbidly obese are more susceptible to
hypoventilation, carbon dioxide retention, blood circulatory
dysfunctions, hypertension, and endocrine and metabolic
complications.83 Unfortunately, even morbidly obese
7 See Equal Employment Opportunity Commission Compliance
Manual, 2009 WL 4782107 (2009).76 id.
77 MERCK MANUAL 16TH ED., supra note 67, at 981.
7 CLINICAL GUIDELINES, supra note 73, at 28.
7 MERCK MANUAL 16TH ED., supra note 67, at 981.80
d.
" Id. at 984.
82 See, e.g., Cook v. R.I., Dep't of Mental Health, Retardation, and
Hosps., 10 F.3d 17, 18 (1st Cir. 1993).
83 TEXTBOOK OF MEDICINE 1378-79 (Paul B. Beeson & Walsh
McDermott eds., 15th ed. 1979).
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individuals who eventually do return to a normal weight
still suffer from the increased risk of premature death and
morbidity. 84  Therefore, regardless of morbid obesity's
cause, an individual who is or was morbidly obese bears a
permanent physiological impairment sufficient to render his
condition a "disability."85  Due to the nature of morbid
obesity, it is outside the scope of this Note's argument,
which only contemplates whether regular obesity is a
disability under Tennessee law.
ii. Federal Law on Obesity as a Disability
Prior to the passage of the ADAAA, federal courts
uniformly rejected the idea that obesity was a qualified
disability under the ADA.86 However, with the passage of
the ADAAA, some federal courts have started to recognize
obesity as a disability because the ADAAA generally
includes a broader definition of "disability" than what the
ADA originally included.87 Absent any federal legislation
or a Supreme Court case providing guidance on whether
obesity is a disability under the ADA, this area of law is
quite unsettled. Some of the more recent federal case law,
however, tends to find that obesity is not a disability.88
84 Christine L. Kuss, Comment, Absolving a Deadly Sin: A Medical and
Legal Argument for Including Obesity as a Disability Under the
Americans with Disabilities Act, 12 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y
563, 597-98 (1996).
"Id. at 595.
86 EEOC v. Watkins Motor Lines, Inc., 463 F.3d 436, 440-43 (6th Cir.
2006); Andrews v. Ohio, 104 F.3d 803, 809-10 (6th Cir. 1997); Francis
v. City of Meriden, 129 F.3d 281, 286 (2d. Cir. 1997).
87 See, e.g., EEOC v. Res. for Human Dev., 827 F. Supp. 2d 688 (E.D.
La. 2011) (holding that the EEOC's interpretation of the new language
in the ADAAA permitted plaintiff to claim obesity as a disability).
88 Watkins Motor Lines, Inc., 463 F.3d at 440-43.
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Additionally, a plaintiff may also sue under other
statutes, such as the Rehabilitation Act of 1973,89 which
was used by the plaintiff in Cook v. Rhode Island
Department of Mental Health, Retardation, and
Hospitals.90 Cook was the first case allowing a plaintiff to
win an obesity discrimination claim. 91 Although the court
did not rule that obesity was an immutable condition, the
court did find the plaintiff's claim valid based on her
employer perceiving her as being disabled. 92
Regardless, the question still remains as to whether
obesity is a disability under federal law. The EEOC has
publicly stated that "the law protects morbidly obese
employees and applicants from being subjected to
discrimination because of their obesity." 93 The EEOC,
'929 U.S.C. § 701 (2006).
90 10 F.3d 17, 28 (1st Cir. 1993). The plaintiff applied for a position
with the state's Department of Mental Health, Retardation, and
Hospitals (MHRH) but was denied employment after a pre-
employment physical found her to be morbidly obese. Id. at 20-21.
The defendant, MHRH, argued that her obesity would prevent her from
helping patients evacuate in an emergency situation and would cause
her to miss work. Id. at 21. Further, MHRH feared the possibility of
Cook filing a workers' compensation claim that would be higher than
for employees of a normal weight. Id.
91 The plaintiff, Cook, brought the claim under the Rehabilitation Act
because the claim arose from facts taking place before the enactment of
the ADA. Id. at 20-21. However, because the Rehabilitation Act and
the ADA definition for "disability" are identical, the two statutes follow
the same precedent. See 29 U.S.C. § 701.
92 Cook, 10 F.3d at 23-24. Contra Tudyman v. United Airlines, 608 F.
Supp. 739, 746 (C.D. Cal. 1984). In Tudyman, a bodybuilder was
denied employment as a flight attendant by defendant United Airlines
and brought suit based on weight discrimination. Id. However,
because the plaintiffs weight was found to be voluntary and self-
inflicted, the court reasoned that his condition did not fit the definition
of "disability" or the purposes of disability statutes. Id.
9 Press Release, U.S. Equal Emp't. Opportunity Comm'n, BAE
Systems Subsidiary to Pay $55,000 to Settle EEOC Disability
Discrimination Suit (July 24, 2012),
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however, did not state whether this also applied to those
who are simply obese or overweight as opposed to those
who are morbidly obese. However, applying the concept of
expressio unius est exclusio alterius-the specific inclusion
of an item suggests the exclusion of the rest-dictates that
the EEOC intentionally excluded obesity, especially
considering the alarming statistics on obesity.
Moreover, a trend in federal disability law involving
weight discrimination seems to be emerging-that of
personal responsibility. 95  Proponents of greater legal
protection for victims of weight discrimination celebrated
the Cook decision.96 However, the area of obesity
discrimination is still fresh and undeveloped, leaving room
for more interpretation by courts. 97 A recent case from the
Sixth Circuit confirming this trend, EEOC v. Watkins
Motor Lines, Inc.,98 held that an employee's obesity was
not a "physical impairment" and not a disability under the
ADA because discrimination based on weight is only
http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/newsroom/release/7-24-12c.cfm. Where the
plaintiff is morbidly obese, he need not prove an underlying condition
is the cause of his obesity to be considered "disabled." EEOC v. Res.
for Human Dev., 827 F. Supp. 2d 688 (E.D. La. 2011).
94 See Doukas v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., No. CIV-4-478-SD, 1997 WL
833134, at *3 (D.N.H. Oct. 21, 1997); Leatherman v. Tarrant Cnty.
Narcotics Intelligence & Coordination Unit, 507 U.S. 163, 168 (1993);
Cipollone v. Liggett Grp., Inc., 505 U.S. 504 (1992).
95 EEOC v. Watkins Motor Lines, Inc., 463 F.3d 436, 440-43 (6th Cir.
2006); Andrews v. Ohio, 104 F.3d 803, 809-10 (6th Cir. 1997); Francis
v. City of Meriden, 129 F.3d 281, 286 (2d. Cir. 1997). See generally
Matthew A. Glover, Employment & Disability Law-Americans with
Disabilities Act of 1990-The Weight of Personal Responsibility:
Obesity, Causation, and Protected Physical Impairments, 30 U. ARK.
LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 381 (2008) (examining recent case law, including
Watkins Motor Lines, Inc., and finding that obesity stems from personal
responsibility and, thus, is not a protected disability).
96 Glover, supra note 95.
97 Id.
98 See Watkins Motor Lines, Inc., 463 F.3d at 436.
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actionable if the plaintiff proves an underlying medical
condition.
More law is emerging based on the premise that
obesity is largely preventable. 00 Put very simply, obesity
is caused by an excessive consumption of food, i.e. by
taking in more calories than one burns during physical
activity.' 0' Americans' "ever-increasing sedentary
lifestyles [] make [] for an environment anathema to a
healthy lifestyle."' 02 Congress has even gone so far as to
introduce legislation like the Personal Responsibility in
Food Consumption Act, better known as the "Cheeseburger
Bill," that seeks to limit fast food restaurants' liability in
response to the growing number of lawsuits concerning
health issues arising from their products.103 Although not
the best way to address the problem of obesity, just the
presence alone of the federal and state "Cheeseburger
Bills" lends credence to the consensus that obesity, largely
caused by overconsumption, is preventable.
99 Id. at 443; see also Andrews, 104 F.3d at 810 (holding that the
purpose of the ADA would be distorted if obesity was considered a
disability); Francis, 129 F.3d at 286 (holding that the floodgates of
litigation would open if obesity was considered a disability).
'n Browne, supra note 6, at 1; Stephen A. McGuinness, Time to Cut
the Fat: The Case for Government Anti-Obesity Legislation, 25 J.L. &
HEALTH 41, 46 (2012).
1o1 U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., supra note 65, at 1.
102 McGuinness, supra note 100, at 46; see also U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC.,
PROFILING FOOD CONSUMPTION IN AMERICA 14 (2002),
www.usda.gov/documents/usda-factbook-2001-2002.pdf.
103 H.R. 339, 108th Cong. (2004)
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/BILLS-108hr3390pcs/pdf/BILLS-
108hr339pcs.pdf. Ultimately, this bill did not pass, but many state
legislatures enacted their own versions of the Cheeseburger Bill,
including Tennessee's Commonsense Consumption Act. TENN. CODE
ANN. § 29-34-205 (2012). The Commonsense Consumption Act limits
liability for restaurants based on claims of weight gain or obesity
brought by individuals. Id.
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A federal circuit split currently exists as to whether
obesity is a disability absent a cognizant physiological
condition, such as a glandular issue. Courts' main fear in
permitting obese plaintiffs to sue for discrimination is that
it will open the floodgates of litigation, distorting the
purpose of the ADA to protect those with a genuine
handicap. 104 However, when an underlying physiological
condition is present, most courts will permit the plaintiff to
claim he is disabled. 05  Still, some courts have held that
obesity alone is a disability and should be protected. 106
104See, e.g., Andrews, 104 F.3d 803 (finding that to consider obesity a
disability would distort the purpose of the ADA and allow a very large
group of people to pursue litigation); Francis, 129 F.3d 281 (finding
that considering obesity as a disability would open the floodgates of
litigation and distort the purpose of the ADA to protect those with a
legitimate handicap); Forrisi v. Bowen, 794 F.2d 931, 934 (4th Cir.
1986) (fear-of-heights case where the court refers to several obesity
cases, holding that protecting acrophobia would debase the high
purpose of the statute in allowing minor or widely shared impairments
to qualify as disabilities). An interesting case of how weight
discrimination may be reversed is Tudyman v. United Airlines, 608 F.
Supp. 739, 746 (C.D. Cal. 1984). In Tudyman, the court reasoned that
because the bodybuilder-plaintiff's weight and low-fat content were
self-imposed, he could not claim he was disabled. Id. at 746. The
court opined that it "refused to make the term handicapped a
meaningless phrase." Id.
105 "[S]uch an impairment" within the meaning of subsection (C)
plainly refers to a "physical or mental impairment" within the meaning
of subsection (A). Runnebaum v. NationsBank of Md., 123 F.3d 156,
172 (4th Cir. 1997) ("The 'such an impairment' language incorporates
by reference subsection (A)'s description of the sort of impairment that
qualifies as a disability."); Francis, 129 F.3d at 286 (finding that
obesity must be a symptom of an underlying physiological condition to
constitute a disability); Andrews, 104 F.3d 803 (holding that a disability
must be accompanied by a physiological impairment); Cook v. R.I.,
Dep't of Mental Health, Retardation, and Hosps., 10 F.3d 17, 23 (1st
Cir. 1993) (holding that a plaintiff who was obese because of an
underlying physiological condition was disabled). Contra EEOC v.
Res. for Human Dev., 827 F. Supp. 2d 688 (E.D. La. 2011) (holding
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iii. Other States' Laws on Obesity as a
Disability
At the state level, the law is beginning to mirror the
unsettled federal law with conflicting state court decisions.
Only Michigan's Civil Rights Act 07 explicitly prohibits
employment discrimination on the basis of weight. In the
same vein, Washington D.C.'s Human Rights Law 08
prohibits discrimination on the basis of "personal
appearance," which arguably includes weight. In states
lacking an explicit statute, most courts' interpretations
attempt to resemble federal law because most state
disability statutes are strikingly similar to the ADA.' 09
that morbid obesity was a disability regardless of the existence of an
underlying physiological condition).
106 Res. for Human Dev., 827 F. Supp. 2d 688 (denying defendant's
motion to dismiss because the EEOC's current guidelines permitted
severely obese plaintiffs to state a claim, even without an underlying
physiological condition); Frank v. Lawrence Union Free Sch. Dist., 688
F. Supp. 2d 160 (E.D.N.Y. 2010) (finding that an obese teacher who
was fired by the superintendent because his "size and weight were not
conducive to learning" suffered from discrimination based on a
disability under the New York Human Rights Law); Lowe v. Am.
Eurocopter, LLC, No. 1:10CV24-A-D, 2010 WL 5232523 (N.D. Miss.
Dec. 16, 2010); Rouse v. Mich. Dep't of State Police, No. 1:08-CV-
982, 2010 WL 882821 (W.D. Mich. March 8, 2010) (holding that obese
plaintiff suffered a disability upon finding that the police department
had fired him, stating that if he "had lost a significant amount of weight
he could have the potential ability to perform those essential
functions").
107 MICH. COMP. LAWS § 37.2202(1)(a) (2012).
108 D.C. CODE ANN. § 2-1401.01 (2012).
109 O'Hara, supra note 10, at 930-33. See, e.g., BNSF Ry. Co. v. Feit,
281 P.3d 225 (Mont. 2012) (interpreting the Montana Human Rights
statute in accordance with the ADAAA and various EEOC
interpretations to find that obesity absent an underlying physiological
disorder could constitute a disability as long as the individual's weight
was outside the "normal range" and affected one or more "body
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Disability decisions under state law regarding
obesity differ as well. In 1981, the United States District
Court for the Western District of Washington first
examined obesity discrimination in employment under
Washington state law in Greene v. Union Pacific
Railroad.o"0 Ultimately, the court held that obesity was not
a disability because it was "not an immutable condition
such as blindness or lameness."'I' The court found that the
employer's decision to deny Greene a transfer to a fireman
position was justified because a morbidly obese person
"would be less apt to be an efficient, safe, illness-free, and
claims-free employee than one not having those
conditions."ll 2 Thus, the plaintiff was not discriminated
against because of his weight but due to the "bona fide
occupational requirements of being a fireman," just as any
other job has requirements.113
After the Greene decision, state-law discrimination
cases based on obesity have contained different lines of
analysis leading to different outcomes. In Pennsylvania, an
obese woman brought suit'' 4 against her employer under
the Pennsylvania Human Rights Act,' 15 which defines
systems" as explained in 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(h)(1)); Res. for Human
Dev., 827 F. Supp. 2d 688; Lowe, 2010 WL 5232523.
110 548 F. Supp. 3, 3 (W.D. Wash. 1981).
"' Id. at 5.
112 Id. Similar to the Washington state statute at issue here, the
Tennessee Disability Act disallows discrimination "unless such
disability to some degree prevents the applicant from performing the
duties required by the employment sought or impairs the performance
of the work involved." TENN. CODE ANN. § 8-50-103.
113 Greene, 548 F. Supp. at 5.
114 Phila. Elec. Co. v. Pennsylvania, 448 A.2d 701 (Pa. Commw. Ct.
1982).
11 See Pennsylvania Human Relations Act of 1955, Pub. L. No. 744, as
amended by 43 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 951-963 (1994); see also Phila.
Elec. Co., 448 A.2d at 702-03.
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disability virtually the same as the ADA.1 6 The employer-
defendant, Philadelphia Electric, found that the plaintiff
was "unsuitable for work . . . because of her abnormal
weight."" 7 Despite this finding, the court concluded that
the plaintiff had no job-related or non-job-related disability
because she was "perfectly able to . . . work at all times."' 18
The majority of courts finding obesity to not be a disability
focus on the lack of plaintiffs' medical proof that their
condition is "disabling" and not merely inconvenient. 119
Absent such proof, courts are reluctant to accept obesity as
a disability rather than a result of mere overeating.' 20
Conversely, some states have found that obesity is a
disability, beginning with McDermott v. Xerox in 1985.121
The defendant-employer denied McDermott a job because
of her obesity. 2 Because, under New York law,
McDermott was clinically diagnosed as obese and
considered unsuitable for the position (which is a lawful
reason for an employer to not hire her), her obesity
constituted an actual disability according to the court. 12 3
Additionally, the court rejected the defendant's argument
that the New York statute only applied to involuntary or
immutable conditions, stating that the "statute protects all
persons with disabilities and not just those with hopeless
conditions"l 24 -a drastic departure from previous state case
law.
"' Phila. Elec. Co., 448 A.2d at 703-04; see also 16 PA. CODE § 44.4
(2012).
" Phila. Elec. Co., 448 A.2d at 703.
Id. at 707.
19 See O'Hara, supra note 10, at 896.
I20 id.
121 480 N.E.2d 695 (N.Y. 1985).
122 Id. at 695-96.
123 Id. at 698.
124 id.
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In the same vein, New Jersey has also permitted
obese plaintiffs to recover where the plaintiff can
demonstrate that his obesity is caused by or causes a
physical impairment proven through "accepted clinical or
laboratory diagnostic techniques."l 25 Under this statute, the
plaintiff in Gimello v. Agency Rent-a-Car 26 sued his
former employer for terminating his job because of his
obesity.127  The court found that because Gimello faced
discrimination under this broadly worded statute based on
his obese condition, proven through medical evidence, he
suffered from an actual disability.' It is important to note,
however, that the court never specified what would qualify
as sufficient medical evidence.
iv. Tennessee Law on Obesity as a Disability
Tennessee courts have not yet considered whether
obesity is a disability under state law. Speaking about
disability law generally, Tennessee courts have often stated
that "it is clear that the Tennessee General Assembly
envisioned the Tennessee Disability Act would be
coextensive with federal law," which is a hefty
assumption.129 These courts, however, also noted that the
125 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10-5-5(q) (West 2011).
126 594 A.2d 264 (N.J. 1991).
127 Id. at 265, 273.
128 Id. at 268, 278. Specifically, Gimello's weight-loss specialist
testified that Gimello had been obese for most of his life. Id. at 268.
129 Parker v. Warren Cnty. Util. Dist., 2 S.W.3d 170, 172 (Tenn. 1999)
(finding that the policy of "interpreting the THRA coextensively with
Title VII is predicated upon a desire to maintain continuity between
state and federal law"); Carr v. United Parcel Serv., 955 S.W.2d 832,
834 (Tenn. 1997), overruled on different grounds by Parker v. Warren
Cnty. Util. Dist., 2 S.W.3d 170 (Tenn. 1999); Bennett v. Steiner-Liff
Iron & Metal Co., 826 S.W.2d 119, 121 (Tenn. 1992). The Tennessee
Supreme Court has found that federal law may guide interpretation in
the state's "own anti-discrimination laws." Barnes v. Goodyear Tire &
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federal precedents do not bind or limit Tennessee's courts
in giving the "fullest possible effect to Tennessee's own
human rights legislation"-that is, the courts are not
limited to interpreting the state disability statutes
identically to their federal counterparts.' 30 Without further
legislative direction, a court analyzing an obesity
discrimination claim under Tennessee law may find that
obesity constitutes a disability by following recent federal
case law development. Because federal law is unsettled on
this point, there is no absolute guidance available to
Tennessee courts for deciding that obesity is not a
disability, which is another reason for the legislature to
make a decision. It is only a matter of time before a
plaintiff brings this claim, and Tennessee is not prepared to
decide this issue based on the legislature's lack of thought
given to the issue.
III. TENNESSEE SHOULD NOT INCLUDE OBESITY
AS A DISABILITY PROTECTED BY THE
TENNESSEE HUMAN RIGHTS ACT
Barbeque, sweet tea, and a laid-back lifestyle are
hallmarks in Tennessee. However, what seem like innocent
pleasures contribute to some alarming statistics: 67.8% of
adult Tennesseans are overweight' 3 ' and 31.7% are
Rubber Co., 48 S.W.3d 698, 705 (Tenn. 2000) (finding that that court
"may look to federal law for guidance") (emphasis added).
130 Carr v. United Parcel Serv., 955 S.W.2d 832, 835 (Tenn. 1997);
Weber v. Moses, 938 S.W.2d 387, 390 (Tenn. 1996); Bennett v.
Steiner-Liff Iron & Metal Co., 826 S.W.2d 119, 121 (Tenn. 1992).
131 "Overweight" includes individuals with a BMI of twenty-five or
greater. CDC, BEHAVIORAL RISK FACTOR SURVEILLANCE SYSTEM:
PREVALENCE AND TREND DATA-OVERWEIGHT AND OBESITY, U.S.
OBESITY TRENDS, TRENDS BY STATE, 2010, available at
http://www.cdc.gov/brfss/ [hereinafter PREVALENCE AND TREND
DATA].
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obese.13 2 While these statistics certainly indicate a public
health crisis and an obesity epidemic, no court or legislative
action can combat obesity merely by affording the obese
protection under disability statutes.
In light of the 2008 amendments to the ADA and
the increasing number of obese persons in Tennessee, this
Note argues that Tennessee should not consider obesity a
disability, regardless of how the federal courts hold in the
future. More specifically, Tennessee should not classify
obesity as a disability absent an underlying condition. To
support this point, this Note first shows how obesity is
inherently different from other protected disabilities.
Second, this Note asserts that there is no need to expand the
definition of "disability" to include obesity because the
medically diagnosable conditions associated with obesity
are already generally protected by disability statutes.
Lastly, the purposes of the THRA show that the legislative
intent of the Tennessee General Assembly when enacting
the THRA and TDA was not to follow the ADA or create
such an expansive definition of disability but rather to
provide a comprehensive list of ideals that should guide the
courts when applying disability statutes.
A. Inherent Differences Exist Between Obesity
and Other Disabilities
Obesity is generally mutable. 33 This lends
credence to the argument that obesity is often only
temporary.134  The characteristics of "mutable" and
132 Id. "Obese" includes individuals with a BMI of thirty or greater.
133 See generally Browne, supra note 6 (arguing that obesity is largely
caused and fixed by habits of overconsumption and physical activity).
134 Although most instances of obesity are from high caloric intake and
lack of exercise, this Note leaves room for protecting obese persons
whose condition is the result or cause of an underlying condition.
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"temporary," the courts argue, lead to the conclusion that
Congress and the EEOC never intended obesity to be
protected as a disability in the first place.' 35  Building on
this distinction, even after the ADAAA was enacted, the
EEOC has not deviated from its declaration that physical
personal characteristics are not covered by the ADA,
including "eye color, hair color, left-handedness, or height,
weight or muscle tone that are within 'normal' range and
are not the result of a physiological disorder."' 36
Medical studies have found that behavioral
techniques derived largely from experiments in psychology
provide the means to show that many obese people are able
to learn new behavior patterns, including how to control
certain eating habits that have contributed to their
conditions.137 Further, at reasonable pricesl38 and perhaps
even covered by insurance plans, medication (such as
appetite suppressants) or counseling can treat obesity.' 39
Once weaned off of the medication, individuals show high
success rates for weight loss and increased health after
seeing how a person with a healthy, balanced diet eats.14 0
The theory behind that medication is that obesity
can be changed through a personal habit (here, eating
properly). This fact alone could constitute a showing that
135 Browne, supra note 6, at 23; see Cook v. Rhode Island, 783 F. Supp.
1569 (D.R.I. 1992).
136 ADA Guidelines § 1630.2(h) (1995) (emphasis added).
13 Kyoung Kon Kim et. al, Effects on Weight Reduction and Safety of
Short-Term Phentermine Administration in Korean Obese People, 47
YONSEI MED. J. 614 (2006).
13 In Shelby County, Tennessee, a month's supply of Phentermine, a
well-known appetite suppressant, costs approximately $50-$75 (around
$25 for the office visit and $40 for the prescription). E.g., CORDOVA
MEDICAL CLINIC, http://www.cordovamedical.com/ (last visited Dec.
22, 2012). This price includes nutrition and physical exercise
counseling by either a medical doctor or a nurse practitioner.
139 23 AM. JUR. 2D Proof of Facts § 6 (2012).
140 Id.
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obesity is self-imposed, unlike the disabilities listed by the
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mobility impairments
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Of course, many of the items on this list are
preventable-for example, when a conscious decision is
made by a drug user to share an HIV-infected needle-but
for the most part, they are not mutable, unlike obesity.
In fact, many courts have agreed with this idea,
finding that obesity is a voluntary and mutable condition.142
For example, the court in Andrews v. Ohiol43 repeatedly
141 See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(3)(iii) (2011).
142 See, e.g., EEOC v. Watkins Motor Lines, Inc., 463 F.3d 443 (6th
Cir. 2006) (holding that obesity, absent a physiological condition, was
simply a physical characteristic and not a physiological disorder in
itself); Dale v. Wynne, 497 F. Supp. 2d 1337, 1342 (M.D. Ala. 2007)
(holding that obesity is a voluntary condition and thus not a disability
under Alabama law); Greene v. Union Pac. R.R., 548 F. Supp. 3, 5
(W.D. Wash. 1981) (holding that because obesity "was not an
immutable condition such as blindness or lameness," it is not a
disability); Cassista v. Cmty. Foods, Inc., 856 P.2d 1143, 1152 (Cal.
1993) (finding that obesity was a voluntary condition and thus not a
disability under California disability law); Mo. Comm'n on Human
Rights v. Sw. Bell Tel. Co., 699 S.W.2d 75, 79 (Mo. Ct. App. 1985)
(holding that because plaintiff failed to take advantage of treatment for
her known hypertension and obesity, she could not get the benefit of
disability law).
143 Andrews v. Ohio, 104 F.3d 803, 808-09 (6th Cir. 1997). In
Andrews, seventy-six law enforcement officers sued the State of Ohio,
the Department of Highway Safety, and the state highway patrol under
the ADA claiming weight discrimination. Id. at 805. The court found
that the officers were not disabled because "they have not alleged a
weight or fitness status other than a mere, indeed possibility transitory,
physical characteristic." Id. at 810.
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stated that a physical characteristic must relate to a
physiological disorder in order to qualify as an ADA
impairment. 144  This reasoning arose from the Code of
Federal Regulations' definition of an impairment: any
"physiological disorder, or condition, cosmetic
disfigurement, or anatomical loss affecting one or more of
[various] body systems."14 5  Consequently, the Andrews
court found that "physical characteristics that are 'not the
result of a physiological disorder' are not considered
'impairments' for purposes of determining either actual or
perceived disability." 46  In deciding Andrews, the court
reasoned that a disability is one that is physiologically
caused and immutable.147
Tennessee, too, has recognized that obesity is
mutable in its other legislation, such as the Commonsense
Consumption Act, 148 which supports the argument that
obesity is not a disability. Obesity is inherently different
from other already-recognized disabilities in that it is
largely controllable. 14 9  When there is no underlying
physical condition, obesity is comparable to a person's
conscious decision to gain muscle by weightlifting because
"mere physical characteristics [do] not, without more, equal
a physiological disorder."o5 0 The Tennessee Commonsense
Consumption Act, modeled after the federal Cheeseburger
144 Id.
14'29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(h)(1).
146 Andrews, 104 F.3d at 808 (emphasis added).
147 Id. at 809. See, e.g., Cook v. R.I., Dep't of Mental Health,
Retardation, and Hosps., 10 F.3d 17 (1st Cir. 1993) (holding that where
a physiological condition caused the plaintiff s obesity, the court would
find an impairment).
148 TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-34-205 (2012).
149 See generally Browne, supra note 6 (explaining how the condition
of obesity may be controlled by developing healthy habits).
'soAndrews, 104 F.3d at 810.
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Bill, 151 denies plaintiffs the ability to sue restaurants merely
because the plaintiff, in eating the restaurant's food,
became overweight or obese. 152 The statute is not without
support either. Groups including the American Bakers
Association, the National Association of Wheat Growers,
and the American Frozen Food Institute urged Senate
Majority Leader Bill Frist of Tennessee to cosponsor the
bill at the federal level. 1 Further, a 2003 Gallup Poll
revealed that 89% of Americans agreed that restaurants
should not be responsible for their customers' eating habits
and weight gains. 154 The purpose of disability statutes is to
protect a vulnerable group-here, the disabled. Arguably,
with legislation such as the Cheeseburger Bill and the
results of the Gallup Poll, obesity is a condition that people
agree does not need to be protected like true disabilities,
such as cancer, cerebral palsy, or depression.
Obesity is also inherently different from other
disabilities because it affects a huge amount of the
population. Expanding the definition of obesity in
Tennessee creates room for more plaintiffs to be able to
sue. The possibility of the "floodgate" effect is arguably
the most looming concern in the debate.'55 If Tennessee
finds that obesity is a disability, nearly one-third of the
state's population qualifies as "disabled" and, if obesity is
further declared a protected condition, could potentially be
protected under disability statutes. 156 If an obese plaintiff
151 See supra p. 286.
152 TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-34-205.
153 Congressional 'Cheeseburger Bill' Gains Support, HEARTLANDER




'5 Cook v. R.I., Dep't of Mental Health, Retardation, and Hosps., 10
F.3d 17 (1st Cir. 1993).
156 Adult Obesity Facts, supra note 2.
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can sue without proving an underlying physiological
condition, more plaintiffs would be able bring other claims
based solely on physical characteristics that pose some
limitation on their daily lives. As one author noted, "if
anyone can bring a suit alleging discrimination based on a
physical characteristic, then virtually every employment
dispute . . . can turn into a vehicle for a discrimination
suit."157  When rejecting the claim that mere
overweightness was a disability, the First Circuit warned
that allowing claims based on physical characteristics
would encourage a "catch-all cause of action for
discrimination . . . far removed from the reasons the [ADA
was] passed"-to protect true disabilities. 58
In May 2011, the EEOC amended its regulations to
reflect the new ADAAA, stating that an impairment is a
"disability if it substantially limits the ability of an
individual to perform a major life activity as compared to
most people in the general population."' At the time of
157 Mary Crossley, The Disability Kaleidoscope, 74 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 621, 713 (1999).
158 Francis v. City of Meriden, 129 F.3d 281, 287 (2d Cir. 1997).
159 29 C.F.R. § 1630(j)(1)(ii) (2011). Further, the EEOC Manual and
Code of Federal Regulations provide a list of physical impairments.
Obesity is not included. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(3)(iii). These
impairments and activities include: "deafness substantially limits
hearing; blindness substantially limits seeing; an intellectual disability
substantially limits brain function; partially or completely missing
limbs or mobility impairments requiring the use of a wheelchair
substantially limit musculoskeletal function; autism substantially limits
brain function; cancer substantially limits normal cell growth; cerebral
palsy substantially limits brain function; diabetes substantially limits
endocrine function; epilepsy substantially limits neurological function;
Human Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV) infection substantially limits
immune function; multiple sclerosis substantially limits neurological
function; muscular dystrophy substantially limits neurological function;
and major depressive disorder, bipolar disorder, post-traumatic stress
disorder, obsessive compulsive disorder, and schizophrenia
substantially limit brain function . . . ." Id. Because this Note argues
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enactment of the ADAAA, obesity was a severe epidemic
in the United States.160 With that in mind and the
increasing number of obese persons in the United States,
Congress could have easily included obesity in the
ADAAA but chose not to.161 The EEOC estimated that out
of a total workforce of approximately 142 million,
that obesity absent an accompanying physiological condition is not a
disability, obesity will be considered a disability when paired with a
condition from this list. Thus, an individual who is obese and must
result to using a wheelchair is disabled because she has a physiological
impairment that substantially limits her ability to walk. In the same
vein, if she becomes obese because she is confined to a wheelchair, this
also qualifies as a disability for the same reason.
In the list provided by the EEOC, all of the conditions listed are
virtually non-controllable or occur because of an accident of sorts.
Further, these conditions also all stem from an underlying physiological
condition or result in one. On the other hand, obesity, which is not
listed, often results from an individual's conscious decisions to engage
in behavior that leads to obesity.
160 In 2008, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention estimated
that 25.6% of the population was obese, an increase of 1.7% from the
previous two years. Press Release, Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention, Latest CDC Data Show More Americans Report Being
Obese (July 17, 2008),
http://www.cdc.gov/media/pressrel/2008/r08O717.htm. In this press
release, Dr. William Dietz, the Director of the Division of Nutrition,
Physical Activity, and Obesity, stated that to curb the problem of
obesity, people need to be encouraged to eat better and exercise. Id. In
his analysis of the problem, Dr. Dietz never mentioned that obesity was
a condition that could not be controlled. See id.
161 See 154 CONG. REC. S9626-01 (daily ed. Sept. 26, 2008) (statement
of Sen. Reid). Senator Reid stated that the Americans with Disabilities
Act needed an amendment due to the strict application of what
constituted a disability by the Supreme Court. He states as follows:
"As a result, the lower courts have now gone so far as to rule that
people with amputation, muscular dystrophy, epilepsy, diabetes,
multiple sclerosis, cancer, and even intellectual disabilities are not
disabled." However, several weight discrimination cases under the
ADA had already occurred when Mr. Reid spoke, but Mr. Reid did not
mention obesity or weight discrimination in his proposal.
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8,229,000 workers were disabledl62 when the ADAAA was
enacted.163 However, with the EEOC's estimation that
25.6% of adults are obese, the EEOC's number for disabled
workers would have been much higher had the EEOC
chosen to consider obese persons as disabled as well.
Turning to the general population for guidance would show
that obese people share this condition with many others.
B. Obesity Need Not Be Protected Absent an
Underlying Condition
Because Tennessee law protects many of the
underlying physiological causes and effects of obesity,
there is no need to expand disability protection to obese
plaintiffs. Statutory protections do not extend to all
abnormal physical characteristics of a person.1 To the
extent a person is obese without a medically diagnosable
cause or side effect, obesity is merely a physical trait of that
person-not a disability. Obesity either causes or is
correlated with the following conditions, complications,
and diseases:
162 The indicator of "disability" depended on six categories: a severe
vision or hearing impairment; a condition that "substantially limits one
or more basic physical activities such as walking, climbing stairs,
reaching, lifting, or carrying; a physical, mental, or emotional condition
lasting 6 months or more that results in difficulty learning,
remembering, or concentrating; or a severe disability that results in
difficulty dressing, bathing, getting around inside the home, going
outside the home alone to shop or visit a doctor's office, or working at
a job or business."
163 Regulations to Implement the Equal Employment Provisions of the
Americans with Disabilities Act, as Amended; Final Rule, 76 Fed. Reg.
16,977 (Mar. 25, 2011) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630), available
at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2011-03-25/html/2011-6056.htm.
'" E.g., Andrews v. Ohio, 104 F.3d 803 (6th Cir. 1997).
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death, asthma and impaired
air flow, decreased lung
capacity, sleep apnea,
degenerative osteoarthritis
and joint stress (spine, hip,
knee, etc.), increased surgical
risk and complications,
fertility problems (decreased






suicidal thoughts, and suicide
attempts, psychological
difficulties due to social
stigmatization, acanthosis
nigricans (dark skin disorder
linked to obesity), hirsutism
(excess body and facial hair),
stress incontinence (urine
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leakage caused by weak
pelvic floor muscles).165
Tennessee recognizes most of the conditions on the
list above as "disabilities."' 6 6 According to the Tennessee
Employment Law Letter, conditions such as diabetes and
depression (two that are often associated with obesity)
certainly qualify as "disabilities" under Tennessee law.167
The problem facing some plaintiffs, however, is that they
cannot demonstrate that the condition substantially limits a
life activity.168 The Tennessee Supreme Court has already
held that the inability to "work[] at a job of choice" does
not constitute a major life activity. 16 Thus, Tennessee law
provides relief for obese plaintiffs but only when they can
show a physiological cause of the condition. Until then, the
condition is merely a physical characteristic.
Because Tennessee could choose to follow federal
law, data from ADA claims is helpful in proving that obese
plaintiffs still have a cause of action if they can prove an
underlying physiological condition that is diagnosable
either caused the obesity or resulted from the obesity.
Under the ADA, the ten most common disabilities to which
the ADA is applied include: back/spinal injuries,
psychiatric/mental impairments, neurological impairments,
extremity impairments, heart impairments, former
165 OFFICE OF RESEARCH & EDUC. ACCOUNTABILITY, WEIGHING THE
COSTS OF OBESITY IN TENNESSEE 15 (2006), available at
http://hit.state.tn.us/Reports/Final-ObesityReport.pdf.
166 Martin Miller, What's an ADA Disability?, 18 No. 8 TENN. EMP. L.
LETTER 5 (2003).
167 Id.
168 Id. (citing Gourgy v. Metro Nashville Airport Auth., 61 Fed. Appx.
958 (6th Cir. 2003)).
169 Barnes v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 48 S.W.3d 698, 706 (Tenn.
2000).
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substance abuse,170 diabetes, hearing impairments, vision
impairments, and blood disorders.171 From this sampling of
ten ADA disabilities, one notices that at least four of those
listed are side effects of obesity and overweightness. Thus,
a merely obese plaintiff suffers only from stigma
discrimination or discrimination based on a mutable
physical attribute. Once the plaintiffs condition develops
into a diagnosable physical impairment, however, the
plaintiff can be considered disabled but not until then.172
170 U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, SHARING THE DREAM: IS THE ADA
ACCOMMODATING ALL? (2000), available at
http://permanent.access.gpo./gov/LPS13245/mail.htm. The ADA
provides that an individual "currently engaging" in the illegal use of
drugs is not a "qualified individual" with a disability. 42 U.S.C. §
12114(a) (2011); 29 C.F.R. § 1630.3(a) (2011); see also Shafer v.
Preston Mem'l Hosp. Corp., 107 F.3d 274 (4th Cir. 1997) (holding that
current substance abuse is not covered by the ADA). A former drug
addict (not a casual user) may be protected under the ADA as having
an impairment. But see EEOC, TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE MANUAL ON
THE EMPLOYMENT PROVISIONS OF THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITY
ACTS § 8.5 (1992).
171 Norman H. Kirshman & Roger L. Grandgenett II, ADA: The 10
Most Common Disabilities and How to Accommodate, 2 LEGALBRIEF
L. J. 3 (1997), available at http://legalbrief.com/kirshman.html.
172 See TENN. CODE ANN. § 4-21-102(3)(A) (2012). But see Cassista v.
Cmty. Foods, Inc., 856 P.2d 1143 (Cal. 1993). The defendant,
Community Foods, refused to hire Cassista, a 5-foot, 4-inch, 305-
pound woman (BMI of approximately 52) based mainly on her weight.
The California Fair Employment and Housing Act (under which the
plaintiff brought suit) contained a definition of disability modeled after
the ADA definition. Although California modeled the statute after the
ADA, the court found that obesity was not a disability absent medical
proof of an underlying physiological cause.
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C. Labeling Obesity as a Disability Does Not
Further the Purposes Set Forth in the Human
Rights Act
Considering obesity as a disability does not serve
the purposes laid forth in the Tennessee Human Rights Act
(THRA) and Tennessee Disability Act (TDA). In the
THRA, the Tennessee legislature stated that its goals were
as follows:
(1) Provide for execution
within Tennessee of the
policies embodied in the
federal Civil Rights Acts of
1964, 1968, and 1972, the
Pregnancy Amendment of
1978, and the Age
Discrimination in
Employment Act of 1967
[ ...]1
(2) Assure that Tennessee
has appropriate legislation
prohibiting discrimination in
employment . . . sufficient to
justify the deferral of cases
by the federal [EEOC] ... ;
(3) Safeguard all
individuals within the state
from discrimination because
of race, creed, color, religion,
sex, age or national origin in
connection with employment
146
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(4) Protect their interest
in personal dignity and
freedom from humiliation;
(5) Make available to the
state their full productive
capacity in employment;
(6) Secure the state
against domestic strife and
unrest that would menace its
democratic institutions;
(7) Preserve the public
safety, health and general
welfare; and




Although the Tennessee General Assembly
explicitly listed these eight purposes for the creation and
carrying out of the THRA (and thus the TDA as well),
courts analyzing these claims tend to focus only on the first
purpose: "to provide for execution within Tennessee of the
policies embodied in the [federal acts]."' 74 Although
consistency between state and federal law is an
understandable concern,175 courts ignore the purpose of
173 TENN. CODE ANN. § 4-21-101(a)(1)-(8) (2012).
174 Id.; see, e.g., Parker v. Warren Cnty. Util. Dist., 2 S.W.3d 170, 172
(Tenn. 1999) (finding that the policies of the THRA were to be
interpreted in light of federal interpretation). The Tennessee Supreme
Court has found that federal law may guide interpretation of the state's
"own anti-discrimination laws." Barnes v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber
Co., 48 S.W.3d 698, 705 (Tenn. 2000) (finding that that court "may
look to federal law for guidance") (emphasis added).
175 See, e.g., Parker, 2 S.W.3d at 172 (finding that the policy of
"interpreting the THRA coextensively with Title VII is predicated upon
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"preserv[in ] the public safety, health and general
welfare." 7  A court should look at all the purposes for
guidance but also weigh other concerns, such as whether a
potential rule would "preserve the public safety, health and
general welfare"17 7 of the state's citizens.
Indeed, the Tennessee Supreme Court has
previously exercised its authority to make decisions free of
the confines of relevant federal interpretation.17 8 In Booker
v. Boeing Co., the court noted that one of the purposes of
the THRA was to "[p]rovide for execution within
Tennessee of the policies embodied" in federal law.17 9
Courts faced with the question of whether to follow federal
law typically quote a popular phrase in Tennessee disability
jurisprudence: that the court is "neither bound by nor
restricted by the federal law when interpreting our own
anti-discrimination laws." 8 0 The court in Booker further
opined that it would decline to apply the reasoning and
a desire to maintain continuity between state and federal law"); see also
Carr v. United Parcel Serv., 955 S.W.2d 832, 834 (Tenn. 1997),
overruled on different grounds by Parker v. Warren Cnty. Util. Dist., 2
S.W.3d 170 (Tenn. 1999); Bennett v. Steiner-Liff Iron & Metal Co.,
826 S.W.2d 119, 121 (Tenn. 1992). At least one Tennessee Supreme
Court opinion has found that federal law may guide interpretation of
the state's "own anti-discrimination laws." Barnes v. Goodyear Tire &
Rubber Co., 48 S.W.3d 698, 705 (Tenn. 2000) (finding that that court
"may look to federal law for guidance") (emphasis added).
176 (Currently, Tennessee has the twelfth highest percentage of obese
adults when compared to other states at 29.2%. Adult Obesity Facts,
supra note 2. The lowest percentage of obese persons by state is
Colorado with 20.7%. Id. The highest percentage belongs to
Mississippi at 34.9%. Id. However, the South has the highest
prevalence of obesity at 29.5%. Id.)
17 TENN. CODE ANN. § 4-21-101 (a)(7) (2012).
178 Booker v. Boeing Co., 188 S.W.3d 639, 647 (Tenn. 2006).
17 9 Id.
1so Barnes, 48 S.W.3d at 705; Phillips v. Interstate Hotels Corp. No
L07, 974 S.W.2d 680, 683-84 (Tenn. 1998).
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conclusions found in federal law because doing so
conflicted with the THRA's purposes.
Some states have relied on federal law for guidance
in disability cases, but the statutes do not include a lengthy
list of purposes like Tennessee's. Other states have
considered obesity a disability, but those states' statutes are
different than Tennessee's. In Feit v. BNSF Railway, the
Montana Supreme Court, in a 4-3 decision, held that
obesity was a disability and covered by the Montana
Human Rights Act (MHRA).1 BNSF Railway gave the
plaintiff, Feit, a conditional offer of employment to work as
a conductor trainee.183 Feit's "employment was
conditioned upon successful completion of a physical
examination" and other customary items. 184  BNSF
informed Feit that he was not qualified for the "safety
sensitive position" due to the "significant health and safety
risks associated with extreme obesity."' BNSF further
informed Feit that he would not be considered for the
position unless he "lost 10% of his body weight, or
successfully com leted other physical examinations at his
own expense."' 8  However, after passing several of the
physical examinations, Feit could not afford the final sleep
study test at a cost of $1,800.187 Accordingly, Feit
attempted to lose 10% of his body weight.' Shortly
'' Booker, 188 S.W.3d at 647.
182 BNSF Ry. Co. v. Feit, 281 P.3d 225 (Mont. 2012); see also MONT.
CODE ANN. § 49-2-202 (2012).
183 Feit, 281 P.3d at 227.
184 id.
185 Id.
186 Id. (However, BNSF informed Feit that regardless of the outcome
of the results, it could still not guarantee him a job.)
17id.
188 Id. (A genuine dispute of whether BNSF ever received
documentation of the weight loss existed at trial.)
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thereafter, Feit filed a complaint against BNSF, charging it
with discrimination based on a disability.' 89
The Montana Supreme Court found that if a person
is obese, even absent another condition, and the obesity
affects at least one body system, the condition may
constitute a disability per the MHRA.190 The court based
its decision on the fact that the Montana legislature had
indicated clear intent that the MHRA be interpreted with
federal discrimination law, statutory and case law, and the
Montana Supreme Court's interpretation of federal law was
that federal law does protect obesity. 191 The court relied on
the legislature's actions in making the MHRA more like the
ADA. 192
However, the MHRA differs from the THRA in that
the MHRA never spells out its purpose like the THRA
does.193  The Montana Supreme Court relied on the
legislature's actions in following federal law and legislative
history.194 The similarity in the language of the statutes left
the Montana Supreme Court with only two ways to shape
its ruling: either analogous to federal law or not. Unlike
the Montana legislature, the Tennessee legislature has
provided eight reasons for courts interpreting the THRA
189 id.
90 Id. at 231.
19' Id. at 228. The Montana Supreme Court relied on EEOC
definitions. The court ignored federal case law finding obesity not to
be a disability.
192 At least one state representative commented in her opening
statement regarding the MHRA that "[t]he purpose of [the law] is to
update terminology used in the Americans with Disabilities Act
(ADA)." Id. at 234 (Rice, J., dissenting) (citing Hearing on H.B. 496
Before the Mont. S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 53rd Leg., Reg. Sess. 2
(1993)).
193 Compare TENN. CODE ANN. § 4-21-101(a) (2012), with MONT.
CODE ANN. § 49-2-501 (2011), and MONT. CODE ANN. § 49-1-102
(2011).
194 Feit, 281 P.3d at 227.
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and TDA to shape a rule that serves Tennesseans.' 95 The
statute has multiple purposes, and when a court decides to
value only one, there is a conflict with the others (here, the
"health and safety" purpose), which is especially true if the
court decides to consider obesity a disability. At no place
in the THRA or TDA does the legislature indicate that any
purpose listed in § 4-21-101(a) weighs more than the others
listed.19
Further, none of the purposes listed in the THRA
appear anywhere in the ADA, indicating the Tennessee
legislature's willingness to guide courts' interpretation
down a different path. There are several methods of
statutory construction in which the courts may give effect
to the purposes listed in the THRA. Although courts
typically rely on the purpose of remaining consistent with
federal law, the court would be ignoring other purposes
explicit in the statute. First (and simplest), using the plain
meaning of the THRA, courts should apply the statute as it
appears including the purposes listed. To this end, another
basic principle of statutory interpretation given effect to the
oft-neglected other purposes in the THRA is that courts
should presume the legislature intended each word to be
given full effect.198 In doing so, the court would find that
several of the purposes in the THRA require that obesity
not be protected as a disability.' 99
195 TENN. CODE ANN. § 4-21-101 (a)(1)-(8) (2012).
196 See TENN. CODE ANN. § 4-21-101(a) (2012).
197 Compare id. with Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42
U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (2011).
' In re Hogue, 286 S.W.3d 890 (Tenn. 2009) (citing Lanier v. Rains,
229 S.W.3d 656, 661 (Tenn. 2007)).
199 For a discussion of how the interests of employers would be
compromised, see infra page 323. This directly conflicts with the
THRA purpose of furthering the interests, rights, and privileges of
individuals in TENN. CODE ANN. § 4-21-101(a)(8) because it places an
undue burden on employers taking on costs by hiring obese employees.
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The modern implementation of this principle
renders life to all clauses in a statute "so as to avoid
rendering superfluous" any language within the statute.200
In interpreting the THRA's list of purposes, courts have
only been relying upon the first purpose listed: to interpret
the THRA along with federal law. Notably, however, the
ADA is not included in the list of federal laws that the
Tennessee legislature intended to imitate.20 1  A negative
inference may be drawn here-expressio unius est exclusio
alterius (the inclusion of one is the exclusion of others).202
The list given by the legislature, including "the federal
Civil Rights Acts of 1964, 1968 and 1972, the Pregnancy
Amendment of 1978, and the Discrimination in
Employment Act of 1967, as amended,"203 are arguably the
200 See generally Astoria Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Solimino, 501 U.S.
104, 112 (1991). Another view of this principle offered by the
Supreme Court states that two overlapping statutes may be given effect
so long as there is no "positive repugnance" between them. Conn.
Nat'l Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 253 (1992) (finding that
overlapping statutes still addressed matters that the other did not
address). This may be helpful here to view the ADA and THRA/TDA
as "overlapping statutes." While the ADA and THRA/TDA represent
two distinct areas of the law, the current trend to interpret them as one
practically creates liability under both for a defendant facing an alleged
violation. Further, although the two statutes are nearly identical, the
purposes listed in the THRA should not be rendered superfluous merely
because they do not appear in the ADA. Thus, the purposes should be
given effect.
201 See TENN. CODE ANN. § 4-21-101(a)(1) (2012). But see, e.g.,
Barnes v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 48 S.W.3d 698, 705 (Tenn.
2000) (finding that courts may look to federal law when interpreting
Tennessee disability statutes). The TDA was amended slightly in 2008;
however, the Tennessee legislature did not add the Americans with
Disabilities Act to the list of federal laws to be used as guidance.
However, whether this was oversight or blatant is unknown.
202 See YULE Kim, CRS REPORT FOR CONGRESS, STATUTORY
INTERPRETATION: GENERAL PRINCIPLES AND RECENT TRENDS 16-17
(2008), http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/97-589.pdf.
203 TENN. CODE ANN. § 4-21-101.
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only pieces of federal legislation that the courts may use for
guidance in disability claims. The Tennessee Supreme
Court opined that the primary rule of statutory construction
is to give effect to the legislative intent.204 Although the
THRA and TDA were created before the enactment of the
ADA, the Tennessee legislature amended the statutes after
the passage of the ADA-and still did not add the ADA to
its list of model purposes.205 Although obesity is not a
"disability," it is a public health crisis.
Medical professionals have also found that
declaring a condition a "disability" sets up a "resentful
atmosphere" against the condition. 206  Legally labeling
obesity a "disability" heightens the stigma already
associated with obesity.207 The THRA's goal of
"protecting [one's] interest in personal dignity and freedom
from humiliation" is rendered meaningless if obesity is
considered a disability because it affixes a label with a
negative connotation on the individual-"disabled."
Stigmatization alone is insufficient to prove an actual
disability exists.208
IV. THE PROPOSAL AND ITS BENEFITS
The essence of this section is to offer an alternative
way of thinking about obesity from a legal standpoint. In
this section, this Note shows how the legislature can act to
create a holistic statutory scheme that combats obesity but
does so in a way that complements purposes set forth in
other legislation, such as the THRA and TDA. In doing so,
this Note proposes that the legislature has several options in
204In re Hogue, 286 S.W.3d 890 (Tenn. 2009).
205 See TENN. CODE ANN. § 4-21-101 (2012).
206 id.
207 Id.
208 See EEOC v. Gen. Elec. Co., 17 F. Supp. 2d 824 (N.D. Ind. 1998).
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combating obesity. These options can be seen as a
compromise.
A. Proposal: The Legislature Should Exclude
Obesity from Protection under the THRA
and TDA
Certainly, obesity is a growing epidemic in
Tennessee, and its victims require sympathy and action
from the legislature. Cancer, contagious diseases, war, and
terrorism are crises in which the government has responded
in full force; however, the government has done relatively
little to battle obesity, "the silent killer." 209
Rather than weakening the disability statutes by
including the large number of obese persons, the Tennessee
legislature should enact other mechanisms to help combat
obesity. In doing so, the Tennessee legislature should first
act to exclude obesity from protection under the Tennessee
Human Rights Act. On a national level, this has already
been done for several conditions such as for addiction to
controlled substances or vision impairments that are fixable
with prescription lenses.2o Likewise, the Tennessee
legislature can either exclude obesity wholly or draft a list
of protected disabilities and exclude obesity.
Building on the exclusion of obesity from disability
statutes, the Tennessee legislature should then create laws
that encourage a healthier citizenry. Using policy initiates
from other state legislatures as guidance, the Tennessee
209 McGuinness, supra note 100, at 49.
210 James E. Kellett, An Employee with a Drug Addition Who Is Not
Currently Using the Drug Is Protected by the ADA as Disabled If the
Drug Addiction Constitutes an Actual or Perceived Disability That
Motivated an Adverse Employment Action, PRAC. INSIGHTS EMP. 0159
(2013) (explaining how current substance abuse is not a disability);
Charles S. Plumb, Individuals with Correctable Vision Problems Are
Not Disabled, 6 No. 2 OKLA. EMP. L. LETTER 1 (1998).
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legislature has eight broad areas in which to create
legislation to assist the obese in a legal sense. 2 11 These
eight areas include: (1) commemorative or advisory
regulations; (2) advisory commissions and studies; (3)
insurance regulation; (4) school food programs; (5)
nutrition education; (6) physical education and physical
activity of children; (7) adult physical activity; and (8)
other policies.212 For example, one author has suggested
imposing a "sin tax" on unhealthy foods and beverages-a
tax modeled on those already placed on alcohol and
cigarettes.213 Another author suggests five legal
mechanisms that could be effective, including "full
disclosure laws" requiring increased dissemination of
nutritional value; restrictions on the advertising of certain
low-nutritional value foods; requiring warnings on
unhealthy products; providing subsidies to growers and
manufacturers of healthy foods; imposing a tax on
especially unhealthy foods; banning certain ingredients;
and enacting special foods policies to help particular sub-
groups, such as children and those living in economically
disadvantaged areas.214
Although precise statutory models for each relevant
area are outside the scope of this Note, it is important for
lawmakers to respect individual freedom of choice-a
hallmark of American society.215 However, a
counterbalancing policy arises when considering the
211 KAN. HEALTH INST., OBESITY AND PUBLIC POLICY: LEGISLATION
PASSED BY STATES, 1999 TO 2003, 5 (2004),
http://media.khi.org/resources/Other/50-04020besityLegislation.pdf.
212 id.
213 Alexander Copp, The Ethics and Efficacy .of a "Fat Tax" in the
Form of an Insurance Surcharge on Obese State Employees, 15
QUINNIPIAC HEALTH L.J. 1, 1 (2011).214 McGuinness, supra note 100, at 49.
215 Id. at 5; see KAN. HEALTH INST., supra note 211 (discussing other
states' initiatives and responses to the obesity epidemic).
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expense that employers and insurance companies incur
regarding obesity.
B. Benefits of this Proposal
After the Tennessee General Assembly enacts this
proposal, the state will reap several major benefits from its
enactment. First, Tennessee litigants will be able to avoid
relying on a conflicting body of law that often occurs when
the court of appeals releases incompatible opinions.
Second, the obesity epidemic will be more effectively
combated in the state because the legislature is taking a
proactive role to do so. Finally, the proposal gives the
state's employers freedom in their businesses.
i. Prevents the Tennessee Court System from
Being Muddled with Varying Decisions
Regarding Whether Obesity is a Disability
The Tennessee Court of Appeals is divided among
three sections: the Western Section, the Middle Section,
and the Eastern Section.216 Tennessee Code Annotated
section 16-4-101 states that "[t]here shall be an appellate
court of twelve (12) judges, styled 'the court of appeals."'
Although the court of appeals is regarded as one court, the
ruling of one section of the court of appeals is merely
persuasive, not binding, authority for the other two
sections. 2 17 Thus, while a decision rendered by one section
of the court is considered a decision of the court of appeals
216 Court of Appeals Judges, TENN. ST. CTS.,
http://www.tncourts.gov/courts/court-appeals/judges (last visited Nov.
26, 2013).
217 Court of Appeals Precedent, Tenn. Op. Att'y Gen. 07-98 (July 3,
2007).
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as a whole, the precedential value of the decision is binding
218only upon the section it was made in.
The different sections of the Tennessee Court of
Appeals have often rendered contradictory decisions,
leaving litigants unable to decipher what the law in the state
is.219 By excluding obesity from THRA coverage, the
legislature can circumvent needless and conflicting case
law in the court of appeals. In the absence of any direction
by the Tennessee legislature or the Tennessee Supreme
Court, any split of opinion between the courts of appeal in
Tennessee "results in a lack of clear authority to assist the
trial courts, with the ostensibly finality of Courts of
Appeals decisions undermined and confused by
contradictory appellate holdings." 220  In 1998, the
Tennessee Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court in only
59% of the cases for which it wrote opinions.221 This left
41% of appealed cases for the Tennessee Court of Appeals'
218 id.
219 E.g., compare Hermosa Holdings, Inc. v. Mid-Tenn. Bone & Joint
Clinic, PC, No. M2008-00597-COA-R3-CV, 2009 WL 711125 (Tenn.
Ct. App. Mar. 16, 2009) (finding that Tennessee jurisprudence required
the plausibility standard in court pleadings), with Ind. State Dist.
Council of Laborers v. Brukardt, No. M2007-02271-COA-R3-CV,
2009 WL 426237 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 19, 2009) (finding that
Tennessee jurisprudence did not require the plausibility standard in
court pleadings). Two years after Hermosa and Brukardt, the
Tennessee Supreme Court held that Tennessee would not adopt the
plausibility standard for court pleadings. Webb v. Nashville Area
Habitat for Humanity, Inc., 346 S.W.3d 422, 424 (Tenn. 2011) (en
banc).
220 Meehan Rasch, California's Dueling Harmless Error Standards:
Approaches to Federal Constitutional Error in Civil Proceedings and
Establishing the Proper Test for Dependency, 35 W. ST. U. L. REV.
433, 435 n.7 (2008).
221 Daniel J. Foley, The Tennessee Court of Appeals: How Often It
Corrects the Trial Courts-And Why, 68 TENN. L. REV. 557, 562
(2001).
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sections to come up with varying holdings for.222 Because
it is not uncommon for the life of one case to span months
or years, it is important that the Tennessee legislature act
soon, before plaintiffs bringing weight discrimination suits
under the THRA are left to an unpredictable precedent in
the court system.
ii. Combats the Obesity Epidemic in Tennessee
Many Tennesseans struggle with obesity, and the
Tennessee legislature can address this concern outside of
disability statutes. In Tennessee, 67.2% of the adult
population is overweight, and 30.8% of the population is
obese. 223 Among Tennessee's adolescents in gades 9-12,
15.8% are obese and 16.1% are overweight. 22 The CDC
estimates that the national obesity rate sits at around
22517%. The number of obese residents in Shelby County,
Tennessee, where the city of Memphis is located, nearly
doubles the national average at more than 30%.226
The Tennessee State Nutrition, Physical Activity,
and Obesity Profile provided by the CDC indicates that
222 Id.
223 CDC, TENNESSEE STATE NUTRITION, PHYSICAL ACTIVITY, AND
OBESITY PROFILE 2 (2012),
http://www.cdc.gov/obesity/stateprograms/fundedstates/pdf/Tennessee-
State-Profile.pdf [hereinafter TENNESSEE STATE NUTRITION].
224 Div. OF ADOLESCENT & SCH. HEALTH, CDC, THE 2009 YOUTH RISK
BEHAVIOR SURVEY, http://www.cdc.gov/HealthyYouth/yrbs/index.htm.
The number of obese and overweight Tennessee youth is provided
because it evidences the importance of the necessity to begin
combating obesity at a young age. See id. Children who are obese
have an 80% chance of becoming obese adults. Id.
225 Adult Obesity Facts, supra note 2.
226 Ed Arnold, Nation's Growing Girth Costs Business, Government,
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Tennesseans' dietary and exercise habits leave much to be
desired.227 To illustrate, less than one-third of Tennessee
adults achieved at least 300 minutes of physical activity per
228week. Even more alarming is that 31% of Tennessee
adults reported that in the last month, they had not
participated in any physical activity.229 In addition to the
scarce number of Tennesseans participating in physical
activity, only about one in every four adults reported
consuming the recommended level of fruits per day. 30n
like manner, only one-third of adults reported consuming
the recommended level of vegetables per day.2 3 1
Because overweight and obese children are more
likely to become obese in adulthood,232  statistics
concerning their age groups are increasingly important in
establishing legislation and preventative measures to
combat obesity. Currently 16.1% of Tennessee adolescents
227 See TENNESSEE STATE NUTRITION, supra note 223, at 2.
228 Id.
229 Id. In comparison, Colorado obtained the lowest obesity percentage
out of all the states: 7.1%. CDC, COLORADO STATE NUTRITION,
PHYSICAL ACTIVITY, AND OBESITY PROFILE (2012),
http://www.cdc.gov/obesity/stateprograms/fundedstates/pdf/Colorado-
State-Profile.pdf. (Accordingly, over one-half of adults achieved at
least 300 minutes of physical activity per week. Further, only 17% of
Colorado adults reported no physical activity for the last month.)
230 TENNESSEE STATE NUTRITION, supra note 223, at 2.
231 Id.
232 Kuss, supra note 84, at 572-73. See generally Laura Blue, Do Obese
Kids Become Obese Adults?, TIME (Apr. 28, 2008),
http://www.time.com/time/health/article/0,8599,1735638,00.html.
Although it depends slightly on the definitions of "overweight" and
"obese" used and the age of the child, overweight and obese children
are more likely to be obese-and sick-as adults. Id. Although an
overweight infant has a lesser risk than an overweight adolescent, Dr.
David Freeman from the CDC stated that "even down to the youngest
ages that I've worked with, age five, overweight five-year-olds maybe
have a tenfold risk of becoming obese adults compared to relatively
thin five-year-olds." Id.
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are overweight,233 and 15.8% are obese.234 The unhealthy
dietary behaviors contributing to adolescent obesity are
alarming. Around 88% reported that they had not eaten
vegetables at least three times a day in the week before the
235survey. In addition, 41.3% drank at least one soda or
pop in each of the seven days before being surveyed. 236 Of
equal importance, only 24.2% reported being physically
active for at least an hour per day the seven days before
being surveyed. 2 3 7  Well over one-third of adolescents
reported watching three or more hours of television per day
on an average school day.238
Perhaps the most logical place to begin combating
obesity is where it can have the biggest effect on its often-
young victims-in schools. Fortunately, well over half of
Tennessee high schools did not sell less nutritious foods
and beverages anywhere outside the school food service
program.239 However, only 22.9% of adolescents in
Tennessee report attending daily physical education classes
in an average week.240 The 2010 Tennessee School Health
Profiles assessed the school environment, indicating that
among high schools only 9.9% always offered fruits or
non-fried vegetables on school grounds.24 1
233 TENNESSEE STATE NUTRITION, supra note 223, at 3. "Overweight"
is considered to be between the eighty-fifth and ninety-fifth percentiles
for BMI by age and sex.
234 Id. "Obese" means in or above the ninety-fifth percentile for BMI
by age and sex.235 Id. at 2.236 Id.




241 Div. OF ADOLESCENT & SCH. HEALTH, CDC, PROFILES 2010-
CHRONIC DISEASE PREVENTION, TENNESSEE SECONDARY SCHOOLS 1
(2010),
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The lack of effective preventative measures
contributes to the alarming number of obese adults and
children today. Superficially, it appears that an obese
person chooses to either disregard healthy food choices or
exercise. But in low-income areas, especially in Memphis,
Tennessee's most populous city, that might not be true.
One argument proving an obese person's lack of control of
his condition is that many Americans live in communities
with limited access to supermarkets and grocery stores that
sell healthy foods. 242 These "food deserts," which tend to
sell cheaper, processed goods, play a significant role in
poor dietary decisions.243 A 2010 Gallup Poll ranked
Memphis first for hunger in the country with 26% of
Memphians reporting they could not afford enough food for
their families. 4 Another survey done by the Mid-South
Food Bank found that 83% of those it served had to choose
between buying food and paying utilities.24 5
Other legislatures have also taken matters into their
own hands by regulating government nutrition programs,
such as the food stamp program. In 2010, New York City
and State asked the USDA to prohibit recipients of food
stamps from buying food with no nutritional value.246
http://www.cdc.gov/healthyyouth/profiles/pdf/facts/tn-chronicprofiles
.pdf.
242 WHITE HouSE TASK FORCE ON CHILDHOOD OBESITY, WHITE HOUSE
TASK FORCE ON CHILDHOOD OBESITY REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT,
SOLVING THE PROBLEM OF CHILDHOOD OBESITY WITHIN A
GENERATION (2010).
243 Id.




246 Anemona Hartocollis, New York Asks to Bar Use of Food Stamps to




Fall 2013 | Volume 9 | Issue 2
Tennessee Journal of Law and Policy 321
While some argue that this type of legislation unfairly
targets the poor,2 47 the food stamp Vrogram is a nutritional
program, not a food program. Providing a solid
nutritional diet to these vulnerable groups would combat
their higher levels of obesity. 249 While strict prohibitions
on junk food might not be the answer, even in this
circumstance, government is attempting to make strides
toward more education for those on these types of
assistance programs.250
Preventative measures geared toward children seem
to be more effective25 1 in combating a growing obesity rate
but are still ineffective as they stand today. Students who
have disabilities or other chronic health problems are often
discouraged from participating in their physical education
classes and other physical activities taking place in public
252schools. For example, 59% of schools with disabled
students permit these students to be exempt from enrolling
247 Id.
248 See id.
249 ROBERT WOOD JOHNSON FOUND., ISSUE REPORT: F AS IN FAT: How
OBESITY THREATENS AMERICA'S FUTURE (2011).
250 "Food vouchers and stamps are not accepted by some merchants
who sell fresh fruits and vegetables," reports the Commercial Appeal,
Memphis's main newspaper. Health Memphis: 'Food Deserts' Tied to
Obesity, Unhealthy Community, COM. APPEAL (May 14, 2012),
http://www.commercialappeal.com/news/2012/may/14/food-deserts-
tied-to-obesity-unhealthy-community/.






252 S.M. Lee et al., CDC, Physical Education and Physical Activity:
Results from the School Health Policies and Programs Study 2006, 77
J. SCH. HEALTH 435, 435-463 (2007),
http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/17908102.
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in physical education.253 This does little for the stigma of
obesity 254 and even less for the well-being of these
children.
Tennessee's attempt to battle obesity has led to the
implementation of several programs geared toward
encouraging citizens to become more active and more
educated on nutrition. Obesity Mini-Grants, given by the
Tennessee Department of Health in cooperation with the
Tennessee Obesity Task Force, help to support local
communities to implement the objectives of the state
nutrition, physical activity, and obesity plan-the "Eat
Well, Play More Tennessee" plan. 255  Acting as a
"statewide call to action," the plan gathers assistance from
"scientists, clinicians, city planners, school officials, state
agencies, policymakers, transportation experts,
nutritionists, and parents" to better address more
susceptible populations in the state.256
Various entities in Tennessee have also taken the
initiative to combat the obesity epidemic in Tennessee. In
2010, then-Governor Phil Bredesen signed Executive Order
No. 69,257 endorsing healthier foods and beverages to be
sold at vending facilities on properties within Tennessee's
executive branch.258 Another program, the Gold Sneaker
Initiative, designates child care centers as "Gold Sneaker"
253 Id. at 442.
254 Sharon McDonald of the National Association to Advance Fat
Acceptance stated that the obese would rather not be classified as
disabled. O'Hara, supra note 10, at 896 (citing Telephone Interview
with Sharon McDonald, Program Dir., Nat'1 Ass'n to Advance Fat
Acceptance (Mar. 2, 1995)).
255 TENNESSEE STATE NUTRITION, supra note 223, at 3.
256 Id.
257 Tenn. Exec. Order No. 69 (Aug. 6, 2010),
https://news.tn.gov/system/files/Executive%200rder%20%252369.pdf.
258 Press Release, Bredesen Signs Executive Order Promoting Healthy
Options for State Vending Machines (Aug. 6, 2010),
http://news.tn.gov/node/5694.
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facilities upon the facilities successfully implementing
nutritional and physical activity-related objectives. 259 The
YMCA of Middle Tennessee has also joined the fight
against obesity, hosting Nashville on the Move, a free
lunchtime walking event, on the first Friday of every
26month.260 Utilizing Tennessee's landscape, the state's
"Connect with Tennessee" campaign encourages
individuals and families to utilize the abundance of trails
and greenways throughout the state, including by activities
such as walking, running, biking, hiking, and horseback
261riding.
iii. Reduces Burdens on Employers
Employers are beginning to consider obesity as a
disability and a potential threat to business. Absenteeism,
lowered productivity, and higher health care costs are
several items that employers struggle with due to
heightened numbers of obese workers. Health care costs
to individuals and employers are at risk of increase with the
259 TENNESSEE STATE NUTRITION, supra note 223, at 4. Currently, 240
child care centers in the state have received the designation. Id.
260 NASHVILLE ON THE MOVE, http://www.nashvillemoves.org/ (last
visited Dec. 19, 2012).
261 CONNECT WITH TENNESSEE, www.connectwithtn.com (last visited
Dec. 19, 2012). Interestingly, one author has noted that the "suburban
sprawl" contributes to obesity because it encourages suburbanites to
drive into the city often. Paul Boudreaux, The Impact Xat: A New
Approach to Charging for Growth, 43 U. MEM. L. REV. 35, 80 (2012).
In the same vein, Connect with Tennessee recognizes this problem and
attempts to provide people outside bigger Tennessee cities with
opportunities for physical activity.
262 Id. "It impacts cost, it impacts productivity, it impacts absenteeism
and disability," says Russell Robbins, principal and senior consultant
for Mercer Consulting, a global HR adviser. Id. Robbins also suggests
that "[d]epending on the job type, obesity could definitely impact
worker's comp claims." Id.
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rising rates of obesity. Obesity has contributed to health
care spending that has tripled in the last twelve years,
rocketing past inflation rates.263 One human resources
adviser suggests that obesity attributes for approximately
20%-25% of health care costs either directly or
indirectly.264 The CDC estimated that the direct cost of
treatin obesity and its related illnesses was $147 billion in
2011.2  Moreover, obesity forces businesses to bear
another $75 million in costs from absenteeism and lost
266productivity. To put this in perspective with other
governmental expenditures, the total spent on obesity adds
up to more than the budgets of the federal government's
Departments of Transportation, Education, and Homeland
267Security combined.2
Because of the mutable and voluntary nature of
obesity, protecting the obese under Tennessee law puts
unfair burdens on employers based on lessened
productivity and increased cost.2 68 Some studies indicate
that obesity costs American businesses around $12.7 billion
annually.269 Health care costs businesses 36% more for
obese workers than normal weight workers, and







269 Robert J. Grossman, Countering a Weight Crisis: America's
Growing Weight Problem Raises Serious HR Issues Relating to Health
Care Costs, Wellness, Recruiting, and Employee Relations, HR MAG.,
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alarming is the indirect costs to businesses, such as
271decreased productivity or absenteeism at work.
Employers' reluctance to invest in curbing this
epidemic thwarts the purposes of the THRA even further.
In Tennessee, particularly among state employees, the top
two health risks in 2003 and 2004 were a high BMI and a
low level of physical activity.272 These statistics evidence
the need for legislative action. However, while some
employers seek to improve their employees' health through
increasing health and wellness programs, many employers
are "reluctant to commit to these programs for fear that
they will fail to recoup their investment from short-term
employees."273 A study done at Vanderbilt University
found that employers remained hesitant to provide health
and wellness programming to employees based on a lack of
awareness, lack of awareness of intervention options, an
assumption that the issue is one of personal choice, and a
reluctance to invest in programs without clear evidence that
the programs provide a worthwhile return. 274
V. CLOSING REMARKS
Currently, the muddled jurisprudence stemming
from whether obesity is a disability does little for public
health, employers, and hope for a healthier future. Though
there are substantial policy concerns in battling
discrimination based on appearance, using disability law to
do so is inappropriate in this context. Disability statutes
need to remain limited in scope and to serve those who are
271 Id.
272 OFFICE OF RESEARCH & EDUC. ACCOUNTABILITY, WEIGHING THE
CosTs OF OBESITY IN TENNESSEE ii (2006),
http://hit.state.tn.us/Reports/FinalObesity-Report.pdf.
273 Id. at 13.
274 Id.
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truly disabled and those who have no control over the harsh
treatment they receive every day at their jobs and in their
communities.
The Tennessee General Assembly retains the power
to use other avenues, such as legislation geared toward
preventative programs and helping those in "food deserts,"
before the courts should take action in this context. While
obesity does not qualify under the THRA and TDA as a
disability, Tennessee needs to take greater legal initiatives
to prevent obesity at a young age, starting in the school
system and educational programs. With respect to the
THRA and the TDA, the Tennessee legislature needs to set
forth clearer guidelines so that courts are not left to blindly
follow the interpretations of the federal disability statutes.
Rather than hastily deeming obesity a disability, the
legislature needs to enact various laws to further the
policies of the disability statutes first, such as requiring an
increase in nutritional information provided to consumers
or imposing a tax on foods especially low in nutrition. 275In
doing so, Tennessee can promote the health and welfare of
its citizens while following the original purpose of the
THRA and TDA-to protect the truly disabled.
275 McGuinness, supra note 100, at 48-49.
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